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ABSTRACT
THE THEORY OF AL-MASALIH AL-MURSALAH IN ISLAMIC LAW.
This thesis seeks to analyse the concept of al-maslahah
al-mursalah (unrestricted utility) as it has been developed by
Muslim jurists. Chapter one discusses the legal background in
which the concept developed and the area of Islamic law in
which it might be deemed appropriate. It also provides the
linguistic and legal definitions of the term. In chapter two,
the primitive uses of the principle as used by early Muslim
scholars are analysed. Although there is as yet no systematic
theory, applications of al-maslahah al-mursalah can be clearly
seen to be emerging. Chapter three outlines the systematic
development of the theory in which the jurists categorise the
kind of benefits appropriate to this legal principle. In
chapter four, this systematisation is studied in terms of the
contribution of individual thinkers including al-Ghazali and
al-RazI but also several other important thinkers who made
their own contributions to the theory of al-masalih
al-mursalah are with.
Chapter five is devoted to the work of al-Shatibl whose
contribution to the theory is probably the most significant
and lasting. Chapter six contains an analysis and critique of
the work of al-Tufl, who made this principle the paramount
principle in Islamic law. The theory put forward by al-Tufx
led to the developments and redetions in the Modern Islamic
World and the principle came to be discussed by modern
scholars. These aspects are reviewed in chapter seven.
Chapter eight draws the distinction between the Islamic
understanding of "public interest" or "utility" and Western
theories on the subject.
Finally, the conclusion draws together the aspects of the
study and establishes the role of al-maslahah al-mursalah in
Islamic law as it has been developed over the years.
UST OF ABBREVIATIONS
El. 1 = Encyclopaedia of Islam 1st Edition.
El. 2 = Encyclopaedia of Islam 2nd Edition.
ed. = edited by / edition.
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There is a common misconception about Islamic Law
that there is no room in it for any progress or
advancement. It is not that only non-Muslims are a prey
to this misunderstanding, but even many Muslims have been
influenced by this idea who are unacquainted with
character and spirit of Islamic law. What mainly is
responsible for this attitude is the concept that
generally exists in the mind of the common man with
regard to Islamic Law and man-made law. About man-made
law every one knows that its composition and compilation
cWeprimarily influenced by the needs and exigencies of
society. Therefore, changes in the law kept pace with the
changes in social conditions. Likewise, in future, too,
it will probably undergo changes at the same speed as
that of social environment.
On the other hand, Islamic Law is not at all bound
by any changes that might occur in society. Its
foundations rest on Divine revelation, on the wisdom of
the Prophet and on its understanding of the eternal
values of logic and human nature. The nature of Islamic
law is such that human desires and day-to-day events
should not influence its composition in the least, for it
has been sent down to human beings by their Creator. His
Messenger then elucidated and elaborated it to mankind.
And no one except God the Almighty and His Prophet has
any power to alter His law in the slightest degree. Thus,
as far as this conception of Islamic law is concerned
there can be no doubt that Islamic Law is not susceptible
to changes in society. On the contrary, society is
regarded as subordinate to Islamic Law. However, in spite
of this fact, it is not at all correct to assume that
Islamic Law is a static thing and lacks elasticity, and
that it does not possess the potential to accommodate
itself to the growing needs of society.
Since there is a great divergence of opinion among
the Muslim as well as the non-Muslim scholars on this
subject, one section believing Islamic Law to be truly
rigid, while another section, overzealous to prove it
progressive, tends to render it more unenduring and
capricious than even the man-made law. It is, therefore,
all the more necessary that while scholars remain aware
of its strength and stability, there should be a thorough
examination of its potential for change and adjustment to
the advancing forces, so that its true character be
properly understood.
The relationship between legal theory and social
change is one of the basic problems of the philosophy of
law. "Law" which, having its associations with physical
laws, is assumed to be unchanging, always faces the
challenge of social changes which demand adaptability
from it. Most often the impact of social change is so
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profound that it affects legal concepts as well as
institutions and thus creates a need for a fresh
philosophy of law. The problem of social change and legal
theory is of particular significance in Islamic legal
philosophy. Islamic Law is generally defined as
religious, sacred and hence immutable. How does such a
law face the challenge of change?
The above question has brought to the fore the
problem of the adaptability of Islamic Law which has been
so widely discussed, yet remains debatable. The problem
has been generally formulated in the form of the
following question: Is Islamic Law immutable or is it
adaptable to the extent that the change and modernization
sought can be pursued under its aegis?
Broadly speaking, there have been two points of view
in answer to this question. One view, which is shared by
a large number of Islamicists such as C.S. Hurgrpnje and
J. Schacht, and by the most of the traditionalist Muslim
jurists, maintains that in its concept, and according to
the nature of its development and methodology, Islamic
Law is immutable and hence not adaptable to social
changes. A second view, which is upheld by a few experts
on Islamic Law such as Linant de Bellefonds and by the
majority of Muslim reformists and jurists such as Subhl
Mahmasani, contends that such legal principles as the
consideration of maslahah (roughly translated, benefit,
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or utility), the flexibility of Islamic Law in practice
and the emphasis on ijtihad (independent legal reasoning)
sufficiently demonstrate that Islamic Law is adaptable to
social change.
This research is a contribution towards the solution
of the paradox of the dilemma of Islamic Law, namely:
that of being immutable and yet adaptable to social
changes. The theory of al-masalih al-mursalah is a
solution to this paradox. The nature of the essence and
spirit of Islamic Law is explained in chapter one to shed
light on the question of its sublimity and immutability
in the establishment of facts and truths. The Islamic
legal background to the theory of al-masalih al-mursalah
is discussed here in order to show that the principles of
Islamic law have equally remained the same since the dawn
of the first Islamic society right through the ages up to
our days without being affected by the changes in the
society. The position of the early Muslim scholars as
regards the application of the theory of al-masalih
al-mursalah is discussed in chapter two to indicate that
although the theory in question was not elaborated by
then, it was extensively applied by the scholars to show
how important a device of Islamic law it is.
As the Islamic legal theory developed so differing
attitudes and understanding of the concept of maslahah
appear in the work of different scholars, this is dealt
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with in chapter three. The concept of maslahah as a
general as well as a technical term is discussed in
chapter four.
Chapter five is about al-Shatibi's treatment of the
concept of maslahah defining the goals and the objectives
of the Sharicah (maqasid al-SharIcah) which have to do
with the consideration of the benefits of people. This
means that the laws and rules of the Sharicah are for the
attainment of the people's benefits at the same time as
preserving them from injuries. No law therefore is to be
enacted in the Sharlcah without the consideration of the
maslahah of the people. Chapter six discusses Najm al-Dln
al-Tufi's concept of maslahah highlighting his peculiar
opinion on the concept in question and giving a critique
of most of his ideas concerning the concept.
The modern works and definitions of the concept of
maslahah have been discussed at length in chapter seven,
and chapter eight is a comparison between the theory of
al-masalih al-mursalah and the Western theories of public
interest.
It is hoped that after this study, the role of
al-masalih al-mursalah in Islamic law and its scope for
providing the immutable laws of Islam with the
possibilities of meeting the challenges of changing
social needs, will be more clearly understood.
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Chapter 1
THE ISLAMIC LEGAL_ BACKGROUND TO THE THEORY OF
AL-MASALIH AL-MURSALAH
• •
1.1 A. THE SHARICAH
It is necessary to remember that there are two
different conceptions of law. Law may be considered to
be of divine origin as is the case with Islamic law, or
it may be conceived as man-made. The latter conception is
the guiding principle of all modern legislation; it is,
as Count Leon Ostrorog has pointed out, the Greek, Roman,
Celtic or Germanic notion of law.1 We may be compelled to
act in accordance with certain principles because God
desires us to do so, or, alternatively, because the king
or the assembly of wise men or the leaders of the
community or social custom demand it of us for the good
of the people in general.
Now, what is the Islamic notion of law? Man in his
weakness cannot understand what Good and Evil are unless
he is guided in the matter by an inspired Prophet. Good
and Evil, technically as the Muslim scholars have it,
husn (beauty) and qubh (ugliness), are to be taken in the
ethical acceptation of the terms. What is morally
beautifu] must be done; and what is morally ugly must
not be done. That is law and nothing else can be law. But
1
C.L. Ostrorog, The Angora reform, p. 15
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what is absolutely and indubitably beautiful, what is
absolutely and indubitably ugly? These are the important
legal questions; and who can answer them? Certainly not
man, say the Muslim legists. There is Qur'an which is the
very word of God as believed by the Muslims.
Supplementary to it there is Sunnah, which is the model
life of the Prophet - the records of his actions and his
sayings - from which a help and inspiration are derived
in arriving at legal decisions. If there is nothing in
either the Qur'an or the Sunnah to answer a particular
question, then the dictates of reason in accordance with
certain definite principles have to be followed.
These principles give assistance to the
comprehension of sacred law or sharlcah as the Muslim
jurists understand it. And it is these fundamental
juristic notions which we must try to study and analyse
in consonance with the theory of al-masalih
al-mursalah.
Modern jurists emphasize the importance of law for
understanding the character and ethos of a people.
"Law" says a modern jurist, "streams from the
soul of a people like national poetry, it is as
holy as the national religion, it grows and
spreads like language; religious, ethical, and
poetical elements all contribute to its vital
force";2
2
C.K. Allen, Law in the making, p. 54; 5th ed., p. 90
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it is,
"the distilled essence of the civilization of a
people";3
"it reflects the people's soul more than any
other organism".4
This is true of Islam more than of any other faith. The
Sharlcah is the central core of Islam; no understanding
of its civilization, its social history or its political
system is possible without a knowledge and appreciation
of its legal system.5
Sharlcah (lit., the road to the watering place, the
path to be followed) as a technical term, signifies the
Canon law of Islam, the totality of God's commandments.
Each one of such commandments is called hukm (pi. ahkam).
The law of God and its inner meaninggye not easy to
grasp; and Sharlcah embraces all human actions. For this
reason it is not "law" in the modern sense; it contains
an infallible guide to ethics. It is fundamentally a
DOCTRINE OF DUTIES;6 a code of obligations. Legal
considerations and individual rights have a secondary
place in it. Above all, the tendency towards a religious
evaluation of all the affairs of life is supreme.
3
A.S. Diamond, Evolution of Law and Order, p. 303
4 D.H. Parry, Haldane memorial lecture, p. 3
C
J.Schacht, Esquisse, p. 9; and S.G.V. Fitzgerald, Nature and
sources of the Shariah in Law in the Middle East, vol. 1, p. 28
® This was pointed out by Snouck Hurgronje, who according to
Goldziher, is the founder of historical criticism of fiqh. See the
EI. 1, vol. 2, p. 105; and Fitzgerald, op. cit., vol.1, p. 31
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In the Sharlcah, the Muslim scholars have classified
religious injunctions into five kinds, al-ahkam
al-khamsah7 Those strictly enjoined are fard, and those
strictly forbidden are haram. Between them we have two
middle categories, namely, things which you are advised
to do mandub, and things which you are advised to refrain
from makruh, and finally there are things about which
religion is indifferent ja'iz.8
The daily prayers, five in number, are fard; wine is
haram; the additional prayers like those on the cid,
(festival) are mandub; certain kinds of fish, such as
crabs, are makruh, and there are thousands of ja'iz
things, such as travelling by air etc. Thus the Sharicah
is universal; all human activity is embraced in its
sovereign domain. This fivefold division must be
carefully noted; for, unless this is done, it is
impossible to understand the distinction between that
which is only morally enjoined and that which is legally
enforced. Obviously, moral obligation is quite a
different thing from legal necessity, and if in law these
distinctions are not kept in mind, error and confusion
are the inevitable result. Thus, the study of the theory
of al-masalih al-mursalah helps to comprehend those
•7
Kemal A. Faruki, Al-ahkam al-khamsah: The five values; Islamic
Research Institute, pp. 43-8
8 EI. 1, s.v. Shariah, vol. 4, p. 322
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distinctions and make demarcations between moral
obligations and legal necessities.
1.2 B. FIQH: THE CLASSICAL THEORY
Fiqh is the name given to the whole science of
jurisprudence because it implies the exercise of
intelligence in deciding a point of law in the absence of
a binding nass (textual command) from the Qur'an or
Sunnah. Fiqh literally means "intelligence", and faqih is
a jurist, a person skilled in the law. There is thus a
difference between cilm (knowledge), and fiqh, which
requires both intelligence and independent judgment. A
man may be learned, calim (pi. culama'), but to be a
faqih (pi. fuqaha'), he must possess the quality of
independent judgment, the capacity to discern between the
"correct" and binding rule of law, and the "weak" or
unsupported opinion of a classical author. The terms fiqh
and fuqaha' may also have been suggested by the Latin
terms (juris) prudentia and (juris) prudentes; for a
study of fiqh reveals that some traces of similar cases
are to be found also in Roman, Jewish and Persian laws.9
9
Wensinck, Muslim creed, p. 110 - has a valuable discussion on the
term fiqh in hadlth literature. But the idea of the incorporation of
Roman, Jewish and Persian laws in the Islamic law as SuggesllCel by
Goldziher in his article on Fiqh - EI.l, vol. 2, p. 102 - seems
misleading
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1.3 THE DEFINITION OF FIQH
We have now to see how the Muslim lawyers have
defined the term fiqh. Abu Hanlfa's definition stresses
the moral aspect:
"fiqh is the soul's cognizance of its rights and
obligations".10
The Turkish Mejelle (Art. 1) defines it as:
"the knowledge of practical legal questions".11
Most Islamic authorities, however, define it in terms of
its four basic constituents,12 and we may therefore say
that:
"Fiqh or the science of Islamic law is the
knowledge of one's rights and obligations derived
from the Qur'an, or the Sunnah of the Prophet, or
the consensus of opinion among the learned
(ijmac), or analogical deduction "(qiyas)".13
This is the classical view and is said to be founded
on the oft-quoted tradition of Mucadh. The Prophet is
reported to have sent Mucadh, one of his companions, as a
governor of a province and also appointed him as a
distributor of justice. No trained lawyers existed then
and the Prophet asked:
"According to what shalt thou judge? He replied:
"According to the scriptures of God". "And if
thou findest nought therein? "According to the
112 Taftazani, Talwih, vol. 1, p. 10
11 S.MahmasanI, Philosophy of Jurisprudence in Islam, p. 8
12 J.Schacht, Esquisse, p.53; cAbd al-Rahim, Muhammadan
Jurisprudence, p. 48
12 al-Shafici, Al-risalah, tr. by M. KhaddurI, p. 78
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Tradition of the Messenger of God" "And if thou
findest nought therein?" "Then I shall strive to
interpret with my reason". And thereupon the
Prophet said: "Praise be to God who has favoured
the messenger of his Messenger with what His
Messenger is willing to approve".14
Possibly of late origin, this is an important
tradition to explain the Islamic understanding of the
methods of arriving at law as it emphasizes the principle
that the exercise of independent judgement, within
certain limits, is not only permissible but praiseworthy.
The Qur'an has to be interpreted, the actions and sayings
of the Prophet duly considered, and judgment exercised in
accordance with legal theory in case the Qur'an and
Sunnah are silent on the question. A noteworthy feature
of the Sunnah is that the Qur'an is given pre-eminence
and next comes the practice of the Prophet. Although
consensus is not mentioned specifically, it prepares the
way for it, for ijmac emphasizes the importance the Arabs
gave to the "prevalent usage" of the community.
1.4 THE FOUR MAJOR SOURCES OF ISLAMIC LAW
The Qur'an, according to this theory, is the first
source of Islamic law. Its importance is religious and
spiritual, no less than legal, as it is, in Muslim
belief, the Word of God. When a verse of the Qur'an is
14
Ostrorog, op. cit., p. 21; Wensinck, op.cit., p. 156; Khadduri,
Law of war and peace in Islam, p. 28; cAbdu al-Rahlm, Muhammadan
jurisprudence, pp. 140-1
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cited, the Muslim authors say: "God says, Mighty and
Glorious is He" or "Says God, the Blessed and Exalted".
It is for this reason that the verses of the Qur'an
(ayat), although only a few of them deal specifically
with legal questions, are held to be of paramount
authority. In interpreting the Qur'anic verses, one
important principle has to be observed. Some verses are
deemed to be the abrogating (nasikh) verses and some to
be the abrogated (mansukh) ones. Generally speaking, the
earlier verses are deemed to be repealed by the later
ones. The textbooks on Islamic law give a good deal of
attention to problems of interpretation and discuss
exhaustively the question of how the rule of law is to be
deduced when several Qur'anic verses deal with the same
or a similar problem, or when one verse affects another,
directly or indirectly.15
The second source of Islamic law is the Sunnah, the
practice of the Prophet. The word sunnah was used in
pre-Islamic times for an ancient and continuous usage,
well established in the community (sunnat al-ummah);
later, the term was applied to the practice of the
Prophet (sunnat al-nabi). The word sunnah must be
distinguished from the term hadith, for a careless use of
the two terms leads sometimes to confusion of thought. A
15 Mahmasani, op.cit., p.66; cAbd al-Rahim, op. cit., p.77
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hadith is the report of a particular occurrence; sunnah,
the rule of law deduced from it is the "practice" of the
Prophet, his "model behaviour". The two sources, Qur'an
and Sunnah, are often called nass (textual ordinance),
and represent direct and indirect revelation
respectively.16 According to Wensinck, hadith is the
mirror of Muslim society.17
The third source of Islamic law is ijmac, consensus
of opinion among the learned of the community. Although
the modern critics consider it to be the most important
element in Islamic law, and an examination of the corpus
of the fiqh reveals that a major portion of the law
consists of the concurrent opinions of scholars on legal
questions, the Muslim legists give it the third place in
descending order. Snouck Hurgronje considers it to be
"the foundation of foundations" and the movable
element in the law.18
A tradition of the Prophet tersely summarizes the
principle:
16
J. Schacht, Esquisse, p. 16 and p. 58; U.P.Azamgadh, Distinction
between Hadith and Sunnah, p. 91; al-Shafici said that Sunnah
explains the Qur'an, Al-risalah [tr. by Khaddurl ], p. 72. See also
S.M.Yusuf, The Sunnah; Its transmission, Development and Revision, pp.
271-82; and Hadith by J.Robson, EI. 2, vol. 3, pp. 23-8
17 Wensinck, Muslim Creed, p. 1; and generally see EI.l, vol. 4, p.
555
18 S.Hurgronje, Selected Works, p.289
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"My community will never agree on an error"19
and several Qur'anic texts are adduced in its support.20
But ijmac as it stands in Islamic law, representing as it
does the majority view among the Muslim scholars, was
allied to the pre-Islamic sunnah, the prevalent usage,
and thus it should not be taken as an original source of
the Sharlcah like the Qur'an and Sunnah but as an aid to
understand and supplement these twin origins of the
Sharlcah.21
The fourth and last source of Islamic law is qiyas,
analogical deduction. It is derived from Hebrew term
(hiqqish), from an Aramaic root, meaning "to beat
together".22 In Arabic usage the word means "measurement"
and therefore "analogy". The term ra'y and qiyas are
often used by lawyers and it is well to know their exact
significance. According to Schacht,
"Individual reasoning in general is called ra'y
(opinion). When it is directed towards achieving
systematic consistency and guided by the parallel
of an existing institution or decision is called
qiyas. When it reflects the personal choice of
the lawyer, guided by the idea of
appropriateness, it is called istihsan or
19 —
Wensinck, op. cit., p. 113; According to al-Shafi i, giyas and
ijtihad run parallel and have equal value, M.H. Kerr, Islamic Reform,
p. 76; cAbdu al-Rahim, op. cit., p. 115
? 0 — —
Mahmasani, op. cit., p. 76
21 For ijmac generally, see Schacht, op. cit., p. 82; and
D.B. Macdonald, EI. 1, vol. 2, p. 448
22 Schacht, op. cit., p. 99
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istislah (preference)".23
The exercise of opinion, the drawing of conclusions,
and the use of discretion were used in the law of Islam
from the earliest days, and in Sunnite law, the method of
deduction forms the fourth and last source of law. This
is the type of source in which a jurist may consult the
theory of al-masalih al-mursalah to draw his conclusions
and formulate his opinions. There are other sources of
law as well, often in the nature of judicial discretion
exercised by English judges on matters of public policy,
such as istislah , istidlal, istishab and istihsan,
which will be discussed later on. They mainly reflect the
difference of opinion among jurists in matters where
discretion can be exercised and lead to refinements and
distinctions which have become questions of controversy
among the adherents of various schools. Qiyas, like
ijmac, is a secondary source of the Sharlcah and is
therefore a supplement of Qur'an and Sunnah.24
In addition to the four formal sources, there are
others which may be termed as the material sources of
law, and these cannot be neglected, such as pre-Islamic
23 Schacht, op. cit., p. 98
24 Generally see Schacht, op. cit., p. 98; and Ency. of Islam, under
subject matter "Qiyas"; also see Mahmasani, op. cit., p. 79. For
Shiite doctrine see Fitzgerald, Law in the Middle East, vol. 1, p.
122
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custom. There is considerable authority for the
proposition that beneficial customs, although ancient and
pre-Islamic, are to be retained.25 But it is important to
bear in mind that those customs which are directly or
indirectly at loggerheads with a binding ordinance from
the Qur'an or Sunnah will not be considered as material
sources of law in Islam. Evidence of the retention of the
customs of different peoples and countries is also to be
found, as in Java and Indonesia, Africa, Egypt and India;
this is known as cadah or curf.26 Customs are also
accepted under the guise of ijmac.
1.5 THE DIVISIONS OF FIQH
While we are discussing the nature of fiqh, it must
also be pointed out that this science has been divided
into two sections. The usul, literally the roots (or the
foundations) of the law, and the furuc, the branches (or
the applications) of the law. The science of usul deals
with the first principles of interpretation and may be
likened to our modern jurisprudence, while the science of
furuc deals with particular injunctions - ahkam - or the
substantive law, as we would call it, which really
follows from the science of usul. The science of usul
9 c
Fitzgerald, op. cit., p. 28; MahmasanI, op. cit., p. 91
2® See " cAma1", E.I. 2, vol.1, p. 427. On custom in general, see
Levy, Social structure of Islam, chap, vi; Mahmasani, op. cit., p.
130; S. Hurgronje, Selected Works, p. 290 and Fitzgerald, Law in the
Middle East, vol. 1, p. 110; Coulson, History of Islamic law, p. 147
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deals with the sources of the law and its interpretation;
the science of furuc deals with the law as it is actually
applicable in courts of justice, for instance, the law of
marriage, the law of waqf (charitable foundation) or the
law of inheritance. It is, therefore, necessary to
realize that in Islamic law there is a very clear
distinction between the first principles and the rules
deduced from their application.27
1.6 THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE SHARICAH AND FIQH
We have now seen what Sharicah is and what, in
essentials, is the definition of fiqh. What is the
distinction, if any, between them? Sharicah is the wider
circle, it embraces in its orbit all human actions ; fiqh
is the narrower one, and deals with what are commonly
understood as legal acts. Sharlcah reminds us always of
revelation, that cilm (knowledge) which we could never
have possessed but for the Qur'an and Sunnah; in fiqh,
the power of reasoning is stressed, and deductions based
upon cilm are continuously cited with approval. The path
of Sharicah is laid down by God and His Prophet; the
edifice of fiqh is erected by human endeavour. In fiqh,
an action is either legal or illegal, (ma ya juz wa ma la
yajuz) permissible or not permissible. In the Sharlcah,
2 7
I.Goldziher, on Fiqh, E.I. 1, vol. 2, p. 104; this is a most
valuable general article on the subject; MahmascTtyt..Philosophy of
Jurisprudence in Islam, p. 63; cAbd Rahim's Muhammadan Jurisprudence
is a modern textbook on usul
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there are various grades of approval or disapproval. Fiqh
is the term used for the law as a science; and Sharicah,
for the law as the divinely ordained path of rectitude.
It must, however, be candidly confessed that the line of
distinction is by no means clearly drawn, and very often
the Muslim scholars themselves use the terms
synonymously; for the criterion of all human action,
whether in the Sharlcah or in the fiqh, is the same -
seeking the approval of Allah by conforming to an ideally
perfect code.28
1.7 THE ROOT OF MASLAHAH AND ITS MEANING
• •
Before discussing the role of al-masalih
al-mursalah, it seem appropriate to define the words
maslahah and mursalah. Etymologically, the word maslahah
is a noun of a root "s-l-h". The verb "saluha" is used to
indicate when a thing or man becomes good, uncorrupted,
right, virtuous, honest, or alternatively to indicate the
state of possessing these virtues. When used with the
preposition "li" it gives the meaning of suitability.
Maslahah in its relational sense means a cause, a means,
an occasion, or a goal which is good. It is also said of
a thing, an affair or a piece of business which is
conducive to good, or that is for good. Its plural form
2 8
Levy says that fiqh plus kalam [scholastic philosophy] combine and
constitute the Sharicah, Social Structure, p. 150, which is a wrong
ete-fimition of the Sharicah
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is "masalih". Ma£sadah is its exact antonym. In Arab
usage, it is said: "nazara f1 masalih al-nas" which
means: "He considered the things that were for the good
of the people". The sentence "f1 al-amr maslahah" is used
to say: "In the affair there is that which is good (or a
cause of good).29
In the Qur'an various derivatives of the root
"s-l-h" are used, the word maslahah, however, does not
appear there. The Qur'an uses "zalama" (he did wrong)30
and "fasada" (he/it corrupted)31 as opposite terms to
"saluha". "Salih" the active participle of "s-l-h",
occurs very frequently in the Qur'an. On one occasion the
meaning of this term is elaborated textually as follows:
"They believe in God and in the last day and
enjoin goodness and forbid evil and hasten to do
good deeds and these are the righteous ones
(salihin).32
Whereas it is clear that its use in the early period
and in the Qur'an was essentially related to the meanings
of good and utility, there can be no doubt that the word
had not yet become a technical term.
29 See E. Lane, An Arabic-English lexicon, [London: Williams and
1863-93], vol. 4, pp. 1714-15
30 See Qur'an, 5:39
31 Ibid., 26:125; 27:142; 2:220
32 Ibid., 3:114. Raghib al-Isfahani, Al-mufradat fi gharib al-Qur'an,
[Karachi: Tijarat al-kutub, 1961], p. 286, also confirms that in the
Qur'an "salah" is often opposed to "fasad" and "sayyia'"
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1.7.1 THE DEFINITION OF MURSALAH
In Arabic language the word "mursalah" means
independently judged, or unrestricted. The word also
indicates a state of being left alone which is normally
expressed in Arabic by the term "mutlaq al-hal" ♦ The word
"mursalah" appears neither in the Qur'an nor in the
Sunnah; it only appears in the books of "usul al-fiqh"
used concurrently with the word "maslahah" to formulate
the term "maslahah mursalah" {pi. masalih mursalah}
(unrestricted benefit) as a means of determining
unspecified benefits in Islamic law.
1.8 THE ROLE OF AL-MASALIH AL-MURSALAH
For the term "al-masalih al-mursalah" some Muslim
lawyers, jurists and scholars use other terms. Some call
it as "al-munasib al-mursal" (unrestricted suitability),
while others use the term "istislah". (seeking the
better) and still others use the term "istidlal" (seeking
proof). Although these terms may seem different, in
reality they imply the same objective. Yet, each term
looks at the same objective from a different angle. This
is due to the fact that every rule which is based on
"maslahah" (benefit) could be observed in three aspects:
(i) as a resulting benefit; (ii) as a suitable
description which necesitates the legislation of a rule
to obtain a certain benefit; and (iii) as a deciding
benefit.
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Those who perceive "maslahah" through the first
aspect use the term "al-masalih al-mursalah"; while
those who discern "maslahah" through the second aspect
use the term "al-munasib al-mursal" such as Ibn al-Hajib
in his book "Al-mukhtasar" where he divides the
"al-munasib al-mursal" into: (a) an effective benefit,
(b) a consistent benefit, (c) a strange benefit, and (d)
an unrestricted benefit.33 Whereas those who perceive
"maslahah" within the scope of the third aspect use the
term "istislah"34 or "istidlal"35
Some Muslim scholars regard "istidlal" as being
superior to all types of evidences, excluding evidences
from the Qur'an, Sunnah, ijmac and qiyas, such as
istihsan and istishab. Hence this group of scholars refer
to al-masalih al-mursalah by the term "al-istidlal
al-mursal".36
t
In spite of the differing perceptions amongst the
Muslim lawyers, jurists and scholars on the three aspects
of maslahah mentioned above, notwithstanding, the end
product is the same - i.e. a maslahah which enters in the
intention of the Lawgiver without having an evidence for
33 -
See Ibn al-Hajib, Al-mukhtasar, vol. 2, p. 342; and al-Ghazali,
Shifa Al-qhalll, p. 34
34 See al-Ghazall, Al-mustasfa, vol. 1, p. 139
35 See Imam al-Haramain, Al-burhln, vol. 2, p. 329
See al-Zarkashi, Al-bahy Al-muhit, vol. 3, p. 166
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it from the ordinances of the Qur'an and Sunnah, or ijmac
or qiyas, which acknowledges its consideration or proves
its nullification.
1.9 THE POSITION OF_AL-MASALIH AL-MURSALAH IN THE
SOURCES OF THE SHARICAH
It is important to remember that the theory of
al-masalih al-mursalah is not a primary source of the
Sharicah, hence it cannot stand alone in legislation
except by conditions. Some Islamic jurists have outlined
nineteen sources for Islamic law in which al-masalih
al-mursalah could be described as one of these sources.
These sources are: (i) The Qur'an; (ii) The Sunnah; (iii)
Ijmac of the Islamic Ummah; (iv) Ijmac of the Medinah
people; (v) Qiyas; (vi) A saying of the Companion of the
Prophet; (vii) al-Masalih al-Mursalah; (viii) Istishab
(continuation of a practice); (ix) Al-Bara' al-asliyyah
(original exemption); (x) Al-Cawaid (customs); (xi)
Al-istiqra' (induction); (xii) Sadd al-dharaic
(preventive measures); (xiii) Istidlal ( deduction);
(xiv) Istihsan (equity); (xv) Ikhtiyar al-aysar (taking
the simple); (xvi) Al-Cismah (immunity from sins); (xvii)
Ijmac of the people of Kufah; (xviii) Ijmac of al-GItrah
(the house of the Prophet) for Shicas; and (xix) Ijmac of
the four caliphs.37
37 See cAbd al-Wahhab Khallaf, Masadir al-tashrlc al-Islami fi ma la
nass fih, p. 109
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Some of these sources are accepted by all Muslim
jurists and lawyers and some of them are disagreed upon.
In order to know their boundaries, scopes, realities and
their rules in detail one has to consult the books on u_
sul al-fiqh. Clearly the strongest out of these nineteen
sources are the Qur'an and Sunnah, which are the prime
origins of the Sharicah. As far as al-masalih al-mursalah
is concerned, it is derived from the saying of the
Prophet which states: "Do not inflict injury, nor repay
one injury by another" (La darar wala dirar) this
indicates the importance of confirming the consideration
of benefits and the negation of injuries; and since the
injuries are detested in the Sharicah and benefits are
confirmed it thus formulates the basis of the theory of
al-masalih al-mursalah. In spite of this, if an
injunction is enjoined in the Qur'an or Sunnah which
seems to conflict with some benefit thought of by the use
of the theory of al-masalih al-mursalah, in that case it
is the injunction that will be executed and not this
theory simply because the injunction comes from the
primary source whereas the theory in question is a
secondary source. Moreover, the ordinances either from
the Qur'an or Sunnah are not meant to harass people or
deprive them of their rights and legal benefits as the
Qur'an states clearly:
"And (God) has imposed no difficulties on you in
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religion";38
and also the Prophet is reported to have said:
"When I command you to do something do it
according to your ability".39
It goes without saying therefore that the nature of
the theory of al-masalih al-mursalah in the strict sense
of the terminology is limited within the environment of
benefits which have neither been dealt with by the main
origins of the Sharlcah nor cancelled by them. The
benefits should be independently judged by a mujtahid and
weighed out without referring to previous experience,
simply because when new cases are referred to old ones
bearing the same causes, the whole exercise develops into
analogy and ceases to work under the theory of al-masalih
al-mursalah. The Islamic understanding is that God has
made rules in the best way to fit the lives of people by
providing general principles and guidance and has left
out the details of things to be discovered by the people
themselves through observation and the use of common
sense. He has dealt with the primary issues of life in
general and has left the secondary ones to be tackled by
the human beings themselves (as a mercy to them and not
through forgetfulness or failure). The Qur'an says:
"0 ye who believe! Ask not questions about things
38
Qur'an, 22:78
O Q _ —
Reported by al-Bukhari and Muslim
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which may cause trouble. But if you ask about
things when the Qur'an is being revealed, they
will be made plain to you, God will forgive
those: for God is Oft-forgiving, Most Forbearing.
Some people before you did ask such questions,
and on that account lost their faith".40
The Prophet is also reported to have said:
"...And (God) has kept silent over some things as
a mercy to you without forgetting them, so do not
ask about them".41
1.10 LEGAL ORDINANCES IN THE QUR'AN AND SUNNAH
It follows that the sphere in which the theory of
al-masalih al-mursalah could operate is that in which the
Qur'an and Sunnah are silent. In actual fact the
ordinances of the Qur'an and Sunnah which deal with legal
issues are quite scanty compared to the injunctions which
deal with other aspects of life in general. The main
purpose of this is to give enough room to accommodate
every benefit possible without the need of altering
anything in the main structure of the Sharicah. The
Qur'an, for instance, has not gone into detail of laying
each and every rule, but instead it has just laid down
general principles for the legislation of practical rules
whether in matters concerning civil rights, constitution,
criminology or economics. We see, for example, in trade




44 Reported by al-Bukharl
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"...And God has permitted trade and forbidden
usury...";42
(ii) the condition of mutual agreement:
"0 ye who believe! Eat not your property among
yourselves in vanities: but let there be amongst
you traffic and trade of mutual good-will...";43
(iii) the act of witnessing:
"...And take witnesses whenever ye make a
commercial contract...";44
and (iv) its prohibition:
"0 ye who believe! When a call is made for the
prayer of Friday, rush for the rememberance of
God, and leave trade...".45
Whereas we find, for example, in the Egyptian code for
civil rights one hundred and twenty rules for trade; and
the rules concerning trade in detail are still numerous
in Islamic jurisprudence which differ from one school
system to another.
In connection with the constitutional matters the
Qur'an has confined itself to three major principles for
every just political institution; these are: (i)
consultation and counselling: God commanded the Prophet:
"...And ask for (God's) forgiveness for them; and
consult them in affairs (of moment)...";46





45 Ibid., Surat al-Jumucah:9
46 Ibid., 3:159
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establish worship, and whose affairs are (decided
by) counsel among themselves...";47
(ii) justice:
"God commands you to render back the trusts to
those to whom they are due, and that when you
judge between people you judge with
justice...";48
and (iii) equality:
"The believers are but brethren, therefore make
peace between your brethren...".49
The Islamic understanding of this is that the Qur'an
has not gone into details concerning legal rules in
constitutional matters so as to give an ample space for
every generation to acquire what is beneficial and decide
for themselves what is suitable to them according to
their environment and situation.
In connection with punishments, the Qur'an has
restricted itself to five punishments for five major
offences:- (i) murder:
"And it does not behove a believer to kill a
believer; but (if it so happens) by mistake,
(compensation is due): if one so kills a
believer, it is ordained that he should free a
believing slave, and pay compensation to the
deceased's family, unless they remit it freely.
If the deceased belongs to a people at war with
you, and he was a believer, the freeing of a
believing slave (is enough). If he belonged to a





alliance, compensation should be paid to his
family, and a believing slave be freed. For those
who find this beyond their means, a fast for two
months successively (is prescribed): by way of
repentance to God; for God hath all knowledge and
all wisdom. If a man kills a believer
intentionally, his recompense is Hell, to abide
therein (for ever): and wrath and the curse of
God are upon him, and a dreadful penalty is
prepared for him";50
(ii) theft:
"As to the thief, male and female, cut off his or
her hands: a punishment by way of example from
God for their crime: and God is Exalted in
Power";51
(iii) transgression:
"The punishment of those who wage war against God
and His Apostle and strive to make mischief on
the land is only this, that they should be
murdered or crucified or their hands and their
feet should be cut off on opposite sides or they
should be sent into exile from the land; this
shall be as a disgrace for them in this world,
and in the hereafter they shall have a grievous
chastisement";52
(iv) adultery:
"The woman and the man guilty of adultery or
fornication, flog each of them with a hundred
stripes...";53
and (v) slander of chaste women:
"And those who launch a charge against chaste
women, and produce not four witnesses (to support
their allegation),- flog them with eighty
stripes; and reject their evidences ever after,








It can be noticed here that the punishments of many
kinds of offences and crimes have been left to be decided
upon by the responsible people in every generation as
they see fit for their benefits as to go hand in hand
with the principle: "The recompense for an injury is an
injury equal thereto (in degree)...".55
In connection with economic matters the Qur'an has
limited itself from its multifarious rules by
establishing the right of poor to a share in the wealth
of the rich and the state. The right of poor over the
wealth of the rich is enunciated by many verses such as:
"And those in whose wealth is a recognised right.
For the (needy) who asks and him who is prevented
(for some reason from asking)";56
"By no means shall ye attain righteouness unless
ye give (freely) of that which ye love...".57
And the right of the poor to a share in the wealth of
the state is decided by verses - such as:
"And know that out of all the booty that ye may
acquire (in war), a fifth share is assigned to
God, - and the Apostle, and to the near
relatives, orphans, the needy, and the
wayfarer...";58
"Alms are for the poor and the needy, and those
employed to administer the (funds), for those
whose hearts have been (recently) reconciled (to
truth), for those in bondage and in debt, in the








It could also be discovered that the legal
injunctions of the Sunnah, like those of the Qur'an, are
limited to three categories only:- (i) to establish and
emphasize the injunctions of the Qur'an, e.g. concerning
trade, the Prophet is reported to have said:
"The seller and the buyer have an option before
they depart (i.e. either to accept the deal or to
reject it)";50
(ii) to examplify and elaborate that which has been
ruled by the Qur'an, e.g. the Prophet is reported to have
said:
"The value of the compensation to the family of
the person slain by mistake, as a hundred camels,
or one thousand golden dinars, or ten thousand
dirhams of silver";61
(iii) to give a new rule in a situation where the Qur'an
is silent, e.g. the saying of the Prophet on the
representation of the Muslim community on legal matters:
"The Mulims are (all) liable to the conditions of
their contracts, except a condition which
legalizes an unlawful thing or a condition which
illegalizes a lawful thing".62




Reported by al-Bukhari, Muslim, Abu Dawud, al-Tirmizi, al-Nasai,
Ahmad ibn Hanbal, Malik ibn Anas and al-Darml
r I __
DJ- Reported by Abu Dawud, al-Nisai and Malik ibn Anas
62 Reported by al-Bukhari, al-Tirmizi and Abu Dawud
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given broad lines to the tackling of the legal problems
leaving so much space to accommodate every sensible
legislation which considers public interest in the strict
sense of the word. In this way the theory of al-masalih
al-mursalah has a great role to play. It stands as a
useful tool to a faqih without which his potential to
solve new problems according to the Sharlcah could not
work. The Qur'an and Sunnah have not mentioned all legal
cases known to mankind and thus have not given ready made
answers to all possible problems which could occur. This
gives scope for a mujtahid to find answers to the daily
questions of the society. For the very nature of the
theory of al-masalih al-mursalah demands that a mujtahid
has to consider the unrestricted benefits in the light
and according to the intentions of the Lawgiver.
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Chapter 2
THE POSITION OF THE EARLY MUSLIM
SCHOLARS AS TO THE UTILIZATION OF THE THEORY OF
AL-MASALIH AL-MURSALAH
• •
In our search for the position of the early Muslim
scholars in connection with the application of the theory
of al-masalih al-mursalah as a device of decision making
in Islamic Law, it would be useful for us to look into
the history of Islamic Law in order to find out the
attitudes of the early Muslim scholars towards it.
Although the theory of al-masalih al-mursalah was by then
not known as a technial term, it was actually applied in
general terms in the legislation of the Sahabah (the
Prophet's Companions). After looking at this general
application, we shall investigate the position of the
followers of the Sahabah who were the intermediaries
between the Sahabah and those who came after them so as
to complete the chain till the advent of the Imams of the
major schools of thought (jurisprudence).
2.1 A. THE POSITION OF THE COMPANIONS OF THE PROPHET
[SAHABAH]
There are several evidences which justify the view
that the Sahabah used the concept of al-masalih
al-mursalah and istislah as a device of legislation
without defining it. They have always looked for the
corresponding hukm (judgment) of cases resembling those
which took place at the Prophet's time for issues which
the Sharicah has not given any injunctions. However, if
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ever they did net find anything corresponding to the cases
in the time of the Prophet, they in fact depended upon
the theory of al-masalih al-mursalah for the enactment of
laws although that theory had not yet been presented in
any elaborate form. The Companions of the Prophet did
not hesitate to adopt and legislate a rule on whatever
appeared to possess benefit and had not been mentioned by
the Qur'an and Sunnah but fell within the general range
of the intention of the Sharlcah.
An example of theapplication of the theory of
al-masalih al-mursalah by the Sahabah is the verdict of
cUmar ibn al-Khattab in killing a group of people who had
co-operated in killing an individual (in qisas). cUmar
depended upon the benefit of the preservation of people's
blood in his verdict as the basis of his decision. Were
the fact that it had been a group of people who
participated together in killing an individual to be
considered as a nullification of the crime and an
acquittal by virtue of them being a group, then there
would have arisen so much killing in the society and loss
of human rights, apart from the discarding of the law of
qisas which had been enunciated by the Sharlcah. That
also would have meant opening the door to such crimes
insofar as when there was a desire for somebody to be
killed, a group of people could come together to kill him
knowing that reprisal would have only been taken against
individuals and not groups (as was the case in the time
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of ignorance - jahiliyyah). Nevertheless, this rule is
not mentioned in the Qur'an or Sunnah. So, what ctJmar did
in his verdict is a clear example of the application of
the theory of al-masalih al-mursalah since there is no
injunction in the Sharicah which commanded that, and no
evidence is found of its type on which analogy could be
applied to.1
2.2 B. THE POSITION OF TABICIN {THE FOLLOWERS OF SAHABAH}
REGARDING TO THE THEORY OF AL-MASALIH AL-MURSALAH*
• •
The Tabicin follwed the path of the Sahabah in
applying the theory of al-masalih al-mursalah to new
problems which they confronted. A conspicuous example of
the TabicIn's application of the theory in question is
the method which cUmar ibn cAbd al-cAziz (a great follower
of the Sahabah who is also considered as the fifth of the
rightly guided Caliphs of Islam) used in solving so many
problems, especially in returning people's possessions
(wealth and land) to the owners after they had been taken
unjustly by the Umayyad rulers. He was just content with
slight evidence of the wronged party to verify the truth
of his claim to property without going into details.2
Without any shadow of doubt, his method was based on the
theory of al-masalih al-mursalah.
1
See al-Shatibi, Al-ictisam, vol. 2, p. 107; see also al-Zinjani,
Takhrij al-furuc cala al-usul, pp. 107-109
2 M.A.Saleh, op. cit., p. 479
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Another example of the application of the theory of
al-masalih al-mursalah by the Tabicin is also the way
cUmar ibn cAbd Al-cAziz had established hostels to
accommodate travellers throughout the seasons of the
2
year. This act was neither practised at the time of the
Prophet nor even at the time of the Sahabah; the whole
idea of these hostels to ease the travellers'
difficulties and provide them with services was based
upon the theory of al-masalih al-mursalah.
2.3 C. THE POSITION OF THE IMAMS OF THE_SCHOOLS OF
THOUGHT AS REGARDS THE THEORY OF AL-MASALIH AL-MURSALAH
After our examination of the position of the Sahabah
and the TabicIn in relation to the theory of al-masalih
al-mursalah, we must examine the position of the great
Imams of the schools of thought in Islamic jurisprudence
in order to be fully aware of the general application of
the theory under discussion. Some ambiguities have arisen
in identifying the viewpoints and the position of some
Imams in this issue; eg. the position of Imam al-ShaficI
on the validity of al-masalih al-mursalah as a device of
legislation, and the standpoint of Imam Abu Hanifah in
using istihsan in the place of the theory of al-masalih
4
al-mursalah in most of his expositions.
& M.A.Saleh, op. cit., p. 479
4 M.S.R. al-Buti, Dawabit al-Maslahah fl al-Sharicah al-Islamiyyah,
p. 381
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2.4 IMAM MALIK {THE MALIKIS} AND AL-MASALIH AL-MURSALAH
Imam Malik [d. 179/795] is known as being in the
vanguard of those who apply the theory of al-masalih
al-mursalah in their legal transactions. Whenever
istislah is mentioned the first one to be associated with
it from the great Imams is Malik ibn Anas. He was so
deeply drawn to this theory that he is even claimed to be
the one who elaborated it as a legal principle as noted
by al-Shatibl.5 Malik saw that an interpreter of Sharlcah
or a mujtahid who was versed in Sharlcah and its origins
was indebted to the knowledge of the theory of al-masalih
al-mursalah - in order to distinguish between different
types of benefits and have a clear conception that any
benefit which conflicts with the Sharlcah or its
intention is cancelled.6 Imam Malik is also said to have
permitted the imprisonment of a suspect who is thought by
a judge through analogy to be guilty.7 Imprisonment is a
heavy punishment and should not be applied to a person
just by a simple accusation. Nevertheless, Imam Malik
saw that the attainment of justice is paramount, and he
considered the imprisonment of a suspect was a means of
attaining this justice.
5 See al-Qatafi, Tanqih al-fuhul in al-Dhakhirah, vol. 1, pp.
142-144; Malik, by Abu Zahrah, p.290; Al-rasail by Husain al-Khidr,
vol.3, p. 66
6 Al-Shatibi, Al-ictisam, vol.2, p.114
7 M.A. Saleh, op. cit., p. 481
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The Maliki school has applied the theory of
al-masalih al-mursalah in the question of a Muslim land
being threatened by an enemy while there was a deficiency
of funds in the exchequer to prepare soldiers for defence
purposes. A group of Andalusian scholars has resorted to
the public benefit side of this issue and has produced a
verdict allowing the leader of the country concerned to
put extra tax on the rich people in order to equip the
army with the necessary armament for the defence of the
country. This tax was in addition to the ordinary
poor-rate (zakat) which is compulsory and required by the
Sharlcah. Those scholars considered that to repel the
danger of a foreign attack, to strengthen the state's
security and to preserve the people's independence was a
strong reason for the legislation of an extra tax.
Another case where the Malikis applied the theory of
al-masalih al-mursalah was when the enemy put Muslim
prisoners of war in the front line of his army on the
battle field as a hindrance between him and the Muslim
army. The Maliki school gave its verdict in this issue
allowing the shooting at the army of an enemy even if
that action would end up with killing those Muslim
prisoners of war who are at the front line.8 This was due
to the fact that if the Muslim army ceased to shoot at
8 —Husein al-Khidr, Al-rasail, vol. 3, p. 67
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the army of the enemy because of the fear of killing
those Muslim captives, the enemy would use this loop-hole
to cause a great harm to the Muslim army and to the
people as a whole. So, the public benefit in this
situation lies with the killing of those few Muslims in
order to save the lives of the many - i.e committing the
lesser of the two evils.
2.5 THE POSITION OF AHMAD IBN HANBAL {THE HANBALIS} AS
REGARDS THE THEORY OF'AL-MASALIH AL-MURSALAH
• •
Although Imam Ibn Hanbal [d. 241/855] is considered
to be the second person after Imam Malik in applying this
theory in legislation, some Hanbalite scholars do not
consider it as one of the Imam Ibn Hanbal's devices of
legislation.9 The major reason for their argument is that
Imam Ibn Hanbal considered that al-masalih al-mursalah
could only come within the terms of Qur'an, Sunnah, ijmac
and qiyas. Thus, the maslahah which was recognized by him
is that which was incorporated in the general term of
analogy to formulate a special meaning. In this case the
maslahah was considered as a basis for the enactment of
rules within the general origins of the Sharxcah - i.e
the Qur'an, Sunnah, ijmac and qiyas.
However, even before the specification of
descriptions and terminologies in the field of the
9 M.A. Saleh, op. cit., p. 482
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structure of Islamic jurisprudence which came after
marhalat al-takwin (the period of formation), analogy was
generally taken to encompass a wide range of meanings at
the time of the beginning of the period of the Imams in
the second century of Hijrah. Most of the Hanballs
including Ibn Taymiyyah and his student Ibn Qayyim gave
detailed attention to analogical issues. They put more
emphasis on the general objectives and intentions of the
Sharicah and attempted to give definitions upon which
legitimate analogies could be based and from which
judgments would emerge, which emanated from the
intentions of the Sharicah.10
Among the examples of the application of the theory
of al-masalih al-mursalah by Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal is
that which has been reported to us by Ibn Qayyim in the
case of the one who casts doubt on the truthfulness of
the Companions of the Prophet. Imam Ibn Hanbal considered
that the one who does that action must be punished by the
Sultan (ruler) and the ruler should make him repent to
God. If he repents for it, well and good, but if he
doesn't, the ruler is obliged to repeat the punishment.11
It can be seen here that the demanding of repentance and
the repetition of the punishment by the ruler is a matter
1® Ibn Qayyim, Iclam Al-muwaqqicin, vol. 1, pp. 29-33; cAbd al-Qadir
Badran, Al-madkhal, p. 138; Abu Zahrah, Ibn Hanbal p. 297
11 Ibn Qayyim, op.cit., vol.4, p. 377; Abu Zahrah, Malik, p. 300 and
so on
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of the application of the theory of al-masalih
al-mursalah since there is neither a binding ordinance
(nass) for that nor is there any evidence from qiyas. It
is just done so as to preserve the unity of the Muslim
Ummah from disintegration and in order to appreciate the
position of the Sahabah who passed the Sharicah on to the
Muslims from the Prophet. In doing so there is maslahah
to the Muslims which needed to be attained by meting out
severe punishment to prevent such disintegration and not
allowing the ruler to forgive a person responsible for it
as stipulated by Imam Ibn Hanbal.
2.6 IMAM ABU HANIFAH {THE HANAFIS) AND THE THEORY OF
AL-MASALIH AL-MURSALAH
• •
It would seem, at first, that the Hanafls do not
consider the theory of al-masalih al-mursalah as one of
the devices of legislation in Islamic Law due to the fact
that their school does not mention this theory by this
name. But the truth is that the difference is only in the
name for what amounts to the same technique. In fact Imam
Abu Hanlfah [d. 150/767] puts forward the doctrine of
istihsan (equity) and considers it as one of the bases of
legislation. Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Shaybani (one of
the two great companions of Abu Hanlfah) says:
"The companions of Abu Hanlfah were at
loggerheads with him (i.e Abu Hanifah) when
dealing with analogical issues but when he talked
of istihsan no one quarrelled with him any
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more" .12
Now the istihsan by which Imam Abu Hanifah was talking
about was based on the selection of a strong inference
against a weak one. Indubitably, the criterion used on
the selection of a strong inference, in a situation void
of a binding nass from the Qur'an or from the Sunnah,
would be in favour of public benefit (maslahah). Thus it
is found that in most of the supplementary rules which
are drawn up for the method of istihsan, the sole basis
used is maslahah in terms of the intentions and objective
of the Sharlcah, i.e the attainment of benefits and the
prevention of injuries. It is appropriate to mention here
also that customs which do not conflict with any
ordinances either from the Qur'an or Sunnah or ijmac or
qiyas, were given great scope within the Hanafi School
system. Customs as they are shed light on the
utilization of maslahah by Abu Hanifah, because customs
are built for the benefits of people's life. Thus, it
would, in most cases, be found that, the Hanafi books are
full of analogical issues based on maslahah but using the
name of customs in one place, and the name of istihsan in
another.
If we go deeper into what we have discussed about
maslahah as it was dealt with by Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal we
1 — —
M.A. Saleh, Masadir al-tashric al-Islami wa manahij al-istinbat,
p. 484
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find th it at the beginning of the four great Imams'
period he term "maslahah" did not attain a precise and a
standard definition, but we further also find that Imam
Abu Hani,fah laid great emphasis on the process of
deduction. This means that the theory of al-masalih
al-mursalah had an enormous role in the analogical
methodology of Imam Abu Hanifah provided that a
particular maslahah did not come into conflict with any
ordinance from the Qur'an or Sunnah. Thus, Imam Abu
Hanifah could be considered to be one of the great
advocates of the theory of al-masalih al-mursalah
according to the analysis given above even though he used
the term "istihsan" instead of al-masalih al-mursalah.13
Among the many examples of Imam Abu Hanxfah's
application of the theory of al-masalih al-mursalah in
his analogical deductions is his verdict to take the
value of a produce before its production without fixing a
particular period; but once the duration is fixed the
deal changes to a normal transaction where a reservation
for exchange in commodity and its value has to be
observed,14. So, the consideration of maslahah in making
See al-Shatibi, Al-ictisam, vol. 2, p. 324; Abu Zahrah, Abu
Hanifah, p. 372; Mustafa al-Zarqa', Al-madkhal al-fiqh al-cam, vol.
1, pp. 60-76
14 It is noted in "Badaic Al-sinaci" by al-Kasani, vol. 4, p. 223,
"if a certain period is fixed for the produce, it becomes a normal
transaction whereby a condition of exchange should be stipulated, i.e
taking the value for the goods hand in hand; and this is what Abu
Hanifah says"
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the people's affairs and transactions simple is the sole
basis of the verdict of Imam Abu Hanifah in the above
case.
Another example in which Imam Abu Hanifah applied
the theory of al-masalih al-mursalah by the name of
istihsan was his view of holding a sharing employee as
responsible for damage occurring in his work. This was so
even though the work of this employee differed from what
had been stipulated in the agreement between him and his
employer; except that which was damaged without his
intention eg. by theft or death. In that case he had to
produce evidence for his claim, and his word would not be
accepted except through that evidence. This was what was
reported by al-Sarakhs! (one of the great propounders of
the Hanafi school system) when he said:
"If a sharing shepherd herds sheep, according to
Abu Hanifah, he is responsible and liable to pay
for any damage caused by him to the sheep since
the participating employee is responsible for
what he does with his own hands ".15
It is noted here, as has been noted in the previous
example, that the case of the responsibility and
liability of a sharing employee bases its foundation on
the maslahah of the people and the necessity of these
demands for the development and the prosperity of their
lives.
is - -
Al-Sarakhsi, Al-mabsut, vol. 15, p. 161
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2.7 IMAM AL-SHAFICI {THE SHAFICIS} AND THE THEORY OF
AL-MASALIH AL-MURSALAH
• •
It was due to the standpoint of Imam al-Shafici [d.
204/819] in regard to istihsan (equity) as manifested in
his books: al-Risalah, al-Umm and especially that which
has come in the book entitled Ibtal al-Istihsan
(nullification of equity) that made many people believe
that this Imam did not accept the theory of al-masalih
al-mursalah as a device of legislation in Islamic Law.
Nonetheless, the istihsan which has been denied by Imam
al-ShaficI is not the same as that which has been applied
by Imam Abu Hanifah as we have seen when we talked about
the standpoint of the Hanafi school as regards the theory
of al-masalih al-mursalah. Moreover, the method of
legislation to which Imam al-ShaficI was opposed was
neither istislah (public good) nor al-masalih
al-mursalah. What Imam al-Shafici opposed was "the
following of lusts and passions which result in going
astray from the ordained injunctions (nusus); and
innovating laws which are not decreed by either the
Qur'an or Sunnah or ijmac or qiyas"; and for this reason
came his famous utterance:
"He who applies istihsan is really innovating
laws".16
^ Al-Shafici, Al-risalah, p. 186
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However, we learn from a statement of one of the
great disciples of the Shafici school system - Imam
al-Haramayn al-Juwayni (d. 478 A.H.): "that he who
follows al-Shafici's explanation will find that he (i.e
al-Shafici) accords judgments with public benefits; and
whenever he doesn't find that accordance he turns to
principles of resemblance". Al-Juwayni went further by
elucidating that whatever al-ShaficI stipulated in his
judgments, al-masalih al-mursalah or its equivalent is
innately envisaged. Al-Juwayni also added, "al-Shafici
and most of the Hanafi school system embrace the view of
attaching judgments to the theory of al-masalih
al-mursalah with the condition of suitability to the
considered benefits".17
The dictum that al-Shafici was opposed to was the
sole dependence on benefits which did not fall within the
circle of the Lawgiver's common usage and acknowledgment.
That is why we see Imam al-Ghazali saying in this
connection:
"Every benefit which does not preserve the
intention understood from the Qur'an, Sunnah and
ijmac, itself being one of the alien benefits
which do not agree with the intentions of the
Lawgiver, is void and nullified; and the one who
resorts to it has already made himself a lawmaker
(i.e. a rival with God)".18
The thing which Imam al-Shafici recognizes in the theory
17 Al-Shawkani, Irshad Al-fuhul, p. 242
-1-® Al-Ghazali, Al-mustagfa, vol. 1, p. 310
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of al-masalih al-mursalah is therefore a dependence of
the considered benefits which are accepted by the
Sharicah and the enactment of laws connected with them in
terms which have not been considered by the Lawgiver as
accepted or cancelled.
In the 7th century A.H a scholar of Arabic Language
and a member of Shafici school, Shihab al-Din Muhammad
al-zanjanl (d.656 A.H.), presented the position of Imam
al-ShaficI as regards the theory of al-masalih
al-mursalah by the following words:
"al-ShaficI held the opinion that it is right to
hold steadfast to the benefits which have
reference to the general principles of the
Sharicah even though not closely connected to a
particular section of it".19
Does this not mean the utilization of the theory of
al-masalih al-mursalah which of course is a principle not
closely connected to a special part of the Sharlcah?
One of the examples in which al-Zanjani gives to
explain al-Shafici's acceptance of the theory of
al-masalih al-mursalah is his adoption of the idea of
killing a group of people who have killed an individual
as decided by cUmar ibn al-Khattab. Al-Zanjani says:
" and killing a group of people for one person
in this case, according to al-ShaficI, is an act
of aggression and injustice in its true sense".
He still goes further elucidating the point by saying:
19 Al-ZSnjani, Takhrij al-furuc cala al-usul, p. 169
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"Truly, if similarity were to be observed in this
case, the whole issue would result in
blood-shedding and massive killing. Whereas the
practice commanded by the Sharicah is to kill a
group of people for a group like it, and an
individual for an individual; nevertheless, to
wait for such an occurence would render the whole
practice unjust and inapplicable. The justice in
this case is therefore to apply severity to the
wrong incurred; thus, to kill a group of people
who have killed an individual is an obligatory
act in order to repel a gigantic injustice. In so
doing a public interest which has not been
enunciated by a particular principle in the
Sharlcah is maintained. The benefit is neither
dependent upon an injunction of the Qur'an nor
the Sunnah of the Prophet; but it has only
depended upon the general outlook of the Sharicah
i.e to safe-guard its canon and rule from the
danger of massacre, to exaggerate its detestation
towards unjust killing and to preserve mankind
from anguish and annihilation".
Al-ZanjanI goes further saying:
"Daily happenings know no boundaries and so
should their rules and judgments; and to confine
oneself to particular principles from which
restricted meanings and causes are derived would
mean that nothing could face the extremist except
the use of similar methods. Therefore, there
should be another methodology of accomplishing
particular rules in a general mode though not
connected to a particular principle; and this is
possible only by the general utilization of
benefits attached to the Sharicah and its
intentions".20
Another example whereby Imam al-ShaficI applied the
theory of al-masalih al-mursalah is as mentioned in his
book Al-umm concerning witnesses' renouncing their
testimony. He says:
"If witnesses testify that a man divorced his
in _ —
Al-Zanjani, op. cit., pp. 170-71
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wife three times so that a judge revoked the
marriage; then the witnesses renounced and
abandoned their testimony, the judge had to
impose a fine on them an amount equal to the
wife's required nuptial gift(if the husband had
had a sexual contact with her), but if he hadn't
had any sexual contact with her, the judge will
fine them an amount equals to the half of her
required nuptial gift. This is because they have
forbidden her from her husband and therefore she
deserves an amount equal to her required nuptial
gift. The judge should not inquire into the
actual amount given by the husband (at the time
of marriage) as nuptial gift whether small amount
or large, but he should rule according to the
amount cherished by the jurists (i.e an amount
equal to another woman's required nuptial gift
who is of her status), and so he should make a
decision on that value".21
It can be noticed here that what has been observed
by Imam al-Shafici in the process of imposing a fine on
the witnesses is the dependence of the benefit of the
wronged husband, and this benefit lies within the circle
which the Lawgiver demanded to be preserved and
considered; even though this particular benefit does not
depend on an ordinance from the Qur'an or Sunnah. So, in
this way, Imam al-ShaficI can be reckoned to be one of
those who applied the theory of al-masalih al-mursalah
in his interpretations of a number of cases recorded from
him.
2.8 GENERAL CONCLUSION OF THE FOUR IMAMS' ATTITUDE
At this point we are able to summarise the
21
Imam al-Shafici, Al-umm vol. 7, p. 50
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fore-going account as follows: That the four celebrated
Imams of the school systems, viz. Malik, Ahmad ibn
Hanbal, Abu Hanifah and al-Shafici, as noted from their
expositions and impressions, do accept the theory of
al-masalih al-mursalah as a means of legislation in
Islamic Law inspite of their difference in the method of
application and degree of utilization. Everybody gives it
a different name. As we have seen al-Zanjani (a
propounder of the Shafici school system) considered the
killing of a group of people for an individual as an
application of the theory of al-masalih al-mursalah in
al-Shafici's judgments, whereas the Hanafis take the same
decision but upon the dependence of istihsan (equity).
Although the judgment given by both of the school systems
is one, the name given to the methodology is different.22
A degree of dissimilarity, however, is observed
amongst these Imams in the extent of the utilization of
the theory of al-masalih al-mursalah; the leading and the
paramount one is Imam Malik ibn Anas, followed by Imam
Ahmad ibn Hanbal after which come the two Imams Abu
Hanifah and al-Shafici.
A prominent example of those who explained this
issue is Ibn Daqiq al-cId (an apologist of the Shafici
22 —
See al-Sarakhsi in his book Al-mabsut, vol. 26, p. 126, for a
detailed discussion
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school system) who said the following:
"The truth without doubt is that Imam Malik is
the most likely person (to apply the theory of
al-masalih al-mursalah) of any of the Imams.
After him follows Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal; but this• •
does not exclude the other two Imams in the
general application of the theory, except the
former two Imams have a preference for its
utility and application over the latter ones".23
Al-Qsraf! (an apologist of the Malik! school system)
said regarding this issue:
"There are some people who oppose the theory of
al-masalih al-mursalah, nevertheless, you will
see them in their derivations (of laws) give
account for absolute benefit without inquiring
from themselves about the process of deduction
and generalizations to produce evidence for such
a consideration, but they depend solely on the
proportion and suitability (of the cillah
(cause); and this by itself is a real application
of the theory of al-masalih al-mursalah".24
23 Al-Shawkani, Irshad al-fuhul, pp. 242-43
24 Al-Qarafi, Tanqih al-fusul muqaddimat al-dhakhirah, vol. 1, p.
144
Chapter 3
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LEGAL UNDERSTANDING OF
MASLAHAH
• •
3.1 A.THE LEGAL DEFINITION OF MASLAHAH
The Muslim lawyers have differing definitions of
maglahah and its specifications. To al-Ghazali (d. 1111)
the word "maslahah" denotes "obtaining benefit and
preventing injury". He goes further adding after that,
"We do not mean by interpreting maslahah as
obtaining benefit and preventing injury only
because these are human aims concerned with human
welfare in human terms only, whereas what we
actually mean by maslahah is the preservation of
the aims of the Shariuah. The aim of the Sharicah
in regard to man is fivefold: viz: (i) to
preserve his religion, (ii) to preserve his life,
(iii) to preserve his mind (reason), (iv) to
preserve his offspring, and (v) to preserve his
material wealth. Everything which secures the
preservation of these five elements is a ma _
slahah, and everything which jeopardizes them is
a "mafsadah" (injury), the prevention of which is
a maslahah.1
It could be said that there is no clear cut
difference between the general meaning of maslahah and
the definition given by al-Ghazali, because the obtaining
of benefit and the prevention of injury is the real
intention of the Sharlcah. Still, there is not: anything
which brings benefits and repels injuries that is not
encompassed in the intention of the Sharicah and is
1
A.M. al-Ghazali, Al-mustasfa, vol. 1, pp. 286-87; Kerr, Islamic
Reform, pp. 92-93
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directly or indirectly connected with religion, or life,
or mind, or offspring, or material wealth. Nevertheless,
does it not happen that an individual person considers a
thing to be beneficial to himself while the Lawgiver
considers it the other way round? We read, for instance,
in the Qur1 an:
"Fighting is prescribed for you, and ye dislike
it. But it is possible that ye dislike a thing
which is good for you, and that ye love a thing
which is bad for you. But God knoweth and ye know
not".2
On the other hand, al-Khwarizml (d.850) defines
maslahah by saying:
"It is the preservation of the objective of the
Sharicah to prevent injuries to human beings".3
Maslahah or the preservation of the objectivity of the
Sharlcah does not only mean the prevention of injuries to
human beings because this is one aspect of it only. The
other aspect which is equally important is the positive
side of maslahah - the obtaining of benefits. Although
the Islamic juristic principle has stressed the
prevention of injury more than the attainment of benefit
by saying: "Prevention of injury precedes the attainment
2
Qur'an, 2:216
3 Al-Shawkanl ascribed this definition to al-Khwarizmi in his book
"Irshad Al-fuhul, p. 213; Jamal al-Din al-Qasiml mentioned it in his
commentary on the treatise of al-Tufi on masalih [Al-manar journal,
M9, p. 747] without ascribing it to its auther; while the author of
"Taclil Al-afrkam" has ascribed the definition to its auther but has
not notified from which reference he quoted. See p.378 of Taclil
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of benefit", in reality they are two different things
altogether and are therefore not the same; nonetheless it
is necessary, in order to understand them both, that they
should be considered as complementary.
However, in defining maslahah cIzz al-Din ibn cAbd
al-Salam (d.660/1263), the Egyptian scholar, puts a check
and says:
"He who wants to know the rights, the benefits
and the injuries, strong amongst them as well as
the weak, has to review his mind with a
visualization as to why the Sharlcah hasn't
mentioned the solution or judgment of a
particular problem he is confronted with inspite
of the fact that the Sharlcah manifested rules in
which every single rule demands the subservience
of human beings to their Creator and has not
necessarily informed them of the benefit or
injury of a thing in particular".
Then he goes on to define benefits and injuries saying:
"Benefits are four kinds:- needs and their
causes; and happinesses and their causes.
Injuries are also of four kinds:- pains and their
causes and worries and their causes".4
Elsewhere, cIzz al-Din ibn cAbd al-Salam discusses
real benefits and the allegorical ones in which he says:
"Benefits are two types: real (happinesses and desires),
and the allegorical (their causes). Sometimes the causes
of benefits inflict injuries, they are commanded or
allowed, not because they are injuries "per se" but they
are a means to secure benefits, such as the amputation of
4
I. cAbd al-Salam, Qawacid Al-ahkam, vol. 1, pp. 9-10.
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a thief's hand to protect people's wealth and the warning
before jihad to protect people's lives. As is also the
case with all legal punishments which are in actual fact
not pleasant due to their injury, nonetheless, they are
enforced to attain peace and security which is in one way
or the other meant to attain benefits - such as killing
the transgressors, stoning the married adulterers and
lashing or deporting the unmarried adulterers etc. All
these injuries have been legalised in the Sharicah to
attain real benefits, and they are called allegorical
benefits, although this seems to be calling them "means"
when it is "ends" that is really meant.5
The Muslim lawyers have defined maslahah in this way
for the first seven centuries, whereby they did not agree
to one general standard definition. Their difference on
the definition of maslahah has also reflected the
difference in their views about benefits inclusively or
exclusively .6 But this situation is not a necessary
result in every condition. Inspite of the difference of
opinion of these scholars in considering "public
interest" as a device of decision making, they never
differ in the recognition of benefit wherever it existed
5 Ibn cAbd al-Salam, op. cit., p.12
^ It is meant by this elaboration that what the Muslim lawyers have
pointed out about the difference of Imams in the decision making
process by putting into account "public interest", is that their
difference is mainly caused by the specification of its indications.
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and did not confuse it with injury.
From the Muslim lawyers we learn: (i) that maslahah
(benefit), however defined, is neither a sheer desire nor
a passion, nor is it a personal objective; and that is
why al-Ghazali insists that maslahah is the preservation
of the intention of the Shar1c<3h3 (ii) that the
prevention of injury is as important as the obtaining of
benefit since both of which constitute collectively the
meaning of benefit. This does not contradict with
al-Khwarizml's restricting his definition of maslahah to
the prevention of injury only, because the preservation
of the intention of the Sharicah already considers the
positive aspect of benefit - i.e obtaining happiness.
Perhaps, this consideration has prompted Khwarizmi to
define maslahah negatively so as to include within its
canopy the objective and not to confine the intention
therein; and (iii) that the Lawgiver (God) has considered
each and every benefit in the Sharicah in a sense that
all benefits are connected, whether directly or
indirectly, to the preservation of the five fundamentals,
viz: religion, life, mind, offspring and material wealth.
There is no difference of opinion between the Muslim
scholars in that whatever preserves these fundamentals is
a benefit and therefore must be taken into consideration,
and whatsoever jeopardizes them has to be eradicated.
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3.2 B. AL-MASALIH AL-MURSALAH AS A MEANS OF DECISION
MAKING
It has already been noted that the theory of
al-magalih al-mursalah owes its origin to the conception
that the Sharicah is for social utility, and its function
is to promote benefit and prevent evil. As we have seen
that Imam Malik approved the idea of public interest as
one of the means of decision making in the Shar!ce»h
and names this new device "al-masalih al-mursalah".7
According to MacDonald, the theory of al-masalih
al-mursalah, corresponds to utility, while in the words
of cAbd al-Rahim, the author of Muhammadan Jurisprudence,
it is somewhat similar to juristic equity or preference
(istihsan). He says that Imam Malik would allow a
deduction of law to be based on general considerations of
public good. But it does not appear that the Malik!
jurists took full advantage of this principle, and it
would seem that many followers of that school like the
Hanaf! doctors consider the doctrine to be too vague and
general to be useful in making legal deductions".8
Ijtihad or interpretation of the text, according to
this theory, is to consider the underlying or hidden
meaning of the revealed text in the light of the public
interest. Qiyas (analogy) is the primary method of
^ Abu Zahrah, Malik, p. 290
O —
° A. Rahim, Muhammadan Jurisprudence, p. 166
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tracing the effective cause of a similar nature. If the
cause is apparent it will be admittedly extended to
similar cases; but the difficulty arises when the cause
is not apparent. The Orthodox Caliphs, in such a case,
are claimed to have resorted to reason and tried to
discover the cause with reference to the meaning of the
words of the revealed text, the context and the
traditions of the Prophet. The application of this theory
demands the interpretation of the text according to
reason with regard primarily to social utility. Here lies
the major difference between the principle acted upon by
the Orthodox Cailphs and the use of independent judgment
known as "hikmah" (act of wisdom). Thus the users of this
theory base their "qiyas" or analogy on "hikmah" which
they call the underlying reason of the text. "cIllah"
(cause) is therefore replaced by hikmah in this theory.
"Modern Muslim scholars, says Kerr, are anxious to
convey the humanism of the Sharicah and tend to emphasize
the rational comprehensibility of the hikmah and its
relevance to the promotion of man's material interest. In
this process the distinction between hikmah and cillah is
sometimes lost, the latter term being employed to cover
the meaning of the former".9
Here we must refer to the twentieth century
g
Kerr, Islamic Reform, p. 67
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commentator, cAbd al-Wahhab Khallaf who emphasizes the
social utility of Sharicah. He draws a sharp difference
between cillah and hikmah. "cIllah", he says, must not
only be suitable (munasib) but also objectively
recognizable (gahir) and clearly defined (mundabit);
hikmah lacks these qualifications, yet it represents the
true motive for (God's) enactment of the ruling. Hikmah
is the main thing and the underlying reason without which
cillah will serve no purpose. TViUS/ Vie equates hikmah
with what al-Qarafi referred to as the "promotion of
benefit".
In order to show the difference between the cillah
of a ruling and its hikmah, Khallaf gives an instance of
the Qur'anic verse:
"(Fasting) is for a fixed number of days, but if
any of you is ill, or on a journey, the
prescribed number (should be made up) from the
days later".10
Relief from hardship, according to him, is the hikmah,
while travelling or illness is the cause.11 But he seems
to ignore the fact that hikmah in this case is implicit
in cillah and not separate from it, because hikmah ceases
to exist if the cillah is taken away. Besides, cillah or
cause is the ground of action, if it is considered to be
without hikmah it would amount to folly. Therefore,
10 Qur'Sn, 2:184
11 Khallaf, Masadir, p. 49
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cillah covers hikmah, and the interpreter has to take
into consideration cillah which is the effective cause of
the revealed ruling so as to extend it to similar cases.
He is not primarily concerned to identify the hikmah of
the ruling, but to identify the cillah that occasions the
ruling.
Relying on the hikmah, further more, would lead to
certain legal judgments being contradicted by the
conclusions of consensus. The prohibition of adultery,
for example, might be ascribed to the hikmah of the
necessity to protect genealogy; but on this basis, it
would be logical also to prohibit intermarriage between
persons of unknown parentage, which by consensus is not
in fact the case. The hikmah, in other words, is an
unacceptable criterion for judgment because of its
generality and uncertain character; reliance on it is
therefore presumptuous and likely to lead to
distortion.12
3.3 C. THE MAIN RESERVATIONS IN THE APPLICATION OF THE
THEORY OF AL-MASALIH AL-MURSALAH
The theory of al-masalih al-mursalah does not stand
aloof as an independent device of decision making
(judgment) in Islamic law. It is a supplementary tool
which helps an interpreter or a mujtahid to make up his
12
Kerr, op. cit., p. 74
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mind in the process of judging or giving verdicts to
cases for which no clear cut ordinance is specified in
the Qur'an or Sunnah. So, the Muslim scholars have
stipulated conditions and reservations in order to guide
the interpreter or mujtahid so that he would arrive at
the right decision and reach a safe conclusion in the
process of his decision making through the help of the
theory of al-masalih al-mursalah, and at the same time to
hinder him from attacking the Qur'anic and Sunnah
injunctions and keep him away from perversity. The main
reservations are as follows: (i) He should not build his
judgment, in which he finds public interest, upon
anything which has been abrogated by the Sharicah, since
that excludes the case from the circle of public
interests. This will be shown later to apply to the
verdict of Yahya ibn Yahya al-Laythi who thought of a
public interest which conflicted with a Qur'anic
injunction and was therefore cancelled. (ii) The benefit
should be a result of a well established principle and
not a result of a probable proposition or of fanciful
imagination. A typical example of this condition is, for
instance, to take away the right of divorce in an Islamic
marriage from a husband and vest it in the hands of a
wife; which is in clear opposition to the ordinance of
the Qur'an (2:230-32); so it is not considered a public
interest in this case and therefore is invalid. This is
simply because any benefit which conflicts with any
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injunction whether in the Qur'an or Sunnah is rendered
void. (iii) The benefit should be observed in a
universal manner and should not be deemed in a particular
mode. A rule or law in Islam is not established for an
individual or a particular family or for a specific
group, but it is generally promulgated for all
individuals; because one of the most important qualities
of the legislating nature of Islam is universality. The
laws in the Sharlcah are prescribed to suit and include
all mankind the world over. No reservations or privileges
should be reserved for a special group of people, all the
responsible human beings (believers) are equal before the
Sharicah in the eyes of the Lawgiver.
For that reason, the Muslim scholars have
recommended the attacking of an enemy who shields himself
with the Muslim prisoners of war even though that action
would mean the killing of those Muslims. This is due to
the dependence of public interest in this issue. The
Muslim scholars have established that the enemy is, in
any case, to be attacked except where the danger is
general and reaches all the people. Were it possible to
encircle the enemy within a fort to stop him from
endangering Islam and the Muslims present within the
region of this fort, then it is not recommended to depend
on public interest to attack the enemy and cause death to
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those Muslim prisoners of war.13 (iv) It is an object of
common sense to apply the theory of al-masalih
al-mursalah to a case where there is no conflict with a
clear injunction whether from the Qur'an, Sunnah or ijmac
or qiyas. For we do not need to turn to the theory of
al-masalih al-mursalah except when we fail to find direct
rules or ordinances from these sources, (v) The benefit
should neither be superseded by another important benefit
nor should it be equal to it in preference. This means
that there should be a criterion by which a certain
benefit, as distinguished by a mujtahid, may be assessed.
The standard which is agreed upon by most of the Muslim
jurists and scholars is the consideration of benefits
according to the order of the five fundamental principles
of the aim of the Sharlcah in regard to man; viz: The
preservation of his religion, his life, his mind, his
offspring and his material wealth.
If two benefits come into conflict where one of them
needs be selected while the other is discarded or
suspended, the two benefits should be examined and
assessed in three aspects:- (i) to have a clear vision of
the value of each benefit in respect of their importance;
(ii) to have a general understanding of the extent of
each benefit's utilty; and (iii) to have a clear
1 o „
M.A. Saleh, Masadir al-tashric al-Islami wa manahij al-istinbat,
p. 485
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assurance of whether their results will actually happen
or not.
The preference of one benefit over the other as
regards importance, extent of general utility and the
anticipation of its good results is made through the
following procedure:- "The benefit which preserves man's
religion takes precedence over the one meant to preserve
his life if the two benefits conflict with each other;
that which preserves man's life takes precedence over the
one which preserves his mind; that which preserves man's
mind takes precedence over the one which preserves his
offspring; and that which preserves man's offspring takes
precedence over the one which preserves his material
wealth.14
3.4 D. THE SCOPE AND CLASSIFICATION OF BENEFITS
Muslim jurists consider that the intention of the
Sharlcah is to attain lawful benefits for human beings
the attainment of which will bring them happiness here in
the world and in the hereafter. Added to this is a clear
conception that the Sharlcah is a revealed code of law
from God, the All-Wise and the All-Knowing who knows
what suits mankind best and that which does not suit
them. It goes without saying, therefore, that the
14
For a detailed elucidation of these reservations see
M.S.R. al-Buti, in his Dawabit al-maslahah fi al-Sharicah
al-Islamiyyah, pp. 119-275
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Sharlcah contains all the legal aspects which help people
to procure benefits and repel injuries. Public interest
is therefore something inherent in the actions of the
Lawgiver (God) and His intentions provided that there is
no indication in the Sharicah for a particular thing to
be considered or discarded.
It is important to bear in mind that legal
obligations in the Sharlcah are divided into two
divisions: (i) that which concerns the organisation of
the relationship between man and his Creator, i.e the
acts of worship; and (ii) that which concerns the
organisation of relationship between human bings -
individuals as well as groups, societies and nations -
i.e laws governing behaviour and transactions
(mucamalat). The underlying principle for the first
division is obedience to God (to acquire
God-consciousness) through following the ordained acts of
worship by observing their provision as well as knowing
the methods of performing them without looking into their
causes and effects because that exercise is applicable to
laws governing behaviour and transactions and not to acts
of worship. Moreover, it is not essential for one who
worships to know the cause and effect or even the reason
for a particular act of worship, because by doing so it
deprives him of servitude. It is also not permitted to
him to innovate new acts of worship instead of the
ordained ones because the Prophet of Islam has said,
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every innovation (in the acts of worship) is
perversion and the abode of every perversion is hell
fire".15
The issue in connection with the acts of worship is
clear since the Sharlcah requires, in the first place,
the attainment of subservience to God, the Almighty.
Subservience to God implies the liberation of an
individual from any servitude except that of God alone.
To prepare the soul for this is one of the objectives of
the Sharicah - i.e the preparation of a good individual
in society. This division of obligations (i.e acts of
worship), therefore, does not enter into the orbit of our
research on benefits, though an individual may discover
and try to interpret some implications of benefit in
various acts of worship. It is without doubt that God has
not ordained rules for nothing; we read, for instance,
these verses in the Qur'an:
"O ye who believe! Fasting is prescribed to you
as it was prescribed to those before you, that ye
may (learn) self-restraint";16
" verily prayer restrains (one) from shameful
and unjust deeds ".17
"From their goods take alms, that so thou
mightest purify and sanctify them; and pray on







However, the implications and clear intention of the
Lawgiver may appear in some or most of the acts of
worship, there is also a great portion of acts of worship
with implications which are hidden or unknown to the
human mind. For the human mind in connection with faith
in God sometimes cannot perceive its implications, and it
is not necessary to know the wisdom behind a particular
injunction in matters of faith since the material comes
from God who does not lay a rule except for the good of
human beings. God does not oblige human beings to do or
leave something except for the success and prosperity of
an individual and a group: and the mind does not find any
oddity in accepting such a faith as long as the acts of
worship, in their various forms, are free from
absurdities. Perhaps it is better to mention here that
the difference between an act of worship with an abstruse
implication (wisdom) and the one which is absurd is
clear. It goes without saying, therefore, that acts of
worship are mainly meant for the adoration of and the
obedience to God alone, and the reasons for their
enforcement are primarily confined to the knowledge of
the Lawgiver (God) alone, that is because almost all the




As for the second division of legal obligations in
the Sharlcah comprising of rules of behaviour and
transactions, its scope and range is the organization of
the relationships between people in terms of society and
also internationally. A mujtahid or an interpreter could
discover very easily that the underlying principles for
transactions are based upon the consideration of worldly
benefits which appeal to the mind and are recognized to
be the supreme tenets of individual and communal life.
So, this is the reason why we find that the Muslim
scholars, in matters concerning customs and transactions,
unanimously agree with each other that the consideration
of causes and reasons should be dominant.19 This is
because the intention of the Sharlcah is to ensure the
correct structure of society where its network is
encompassed by justice, tranquility and prosperity so as
to assure the success of an individual and of the society
at large.
Take prayer, for instance, it is not permissible for
r
its structure, the number of rakacat (prostrations),
duration, their circumstances etc. to be influenced by a
change of place, season, generation or race. We neither
need to find out the reason for its structure and
conditions so that we could get rid of it nor can we add
19
A.S. Muhammad, Masadir al-tashric al-Islami wa manahij
al-istinbat, p. 465
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anything new to it, simply because the Prophet of Islam
has said,
"Pray in the way you have seen me praying".20
and God said,
"Verily, prayer is ordained to the believers at
prescribed times".21
Whereas in matters concerning customs and transactions
we are in need of knowing the cause and reason by which a
certain contract is sanctioned or becomes null in order
to legalize its execution and give allowance to a new
rule for a new contract; or to give room for an emergency
in the society which is ever changing and developing.
Wherever legal benefits are found to exist free from
the encroachment of passions and lusts, the Sharlcah
ackowledges and recognizes them and encourages people to
obtain them; and wherever injuries are found the Sharicah
fights and checks them and enjoins people to refrain from
them. Once it becomes clear that the injunctions of the
Sharlcah concerning transactions and personal dealings
aim at bringing benefits to human beings and repelling
injuries from them, it should be realised that the
benefits according to the Muslim jurists are categorized
into three kinds: (1) Considered benefits (masalih
muctabarah) - these are benefits which have been laid
2 0 — —
Reported by al-Bukhari and Muslim
21 Qur'an, 4:103
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down by the Lawgiver with clear'legal proofs; (2)
Cancelled benefits (masalih mulghah) - these are
benefits which have been cancelled by the Lawgiver; and
(3) Unrestricted benefits (masalih mursalah) - these are
the ones which no injunction is given to consider them or
to discard them; they are left to be judged
independently.22
The considered benefits are further divided into
three kinds: (i) The necessary benefits (al-daruriyyat);
(ii) The reasonable benefits (al-hajiyyat); (iii) The
luxurious benefits (al-tahsiniyyat).
3.5 THE NECESSARY BENEFITS
These are the benefits which people cannot do
without, for their lives would become chaotic in their
absence. To preserve these bene-fits is therefore an
urgent need of human existence on earth and they are
attained through the ascertainment of their principles.
According to Muslim scholars these benefits concern the
preservation of religion, life, mind, offspring and
material wealth. The preservation of each one of these
five things is considered necessary and essential.
The preservation of religion is a considerable
benefit which the Sharicah has dealt with extensively.
22 Al-Shatibi, Al-muwafagat, vol. 2, pp. 2-11; Al-ictisam, vol. 2,
pp. 95-108
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The Sharicah has obliged able Muslims to fight for the
cause of God (jihad) to preserve religion, so that the
doctrine of monotheism should reign supreme and eradicate
all the impediments and shackles confronting humanity at
large. The Qur'an says:
"And fight them (the transgressors) until there
is no more tumult or oppression, and there
prevail justice and faith in God. But if they
cease, let there be no hostility except to those
who practise oppression".23
The preservation of life is a legal benefit which
has been dealt with by the Sharicah at length; and a
severe penalty has been specified by the Sharlcah for
those who illegitimately take life in order to secure the
life of mankind and preserve it from extinction. The rule
of legal retaliation (qisas) has been laid down by the
Sharlcah in order to prevent any hostility among human
beings. The Qur'an says:
" And if anyone is slain wrongfully, we have
given his heir (next of kin) authority (to demand
qisas or to forgive); but let him not exceed
bounds in the matter of taking life; for he is
helped (by the Law)".24
In order to assure the security of mankind and the right
to life for every human being and to crush cruelties and
transgressions the Qur'an says:
"0 ye who believe! the law of equality is





for the free, the slave for the slave, the woman
for the woman. But if any remission is made by
the brother of the slain, then grant any
reasonable demand, and compensate him with
handsome gratitude. This is a concession and a
mercy from your Lord. After this whoever exceeds
the limits shall be in grave penalty".25
The Qur'an has laid underlying principles for the
preservation of human life, prevention of committing sins,
removal of severity in duties, in addition to the
illegalization of commiting suicide; all these show
clearly that the Sharlcah is deeply concerned with the
preservation of life.
The enactment of taking vengeance (gisas) is a
modification of the prevailing custom before the advent
of Islam, which could lead to uncontrolled bloodshed.
When the Qur'an came into existence it was made clear
that the taking of revenge in a legal way is not aimed
at the preservation of the life of an individual only but
as a deterrent to preserve society. The Qur'an says:
"In the law of Equality there is (saving of) life
to you, 0 ye men of understanding; that ye may
restrain yourselves".26
In order to preserve a balanced mind, the Sharlcah
has prohibited intoxicants and has enjoined the Muslims
to refrain from all activities which make the mind





"0 ye who believe! Wine and gambling, (dedication
of) stones, and (divination by) arrows, are an
abomination of Satan's handiwork; Eschew such
(abomination), that ye may prosper".27
The Prophet of Islam is reported to have said:
"Every intoxicant is liquor and every liquor is
forbidden".28
Above all, there are several rules governing the whole
issue of the preservation of a balanced mind and
empowering its faculties so as to prepare grounds for its
activities; those rules have been expounded at length by
the Muslim jurists.
In connection with the preservation of offspring,
which is named by some scholars as - the safeguarding of
kinship and chastity - the Sharicah has ordained the act
of marriage as a positive measure. We read in the saying
of the Prophet of Islam:
"Intermarry extensively and spread so that I may
stand proudly with you as the best of the nations
on the Day of Judgment".29
The Sharicah permitted polygamy as a motivation, and an
alternative, to attain the preservation of offspring, and
has entrusted to the husband the obligation of doing
justice to all the wives equally. Says the Qur'an:
27
Qur'an, 5:90
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° Related by al-Bukhari and Muslim? also refer to al-Shawkani, Nail
al-awtar, vol. 7, p. 148
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J Related by al-Bukhari and Muslim. Another wording of this saying
as related by Ahmad ibn Hanbal and narrated by Anas ibn Malik reads,
"Marry the virgins so that I possess more population above all the
Messengers of God on the Day of Resurrection"
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"Marry women of your choice, two or three, or
four; but if ye fear that ye shall not be able to
deal justly (with them), then (marry) only
one" .
To the same end, the Sharicah has prohibited adultery
and fornication and laid down a painful punishment to
those who do it and has legislated it in order to close
all the doors leading to this sinful act which, in the
long run, breaks down the bonds of kinship and demolishes
good character and generates recklessness and
irresponsibility in society.
Concerning the preservation of material wealth, the
Sharlcah has imposed a severe punishment to thieves and
robbers and laid down various rules to enable people to
earn their living legally, and prohibited them from
plundering the belongings of others. The Qur'an says:
"As to the thief, male or female, cut off his or
her hand; a punishment by way of example from God
for their crime; and God is Exalted in Power".31
3.6 THE REASONABLE BENEFITS
These are the benefits which people need to avoid
inconvenient conditions only. The absence of these
benefits neither harms people's lives nor causes
disequilibrium in their worldly and religious welfare





the general features of the Sharlcah. We see, for
instance, permission is granted to a sick person and a
traveller, to break the fast during the month of Ramadan:
"But if anyone is ill or on a journey, the
prescribed period (should be made up) by days
later. God intends every facility for you; He
does not want to put you to difficulties".32
We see also in connection with prayer that a four
prostration prayer may be reduced to two prostrations in
particular circumstances; eg. on a journey or in jihad.
The Qur'an says:
"When ye travel through the earth, there is no
blame on you if ye shorten your prayers for fear
the unbelievers may attack you".
With regard to transactions we see the Lawgiver allowing
trade and commerce and forbiding usury. We do not need to
visualize much in order to comprehend the demand of
people for these two principles - i.e allowing trade and
commerce and forbidding usury. There are numerous
examples of this type in the Sharicah which give scope
for mankind to accommodate all the new circumstances of
life.
3.7 THE LUXURIOUS BENEFITS
These are benefits which are neither necessary for
the smooth running of people's lives nor important for





community's prosperity. They are embellishers of an
already confortable life. The taking, for instance, of
sophisticated ornaments and adopting highly cultured
customs which make the community look at ease are not
necessities of life; they are a surplus to normal life.
Inspite of this lack of necessity, the Sharicah has taken
this issue into consideration in order to provide the
opportunity of happiness and success in this life as well
as in the hereafter. We see, for instance, the Prophet of
Islam commanding the Muslims to observe strictly the
rules of tidiness, wearing new clothes on cid (festival)
celebrations, putting on clean white clothes on occasions
of some gathering. As we find also, in order to attain
luxurious benefits, harmful food-stuffs have been
forbidden and the eating of bad smelling foods is
abhorred.
We therefore find that the thing which is necessary
for life is categorized in the essentials
(al-daruriyyat), that which makes life more enjoyable is
in the category of embellishers (al-tahsiniyyat), and
that which lies between the two is in the category of
ordinary needs and requirements (al-hajiyyat),34
Al-cIzz ibn cAbd al-Salam, Qawacid al-ahkam fi masalih al-anam,
vol. 1, pp. 60-61
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3.8 THE CANCELLED BENEFITS
These are the benefits which have been discarded in
the Sharicah. They are secondary benefits which conflict
with the primary ones, or they are primary benefits which
create grave injuries. An example of this type of
discarded benefits is to surrender to an enemy when one
is capable of defending oneself. It may appear, at the
first glance, that surrendering to an opponent brings
peace to people and stops the shedding of innocent blood
and so on; nonetheless, the Lawgiver considers this act
to lead to successive injuries; such as the domination of
the enemy over the conquered, the exploitation of the
wealth of the conquered and the oppression of the subject
population etc. For these reasons and others, the
Lawgiver has ordained the obligation of self defence to
safeguard the liberty and the security of the Ummah as an
imperative thing and has urged the preservation of the
boundaries and the maintenance of the Ummah in order to
achieve the Ummah's sovereignty and keep the intruders
aloof. The act of not yielding to the enemy helps in
bringing victory and stability to the Ummah and prepares
it to succeed in the difficulties of life.
Another example of the discarded benefits is that of
committing suicide for somebody who finds difficulty in
earning his living, or for someone who is seriously sick
and who despairs of recovering. It would seem at first
glance that committing suicide by these people is an
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individual benefit which puts an end to the torment of
the disease or to the misfortune of life. Nevertheless
the injuries caused by this act are numerous the least of
which would be the termination of human perseverance and
the assassination of character in the society and the
creation of inordinate uncertainty in the hearts of
individuals as well as communities. It also causes
narrowness of optimism and disbelief of the natural
fatality of man which surrounds him from all angles. The
disbelief in the natural fatality of man generates
passiveness and negativity in the mind, while belief in
it imbues man with positiveness and faith.
The Sharicah has forbidden committing suicide and
abhors those who do it and it has declared its exercise
like killing an innocent person with no cause; the Qur'an
says:
"Take not life which God hath made sacred except
by way of justice and law";35
"And do not kill (destroy) yourselves; for verily
God hath been to you most merciful".36
The Prophet of Islam is reported to have prohibited the
killing of oneself, and considered it to be the action of





37 The tradition has been related by al-Bukhari
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Among the examples of cancelled benefits is the
issue of polygamy; a right which rests in the hands of a
husband. Polygamy may appear to bring injuries and
grievances to women, and it would be of great benefit to
them if it did not exist at all. Nevertheless, the
Sharxcah has cancelled this benefit to provide for the
needs of a husband: eg. the need to get children in case
the first wife was barren; the need for social
intercourse which would not be possible to a long term
diseased wife; the need for social welfare and wellbeing
of women whose husbands have died, either being killed in
wars or by calamities, etc.
In this same field of cancelled benefits we bring
forward the verdict of Yahya ibn Yahya al-Laythl, a
famous Andalusian scholar, and the standpoint of other
Muslim scholars towards his verdict. The ArmV of
al-Andalus, cAbd al-Rahman ibn al-Hakam, had sexual* • • *
contact with his wife during the day time of the fasting
month of Ramadan after which he felt sorry for his action
and collected jurists to ask them what would be the
necessary remedy for his action. So, Yahya ibn Yahya
al-Laythl, being a prominent jurist of his time, replied:
"I find no remedy for you except to fast two
consecutive months without breaking a single
day".38
O O
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While it is known in the Sharicah that he who breaks the
fast in this way has the choice of either setting a slave
free, or fasting two consecutive months or feeding sixty
poor people.39. When other jurists questioned him on his
verdict, he replied by saying:
"Were we to open the door of choice to him, it
would be simple for him to have sexual contact
with his wife daily in the month of Ramadan and
simply set free a slave or feed sixty poor people
(because of his richness); so, I have made the
remedy more difficult in order that he should not
repeat the same action again".40
What is noteworthy in this verdict is that it is
based upon a vested benefit which has not been considered
by the Lawgiver. Yes, it might seem that in making the
AvVUf"* cAbd al-Rahman, fast two months consecutively
was to provide a great benefit to him and deter him from
following his passions which made him disobey God and to
set an example to others. Nonetheless, the Sharicah has
not approved this benefit and cancelled it simply because
the choice for remedy applies to all believers regardless
of their economic or social status. The Sharlcah has just
made unlawful and sinful to have sexual intercourse
during the day in Ramadan to all Muslims equally without
segregation between the ruler and the ruled, and has
sanctioned any one of the three mentioned penalties. The
3 9 —
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40 M.A. Saleh, op. cit., p. 472
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Sharicah has depended in this matter upon the view of
fear of God which acts as the first guard in an
individual's soul besides the punishment for the remedy,
to assist the safeguarding of the Law of God and its
executions. So, since the Sharlcah has cancelled the
benefit which has drawn the attention of Yahya ibn Yahya
al-Laythi, the Muslim scholars have rendered his verdict
null and void.
3.9 UNRESTRICTED BENEFITS
These are the benefits which enter the realm of the
consideration of the Lawgiver and His intentions. There
is no evidence in the Sharicah which specifies the
necessary utility of these benefits nor is there any
indication which suggests their removal. These benefits
are called "unrestricted benefits" due to the fact that
the Sharicah has not given direct injunctions on whether
to act upon them or discard them as opposed to the
considered benefits which the Sharlcah has commanded to
be acted upon, and the cancelled benefits which have been
rejected by it. For this reason there are some scholars
who use the term "al-istislah" to mean al-masalih
al-mursalah.
If the meaning of al-masalih al-mursalah tallies
with the meaning of istislah as put forward by some
scholars, and since the Sharlcah does not command man to
do anything except for the benefit of human beings, it
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seems appropriate therefore to take al-masalih
al-mursalah as one of the devices of decision making in
Islamic Law.41
As we have seen previously in chapter one that the
original sources of the Sharlcah are: The Qur'an, the
Sunnah, the ijmac and qiyas; and if a rule is to be given
for a certain case whether wajib (compulsory) or mandub
(recommended), or _ia'i_z (lawful), or makruh (loathsome),
or haram (illegal), we look in the Qur'an for its
enactment; if we do not find it therein, we look in the
Sunnah for its decision. If we do not find in the Sunnah,
we look in the ijmac. But if we do not find a rule for a
certain case in one of these three sources, we resort to
the fourth source qiyas (analogy). We have seen clearly,
when we talked about analogy in chapter one, that
decisions and judgments are connected to causes cilal);
and cillah (the singular of cilal) is a qualification
which if ever found in a particular action or occurrence
of a certain decision or judgment is made similar to
another occasion bearing the same cillah.
In this way we find the Sharlcah connects these
qualifications with causes but without connecting
decisions or judgments with benefits which cannot be
41
M.S.R. al-Buti, Dawabit al-maslahah fi al-Sharicah al-Islamiyyah,
p. 387 and so on
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defined on certain occasions. Moreover, there is a
problem of difference of opinion in demarcating the
limits of benefits. So, the genuine methodology which
could be applied by a jurist or a mujtahid is first of
all to identify the suitable cillah which would be
approved by the Sharicah and then give a decision or
judgment to that particular occasion and other new
occurrences bearing the same cillah.
But events and occurrences are limitless. A jurist
or a mujtahid might face a new event daily; does he make
new decisions depending on benefits for new events and
occurrences which do not bear similar cilal to the
previous ones which have ordinances or is he to stand
still without making any decision, knowing that it is
incumbent upon him to give legal decisions to those
occurrences so that people are kept aware of the
Tightness or wrongness of their actions?42
Were it to be discovered that some type of drink
makes the mind sluggish, slow in thinking and creates bad
character but does not make a person drunk; are we to
permit it as a lawful drink due to the lack of
intoxication or are we to make it unlawful for the
benefit of the preservation of mind and character and get
42 See al-Shatibi, Al-muwafagat, vol. 1, pp. 15-17; also Abu Zahrah,
Malik, p. 398 and so on
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rid of all the impurities which contaminate the integrity
of an individual as well as that of the society at large?
Without any shadow of doubt, according to the intention
of the Sharlcah, we have to declare the drink unlawful to
ensure the legal benefit; and in doing so we have already
applied the theory of al-masalih al-mursalah.
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Chapter 4
MASLAHAH AS A GENERAL AND A TECHNICAL TERM
• •
4.1 MASLAHAH AS A GENERAL TERM
• •
It is quite often claimed that "maslahah" as a
principle of legal reasoning - broadly speaking, to argue
that "good" is "lawful": and that "lawful" must be good -
came to be used at a very early period in the development
of fiqh. The use of this principle is attributed, for
instance, to the early jurists of the "Ancient schools of
law" or even to the Companions of the Prophet. Amomg the
founders of the schools of law, it is associated with
Malik b. Anas. There seems, however, to be a confusion in
these statements in equating the use of "maslahah" as a
general term with its use as a technical term. The early
use of maslahah may have been in its general sense
similar to other terms such as ra'y. Rudi Paret has
observed that the word maslahah as a technical term is
not used by Malik or al-Shafici; hence this concept must
have developed in the post-al-Shafici period.1
Paret's observation, however, does not refute the
possibility already discussed that considerations similar
to maslahah were employed by pre-al-Shafici jurists. Such
considerations do not seem to have been formulated in
1
R. Paret, Istihsan and Istislah, Shorter Encyclopedia of Islam,
[Leiden: Brill, 1961], p. 185
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technical legal terms. The proponents of the use of
maslahah in the early period have, apparently, confused
the early similar considerations with maslahah. It is,
therefore, not incorrect to say that the post-al-Shafici
development of the concept of maslahah was a continuation
of such early methods of reasoning which were not yet
formally defined. Later, when al-Shafici's definition of
the method of reasoning in terms of "sources" and his
insistence that the reasoning be linked with the revealed
texts through qiyas, prevailed over other methods the
concept and method of maslahah was also seen, especially
by Shafici jurists in terms of "sources".
From Imam al-Haramayn al-Juwayni's (438/1047)
Al-burhan, it appears that by his time the validity of
reasoning on the basis of maslahah had become a problem
controversial enough to bring forth three schools of
thought. In this respect some Shaficis and a number of
"mutakallimun"2 are claimed to have maintained that the
acceptable maslahah is only that which has a specific
textual basis (asl). The mursalah (a maslahah not based
on such an asl and such as are contradictory to the
textual evidence (dalil) are not valid. The second school
of thought is attributed to Imam al-ShaficI and to the
majority of Hanafls in general. They believe that
2
A group of usuliyyun in the w®d(aeva,l per iod of Islam were
in-fluevicecj by theological exposition in tlnelr leg&l
interpfG+dt-'i
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maslahah even if it is not supported on a specific basis,
can still be used, provided that it is similar to those
masalih which are unanimously accepted or which are
textually established. The third school is attributed to
Imam Malik who held that a maslahah existed without any
consideration of the condition of similarity or whether
it corresponded with the texts or not.3
This comment by al-Juwaynl does not help us in
determining the dates of the use of maslahah but it is
very significant to note what divides these schools on
maslahah. First, the comment shows that it was the method
of reasoning which sought its basis in the revealed
texts. Secondly, if we accept the attribution of
maslahah to the names of the jurists given in this
comment, it also shows that the method of maslahah in its
early formulation by Imam Malik and his followers was
independent of the consideration of "sources" or "basis"
and further that maslahah was accepted by others if it
conformed to "sources" - to the text in the case of the
first group and to ijmac in case of the second group.
They rejected only al-maslahah al-mursalah because it did
not conform with the sources. This explains why the
concept of maslahah which originally was not necessarily
Imam al-Haramayn al-Juwayni, Al-burhan fi Usui al-fiqh, MS. Ill
Ahmet 1321, photo. I.R.I, no: 219, fol. 135a; see also Mustafa
al-Shalabi, Taclil Al-ahkam, [Cairo: al-Azhar, 1949], pp. 292ff
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conceived and confined within the framework of "sources",
came to be seen, particularly by later Shaficis, in
reference to "sources". This confused the discussion of
the concept of maslahah as we shall see later. One
indication of this confusion that may be noticed in the
following analysis, is the tendency to discuss maslahah
at two levels, i.e first in terms of need and
effectiveness, and second in reference to sources. When
discussed in terms of validity, these two levels were
confused.
4.2 MASLAHAH AS A TECHNICAL TERM
• •
Al-Juwaynl analysed maslahah as an extra-textual
basis of reasoning in the context of analogy by cillah
into five categories. First is the category where its
macna (significance) is rationally understandable and
where it is related to certain essential necessities
(darurat) which are inevitable. The second category
concerns what is a general need (hajat cammah), but below
the level of darurI. Third is the category which belongs
to neither of the above, but rather concerns something
which is noble (mukarramah). The fourth category is
similar to the third, call it less noble, yet in terms of
priorities, the fourth comes later. The fifth category
concerns those usul whose macna is not obvious, and is
not demanded by darurah, nor by hajah; nor is it required
by a mukarramah. Examples of this category are the
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purely physical cadat.4
Maslahah as a technical term is not used in the
Zahirl jurist Ibn Hazm's (456/1065) Al-ihkam fi Usui
al-ahkam, orrniingHanaf l jurist, Pazdawi's (d. 482/1089)
Usui.
The terms maslahah and masalih are used by the
Muctazili Abu al-Husayn al-Basri (ot- 47S/10&5) bothin ejeneral
and in technical sense. To him masalih are good things,
and maslahah means goodness. Al-Basri discusses maslahah
in reference to istidlal and cillah, and in arguments
against his opponents who maintain that masalih cannot be
known through reasoning at all. At one point he defines
al-masalih al-sharciyyah as those acts which we are
obliged to do by the Sharicah such as cibadat.5 Related to
these acts are the means to achieving the Sharci
commands; these means are also connected with masalih.
These means are dalil (evidence), amarah (sign), sabab
(cause), cillah (reason) and shart (condition). The
illustrations of these terms are given as follows: the
validity of consensus, analogy, measurability for riba
(usury) and the conditions in contracts of sale. All of
these means are connected with maslahah.6 For instance,
4
See al-Juwayni, op. cit., fols. 108ff
5 See Abu al-Husayn al-Basri, Al-muctamad fI Usui al-fiqh, {Dimashq:
Al-machad al-cilmi al-Firansi, 1964}, vol. 2, p. 888
® See al-Basri, op. cit., p. 888
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the connection of amarah and cillah is evident in what
follows: When a correct sign indicatesa quality (wasf) as
a reason (cillah), we decide that it is the basis of
maslahah ... It indicates that the basis of maslahah is
r t • a
not to be found wherever an cillah is found.7
For al-Basrl, then, maslahah is an end for which
cillah and other related terms are means. Al-Basri,
• *
however, does not elaborate what these masalih are and
what the connection is between al-masalih al-sharciyyah
which he mentions, and the other masalih which he does
not mention.
4.3 TWO MAIN STAGES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF
MASLAHAH
• •
In the following centuries, however, the concept of
maslahah advanced quite significantly. There are two
main stages in the development of this concept. One is
represented by al-Ghazall in the early twelfth century,
the other by al-Razi in the early thirteenth century.
4.3.1 AL-GHAZALI'S CONCEPT OF MASLAHAH
• •
In al-Ghazali's (d. 1111) Al-mustasfa, the problem
of maslahah is discussed more clearly and fully than by
al-Basrl. Al-Ghazall defines maslahah as follows:
"In its essential meaning (aslan) it (maslahah)
is an expression for seeking something beneficial
(manfacah) or removing something harmful
(madarrah). But this is not what we mean, because
7 —
Al-Basri, op. cit., p. 805
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seeking benefit and removing harm are the
objectives (maqasid) (in usul al-fiqh) at which
the creation (khalq) aims and the goodness
(salah) of creation consists in realizing their
goals (maqasid). What we mean by maslahah is the
preservation of the maqsud (objective) of the law
(sharc) which consists of five things:
preservation of religion, of life, of reason, of
descendants and of property. What assures the
preservation of these five usul (principles) is
maslahah and whatever fails to preserve them is
mafsadah and its removal is maslahah".8
Maslahah as understood in the above definition is
then divided into the following three categories. First,
the type of maslahah which has a textual evidence in
favour of its consideration; second, the type which is
denied by a textual evidence; third, the type where there
is neither a textual evidence in favour, nor in
contradiction. The first category is valid and can be the
basis of qiyas.9 The second is obviously forbidden. It is
the third category which needs further consideration.
Accordingly, the element of maslahah contained in the
third category is further examined from the viewpoint of
its strength. From this angle there are three grades of
maslahah as we have seen before, viz: daruriyyat,
hajiyyat and tahsiniyyat or tazylnat. The preservation of
the above-mentioned five principles is covered in the
grade of daruriyyat. This is the strongest kind of
8 See al-Ghazali, Al-mustasfa min cilm al-usul, {Baghdad: Muthanna,
1970}, vol. 1, pp. 286-87
^ Ibid., p. 284
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maglahah. The second grade consists of those masalih and
munasabat (occasions) which are not essential in
themselves but are necessary to realize the masalih in
general. The third grade is neither of the above but
exists only for the refinement of things.10
Keeping this classification in mind, only that
al-maslahah al-mursalah i.e that which is not supported
by textual evidence, will be accepted which has three
qualities: darurah (essential), qatciyyah (decisive) and
kulliyyah (totality). The other two grades of maslahah,
however, are not admissible if they are not supported by
a specific textual evidence. If these are supported by
the text, the reasoning is then called qiyas, otherwise,
it is called istislah which is similar to istihsan,11
and, hence invalid.
Al-Ghazall counts istislah along with istihsan
among the methods of reasoning which do not have the same
validity that qiyas has. He calls such methods "usul
mawhumah" - those principles in which the mujtahid relies
on imagination or on his discretion rather than on
Tradition.12
The above definition and classification of maslahah
10 Al-Ghazali, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 290
11 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 306
12 Al-Ghazali, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 274, 284
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have a particular place in al-Ghazall's structure of the
discussion of usul al-fiqh. A brief analysis of this
structure will reveal the place that al-Ghazall gave to
the concept of maslahah. Al-Ghazall divides the
discussion of usul in his book Al-mustasfa into six
parts. Apart from the first two parts which deal with
introductory matters such as definition of usul and an
introduction to methods of logic, the remainder of the
parts discusses the following subject matters of usul:
hukm (command); al-adillah al-arbacah (the four
evidences) i.e Qur'an, Sunnah, ijmac and caql; -
interpretation and analogy; and taqlid (imitation) and
ijtihad. The above treatment of maslahah appears as an
annex to the discussion of the four evidences.13 Also it
is significant that it is not discussed in the part
dealing with methods of interpretation and analogy,
although its connection is implied.
References to maslahah, however, appear in other
parts also. In the part of hukm, where al-Ghazall
discusses its essential meaning (haqiqah) and its four
components, maslahah is mentioned occasionally. The four
components of hukm, according to al-Ghazali are the
following: (1) hakim (the one who gives judgment; the
legislator, sovereign); (2) hukm (the judgment); (3)
13 Al-Ghazali, op. cit., pp. 284-315
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mahkum calayh (subject of judgement (4) mahkum flh (the
object of judgement, the act of mukallaf).
Discussing the meaning of hukm, he deals with the
question of whether the goodness or badness of acts (both
human and divine) is known objectively or through sharc
(law). His description of hasan (goodness) is similar to
his above definition of maslahah in its essential
meaning.14 At one point he even uses the term masalih in
place of hasan.15 He frequently refers to mafsadah in the
course of his analysis of mahkum fIh, in dealing with the
question whether only voluntary acts are objects of
judgement or not. He regards it as a mafsadah for
involuntary acts to be considered as objects of
command.16
Reference to maslahah is made again in the part of
methods of reasoning. Dealing with the method of qiyas,
he explains that qiyas has four components: (1) asl (the
root to which anology is made); (2) farc (the branch for
which analogy is sought); (3) cillah (the reason or the
basis of which analogy is made); and (4) hukm (the
judgment to which analogy leads). Al-Ghazali maintains
that qiyas, here, must be distinguished from qiyas in
14
See al-Ghazall, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 56-57
15 Ibid., p. 60
-1® Ibid., p. 87
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philosophy. This distinction lies, apart from the
difference in the form of reasoning, in the conception of
cillah itself. The cillah in fiqh is not "cause" but
merely a "sign".17 Naturally then the methods of finding
the cillah are also different. The evidence in which the
cillah is sought is "naqliyyah" (traditional), meaning
the Qur'an, Sunnah and ijmac. The cillah is either
explicit (sarIh) , or it is implicitly indicated (ima'),
or it is known from the sequence and order of the command
(sabab wa tartib). The fourth manner of finding the
cillah is istinbat (inference). The only valid methods
of istinbat are two: (1) al-sabr wa al-taqsim
(observation and classification; method of exclusion),
and (2) munasabah (suitability).18 It is in reference to
munasabah that maslahah as a main element of suitability
with sharc is frequently discussed.
Al-Ghazall defines "munasib" as that which, like
magalih, is achieved rationally (intadhama) as soon as it
is connected with the command (hukm).19 For a discussion
of the meaning, classification and grades of munasib,
al-Ghazall refers to the annex which is significantly
enough the discussion of maslahah and its grades.
Munasib and maslahah are, however, not identical.
17 _ —
See al-Ghazali, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 230
18 Ibid., vol. 2, 295ff
^ Ibid., p. 297
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Although al-Ghazall analyzes munasib also in terms of
effectiveness and validity in the same way as he does
with maslahah, yet the details vary. Among the various
classifications of munasib, one is of particular
significance for us, as it explains the relationship of
munasib to maslahah as well as the difference between
istihsan and istislah in the eyes of al-Ghazall. Munasib
is divided into four categories: first, the munasib which
is suitable and is supported by a specific textual
evidence. Second, that munasib which is neither suitable
nor is supported by the textual evidence. Third, that
munasib which is not suitable but is supported by textual
evidence. Fourth, that munasib which is suitable but is
not supported by textual evidence.20 Al-Ghazali adds that
in the above classification the first category is
acceptable to all jurists. The second category is called
istihsan which clearly means to make law according to
personal discretion. The fourth is called istislah or
al-istidlal al-mursal♦ It is clear from this
classification that maslahah is the basic consideration
for deciding the suitability or munasabah of something
which istihsan lacks. But again the munasabah of maslahah
further depends on its suitability or conformity to the
text in general; otherwise it will fall into the category
of istihsan.
7 0 — —
Al-Ghazali, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 306
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From al-Ghazali's treatment of maslahah, it can be
concluded in general that his predilection for examining
fiqh in terms of theology21 and for qiyas as a method of
reasoning, led him to examine the concept of maslahah
with reservations. From the point of view of theology, he
rejected the concept of maslahah in terms of human
utility; furthermore, he subjected it to scrutiny on the
basis of revealed texts. Secondly, he made the method of
reasoning by maslahah subordinate to qiyas. He did not
reject maslahah altogether, as he did with istihsan, but
the qualification he provided for the acceptance of
maslahah, did not allow it to remain an independent
principle of reasoning.
Furthermore, with the above limitations on the
concept of maslahah, he could now bring into focus the
other elements which are in his discussion quite relevant
to maslahah, such as takllf (legal obligation), haqiqat
al-hukm (the reality of a rule), fahm al-khitab (the
understanding of speech), niyyah (intention), tacbbud
(self consecration to God), etc. The discussions of these
elements are scattered through various chapters in his
Al-mustasfa. In addition, al-Ghazali did not see the
necessary relationship among different categories of
21 _ — — —
Al-Ghazali, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 5-7. Al-Ghazali complains
that the Transoxian jurists, such as Abu Zayd have tried to bring too
much fiqh into usul al-fiqh [p. 10]
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maslahah.
Some of the above points were taken into
consideration by some jurists after al-Ghazali, but more
systematic consideration was given to them by al-Shatibi,
as we shall see later.
4.4 THE INFLUENCE OF AL-GHAZALI ON OTHER JURISTS
Al-Ghazali's classification and definition were
followed by a number of jurists. His influence,
particularly in reference to maslahah, is very strong. As
Ibn Khaldun noticed, al-Basri's book Al-muctamad and
al-Ghazali's Al-mustasfa remained major sources of
influence for later writers on usul, until the appearance
of al-Razi's monumental work Al-mahsul.22
Al-mahsul combined the above two works and
reformulated a number of concepts. Al-Razi's Al-mahsul
then in turn became a source of considerable influence
for later usul works. This influence is evident from the
number of commentaries and abrigements on Al-mahsul that
were written in later periods. This work influenced even
MalikI and HanafI usul which has so far taken exception
to ShaficI influence. We need not go into details, but it
must be mentioned that al-Qarafi (684/1285), Ibn Hajib
(646/1249) and Ibn cAbd al-Salam with whom al-Shatibi was
22
See Ibn Khaldun, Al-muqaddimah, [Cairo: Bulaq, 1320 A.H], p. 431
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familiar and in general opposed, were largely under the
influence of Fakhr al-Din al-Razi's (606/1209) Al-mahsul.
Al-Razi's Al-mahsul23 is structured more on the
i ■
pattern of al-Basri's Al-muctamad than on al-Ghazali's
Al-mustasfa. Al-Razi deals with the definitions of the
basic terms in the introduction. Significantly enough,
the discussion about the meaning and classification of
hukm and the question of the goodness of acts constitute
more than half of this chapter. The scheme of the rest of
the chapter is exactly the same as that of al-Basri. The
references to maslahah are made, therefore, in the
introduction, where the question of goodness of acts is
discussed, in the chapter concerning qiyas where the
question of munasabah as a manner of finding cillah is
dealt with, and in the last chapter where al-masalih
al-mursalah are discussed as one of the ways of knowing
the commands of the Sharlcah in addition to qiyas.
4.5 AL-RAZI'S CONCEPT OF MASLAHAH
• •
Al-Razi does not define maslahah, but it seems that
in his thinking munasib and maslahah are quite closely
associated with each other. First, munasib is defined as
"what leads man to what is agreeable (yuwafiq) to him
both in "acquisition" (tahsil) and "preservation"
—
- — — - -
Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, Al-mahsul fi usul al-fiqh, MS. Yale
University, Nemoy, A - 1039 [L- 643]
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(ibqa').24 He explains that tahsll means to seek
"utility" (manfacah), and manfacah is pleasure (ladhdhah)
or its means. Ladhdhah is to achieve what is suited
(mulaim)♦ Ibqa' is explained similarly as removing harm
(madarrah), which is alam (pain) or its means. Both
ladhdhah and alam are evident and need not be defined.
Thus munasib in its final analysis is related to ladhdhah
in the positive sense and to alam in the negative sense.
The second definition of munasib is given as that
which is usually suited (fi al-cadah) to the actions of
the wise.25
Al-Razi then maintains that the first definition is
accepted by those who attribute hikam and masalih as
causes of God's commands. The second definition is
employed by those who do not accept the above
causality.26 This explanation takes us back to al-Razi's
own view on the problem of causality and God's commands.
This question is first dealt with in the course of
discussion of whether the goodness or badness of things
is rational or established by law. He argues that in as
much as the definition and understanding of good as
something "suitable to nature (of man)" or as "a quality
2^




of perfection" is concerned, undoubtedly good and bad are
rational. The point in question is, however, whether good
and bad can be defined with reference to praise or blame
as the Muctazilah have done.27 Al-Razi, after detailed
analysis, concludes that, if defined in the latter sense,
good and bad can be established only by law.28 The
question then is whether what is praised in God's
commands corresponds with the rational good or not. If it
corresponds, can this correspondence be understood as
cause or motive?
Al-Razi answers this question in detail in his
discussion of munasabah. He argues that to prove that
munasabah can be cillah, there are three premises to be
established: first, that God issued the commands for the
masalih of the people; second, that the case in question
consists of a maslahah; and third, that it can be shown
that the probable reason for God issuing this particular
command is this particular maslahah.29 Giving six proofs,
he establishes the first condition that the commands are
issued because of masalih. He explains, however, that in
contradiction to the Muctazilah the fuqaha' do not regard
maslahah as gharad (human need); they rather view it in
terms of the general significance (macna) or hikmah
2 7 — —
Al-Razi, op. cit., part I, f. 9a
Ibid., f. 13a
Al-Razi, op. cit., part II, f. 90b
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(philosophical basis). In fact, there is not much
difference between the two positions. The difference is
as follows: whereas the Muctazilah believe that God is
obliged to consider maslahah, the fuqaha' stress that He
is not obliged to do so. God has done so because of His
grace.30 The second condition needs no explanation. The
third condition, that this particular command attributes
a specific motive to God's acts and commands, is a
position which al-Ghazall does not accept.31 Al-RazI
resolves this problem by explaining it in the following
terms:
"Muslims believe that the revolving of the
heavens, the rising and the setting of the stars,
the continuity of their forms and the lights are
not obligatory, yet it has been God's custom to
continue them in one state. Inevitably it
provides the probability that this (i.e what
happens today) will continue tomorrow and after
tomorrow with the same qualities... To sum up, if
a certain thing occurs repeatedly many times, it
gives the probability that when it happens (next)
it will happen the same way... Now, when we
observe sharaic (laws), we find that the commands
and masalih occur together, without being
separated from each other, this is known
inductively...32
To sum up, al-RazI stresses that no motive or cause
can be attributed to God's acts or commands; yet he
admits that God's commands are for the maslahah of the
in
__ —
Al-Razi, op. cit., part II, f. 91b
31 Al-Ghazali, op. cit., part II, f. 92a
32 Ibid., f. 92b
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people, and this maslahah or munasabah can be considered
as an cillah for that command. The paradox in this
position is resolved in two explanations: first, that
these masalih are coincidental with God's acts, only
accidentally, not in terms of cause and effect and,
secondly, that it has happened this way not as a
necessary correlation between maslahah and command,
because God is not obliged to act in this way. Rather,
God has acted as He has as a Grace, so that a sign may be
established to make His command known.
Al-Razi has offered these explanations in view of
the possible objections against his admission of taclll
afcal Allah (to attribute causes to God's acts). It is
significant to note that al-Razi recounts the possible
criticism of his position in detail while his own defence
is very short and quite unsatisfactory. The criticism
consists of more than ten objections.33
Al-Razi's answer to this criticism is very brief,
two main points in his answer are as follows:
"We have explained that God's commands are issued
(mashrucah) because of the masalih. As to the
rational arguments that you have enumerated, they
are not applicable here (ghair masmucah). Because
if they are established, they would infringe upon
the legal obligation (taklif), whereas the
controversy over analogy whether in favour or in
opposition, is based on the acceptance of the
obligation. This well-considered answer is
33
See al-Razi, op. cit., ff. 92 - 97
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sufficient for all what you have mentioned".34
"Secondly, your criticism applies to those who
mantain that to attribute masalih as Hillah to
God's commands is rationally necessary. It is not
applicable to the one who holds that it is not
obligatory for God but He has done so because of
His Grace".35
Thus al-Razi could maintain that munasabah or
masalih were evidence for cillah, and could still insist
that God's commands had no motives. It is with this
reservation that al-Razi apparently accepted the first
definition of munasib. This is also the reason that he
divides munasib into two categories: haqiqi (true) and
iqnaci (seemingly convincing). Haqiqi is that munasib
which consists of either a maslahah in this world or one
in the hereafter. Iqnaci only appears to be a munasib; in
fact it is not.36
Like al-Ghazali, al-Razi also divides maslahah into
daruri, haji and tahsini. He divides munasib according to
ta'thir (effect) and shahadat al-sharc (textual
evidence), and mula'amah (suitability).37 With the
exception of certain differences of detail, he is
generally in agreement with al-Ghazali.
34 Al-Razi, op. cit., f. 97b
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid., f. 88b
37 Ibid., ff. 87 - 90
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In general, the attempt at expressing the concept of
maslahah in theological terms by al-Ghazali was completed
by al-Razi with much more emphasis. Al-Ghazali objected
that a conception of maslahah with reference to human
benefit alone and independent of God's determination, is
not theologically possible. Al-Razi gave this general
objection a specific theological content. He made it
clear that even to attribute the consideration of
maslahah in terms of human benefit to God's commands, is
to attribute causality to His acts and hence
theologically impossible. Both of these positions led to
a kind of ijbar (determination)38 Both implied that God's
commands demand obedience in their own right, not because
of maslahah. If there existed the content of maslahah in
- » a a
Sharicah, it was to be explaned by the grace of God or by
accident, as al-Razi held. These positions rendered the
question of moral and legal responsibility meaningless.
Al-Razi admitted such implications of his position for
the question of taklif as well as for the problem of
reasoning by analogy, but he did not elaborate it
further.
Briefly, the concept of maslahah which was
originally a general method of decision for jurists and
as such a free principle, came to be limited by the
18 — — —
Most probably this is the ijbar which al-Shatibi refers, see
Al-muwafagat, vol. 1, pp. 19 - 20
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opponents of this concept through two considerations.
First, there was a theological determinism which tended
to define maslahah as whatever God commands. Second,
there was a methodological determinism which, aiming to
avoid the apparent arbitrariness of the method, tried to
subject maslahah to qiyas so as to link it with some more
definite basis. Both considerations were inadequate.
First, in order to decide that something is maslahah,
even to say that God's commands are based on maslahah,
some criterion outside these commands has inevitably to
be accepted. This was precisely what theological
determinism denied. Second, to proceed by qiyas, one must
seek the cillah, which was either denied because of
theological reasons or was interpreted so as to mean
"sign". The implication of this position is obvious. On
the one hand, it insisted that further extension of rules
must be in units; every new deduction must have a
specific link in Sharicah. It denied the extension of law
as a whole. On the other hand, it refused to take social
needs into consideration, because it insisted upon
deducing laws from specific rulings of Sharlcah, not even
from the general intent of the law.
4.6 THE MAIN TRENDS_OF THE CONCEPT OF MASLAHAH DURING THE
PERIOD BETWEEN AL-RAZI AND AL-SHATIBI
If we may take general note of major works on usul
during the period between al-Razi and al-Shatibl, we can
see further trends in these works. The first trend refers
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to those whose conception of maslahah is either similar
to that of al-Razi or those who have simply juxtaposed
al-Ghazali's and al-Razi's definitions of munasib and
maslahah. Among Maliki jurists Shihab al-Din al-Qurafi
(684/1285)39 and among Hanafis Sadr al-Sharicah al-Mahbubi
(747/1346)40 stay closer to al-Razi. Accepting al-Razi's
criticism of maslahah, al-Qurafi even went further. He
raised serious doubts whether maslahah could ever be
defined and justified in clear terms.41
Jamal al-Din al-Asnawi (771/1370)42 and Taj al-Din
al-Subki (771/1369)43 combine al-Ghazali and al-Razi. Sacd
al-Din al-Taftazani (792/1290)44 interprets the Hanafi
position, mainly that of Pazdawi (482/1089), in reference
to al-Razi.
The second trend refers to those jurists who reject
al-maslahah al-mursalah as a valid basis of reasoning. In
39 Al-Q3rafi, Tanqih al-fusul fi cilm al-usul, in Al-dhakhirah
{Cairo: Matbacah Kulliyyat al-Sharicah, 1961], pp. 144 -46
49 Sadr al-Sharicah al-Mahbubi, Al-tawdih wa al-tanqih {Cairo: Ma-
tbacah Bosanawi, 1304 A.H.}, pp. 536-540
41 See M. Khalid Mascud, Islamic legal Philosophy, [Islamabad, 1977],
p. 235
42 Jamal al-Din al-Asnawi, Nihayat al-usul, Commentary on Baidawi'S
Minhaj al-wusul on the margin of Ibn Amir al-Hajji's Al-taqrir wa
al-tahbir {Cairo: Bulaq , 1317 A.H.} vol. 3, pp. 134-140
43 Taj al-Din al-Subki, Jamc al-Jawamic in cAbd al-Rahman al-Bannani,
Hashiyah cala matn jamc al-jawamic, {Cairo: Mustafa Babi, 1937}, vol.
2, pp. 270-285
44 Sacd al-Din al-TaftazanT, Sharh al-tawdih wa al-tanqih {Cairo:
Bosanawi, 1304 A.H.} vol. 2, pp. 548-683
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this category fall the ShaficI jurist Sayf al-Din
al-Amidi (646/1249)45 and the MalikI, Ibn Hajib
(646/1249)46 In their arguments against al-maslahah
al-mursalah both follow al-Ghazali rather than al-RazI.
To them a maslahah is acceptable only if it is textually
supported.
The third trend is illustrated by the ShaficI
jurist, cIzz al-Din ibn cAbd al-Salam (660/1263). He was
inclined towards tasawwuf.47 There is a noticiable
inclination towards Sufistic interpretation of law in his
treatment of the concept of maslahah.
To Ibn cAbd al-Salam maslahah means ladhdhah
(pleasure) and farah (happiness) and the means leading to
them.48 The masalih are then divided into two kinds:
masalih of this world and the masalih of the hereafter.
The former can be known by reason, while the latter can
only be known by naql (tradition, revelation).49 In view
45
Sayf al-Din al-Amidi, Al-ihkam fi usul al-ahk'am, {Cairo: Matbacah
Macarif, 1914}, vol. 4, pp. 215-217
48 Ibn Hajib, Mukhtasar muntaha al-usul {Cairo: Bulaq, 1317 A.H.}
vol. 2, p. 289
4^ Ibn cAbd Al-Salam was initiated into the Suhrawardiyyah Tariqah
[Sufistic order]. He is also claimed to have joined the Shadhiliyyah
Tariqah. His relationship with Ibn cArabi has, however, been a
subject of dispute. For details see Ridwan cAli al-Nadawi, al-cIzz
ibn cAbd al-Salam, {Damascus: Dar al-fikr, I960} pp. 103 - 110
48 See Ibn cAbd al-Salam, Qawacid al-Ahkam fi masalih al-anam,
{Cairo: Istiqamah, n.d.} vol. 1, p. 10
49 Ibn cAbd al-Salam, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 10
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of the people's knowledge, however, the masalih differ
according to the level of the approach of the people. The
lowest level of masalih is that which is common to all
men. Higher than this is the level on which the adhkiya'
(the wise people) conceive the masalih. The highest level
is peculiar to the awliya' Allah (friends of God, the
Sufis) alone. The awliya' and asfiya' (pure) prefer the
masalih of the hereafter to those of this world. The
k s_
reason is that the awliya' are anxious to know His
commands and laws (in their reality), hence their
investigation and reasoning (ijtihad) is the most
complete.50
Elsewhere, Ibn cAbd al-Salam divides masalih as
"rights" into two major divisions. First are the rights
of God, and second, the rights of men. The rights of God
fall into three categories: rights which belong purely to
God such as macarif (gnosis) and ahwal (mystic states);
second, rights which combine rights of God and those of
men such as zakat (alms); and third, those which combine
rights of God, and of His Prophet, and of the people in
general. The rights of men are also of three categories:
rights of nafs (self), rights of men toward each other,
and rights of animals toward men.51
Ibn cAbd al-Salam, op. cit., p. 24
51 Ibid., p. 129
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The above references which are recurrent themes in
his Qawacid al-ahkam, indicate that Ibn cAbd al-Salam's
legal thinking was deeply influenced by mysticism. For
instance, although he did not reject huquq al-nafs
(rights of the soul), he considered a maslahah aiming at
the realization of such rights as lower in rank than one
which aimed at macrifah and ahwal.
In fact, Ibn cAbd al-Salam represents the stage
where the Sufi conception of masalih came to permeate
usul al-fiqh. It is not possible at this point to go into
details of the Sufi conception of human masalih and its
history. It must, however, be pointed out that at a very
early stage in Sufism, rejection of huzuz al-nafs
(pleasures of the animal soul) became significant as a
means of controlling the nafs. In Sarraj's (378 A.H.)
al-Lumac, huzuz al-nafs are frequently opposed to huquq
al-nafs.52
Zuhd (denial of worldly pleasures) is defined as
abandoning the huzuz.53 The huquq are defined as ahwal,
52 — — — r
R. A. Nicholson [Ed. Comm.], in Abu Nasr al-Sarraj, Kitab al-Luma^
fi al-tasawwuf, [London: Luzac, 1914], p. 134. For this opposition
of terms cf. Abu Bakr al-Kalabadhi, Al-tacarruf li Madhhab ahl al-ta¬
sawwuf (Cairo:cIsa al-Babi, I960}, p. 23; Najm al-Din Rubra, Fawaid
al-jamal, ed. Fritz Meier, [Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1957], p. 71
[Introduction], pp. 5-6 [text]
See Sarraj, Kitab al-Lumac fi al-Tasawwuf p. 47, (quoting Sufi
Ruwayn b. Ahmad}
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maqamat (high ranks), etc.54
Huzuz had its apparent connection with masalih, and
more particularly, with the question of rukhsah (legal
allowance) in case of hardship. The Sufi stress on zuhd,
warac (piety) and ikhlas (devotion) required abandoning
of huzuz. An obvious example of this encroachment of
tasawwuf on fiqh and usul al-fiqh may be seen in
al-Qushayri's wasiyyah (will) to his disciples where he
advised them against opting for such allowances because
"when a faqlr (holy man) falls down from the level of
haqlqah (reality) to that of rukhsah of Sharlcah, he
dissolves his covenant with God and violates the mutual
bond between him and God.55
Closer to the period of al-Shatibl, the opposition
to huzuz appears still stronger. Abu al-Hasan al-Shadhill
(656 A.H.) with whom Ibn cAbd al-Salam is claimed to have
connections,56 used to define tawhld (oneness of God) in
terms of abandoning the huzuz al-nafs.57 He also
explained it as a curse from God when someone is found
indulging in the huzuz so to be barred from cubudiyyah
54 ibid., p. 336
55 Abu al-Qasim al-Qushayri, Al-risalah fi cilm al-tasawwuf, {Cairo:
Muhammad cAli, 1948}, p. 181
56 See above n. 54
57 See cAbd al-Halim Mahmud, Al-madrasah al-shadhiliyyah wa Imamuha




Ibn cAbbad al-Rundi (792/1390), the famous Shadhuli,
with whom al-Shatibi was in correspondence on matters
relating to tasawwuf and fiqh, also stressed the
rejection of huzuz. Commenting on the Hikam (wise
sayings) of Ibn cAta' Allah, Ibn cAbbad said that "the
nafs always seeks huzuz and turns away from huquq; hence
if you are confused in two matters, always choose what is
harder for the nafs.59 Elsewhere in commenting on the
hikam he says: "the coming of faqat (trial by wants and
needs) is a happy occasion for the disciples", Ibn cAbbad
explained that the Sufi, contrary to an ordinary Muslim,
finds pleasure by loosing his huzuz. Situations of
neediness provide a disciple with purity of heart, which
is not achieved by sawm (fasting) or salat (praying),
because in sawm and salat there is a possibility of hawa
(desire) and shahWS (lust).60
The Sufi view of obligation to God, thus, had
serious implications for maslahah in terms of human
utility. It not only denied human interest as a basis of
consideration, but also insisted on abandoning human
58 cAbd al-Halim Mahmud, op.cit., p. 137
60 Ibn cAbbad al-Rundi, Sharh al-hikam li al-Imam Abi al-Fadl Ahmad
b. cAta' Allah al-Iskandari, {Cairo: Mustafa Afandi, 1320 A.H.}, p.
99
60 Ibid., p. 106
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interests to purify the obligations as "complete
obedience to God". These implications were not generally
recognized by the jurists. Ibn cAbd al-Salam accepted the
Sufi view, but in his attempt to synthesize the two, he
was led either to deny the masalih of this world
altogether, or to accept the two on separate grounds.
The fourth trend is represented by Ibn Taymiyyah
(728/1328) and his student Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah
(751/1350). Ibn Taymiyyah tried to find a middle way
between the two extremes of total rejection and total
acceptance of masalih. He considered al-maslahah
al-mursalah similar to the methods of ra'y, istihsan,
kashf (mystic revelation) and dhawq (mystic taste) of
whose validity he was suspicious,61 and hence rejected
them. On the other hand, he refuted the moral
implications of the denial of maslahah to the commands of
God.
Ibn Taymiyyah also counts al-maslahah al-mursalah as
one of the seven ways of knowing the commands of God,
along with the traditional sources of law. He defines
al-maslahah al-mursalah as follows:
"(It is a decision) when a mujtahid considers
that a particular act seeks a benefit which is
preferable, and there is nothing in sharc that
61 See Ibn Taymiyyah, Qawacid fi al-mucjizat wa al-karamat wa anwac
khawariq al-cadah, in Majmucat al-rasail wa al-masail [Cairo:Matbacah
Manar, 1349 A.H.], vol. 5, p. 22
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opposes this (consideration).62
Ibn Taymiyyah, however, concludes that to argue on
the basis of al-maslahah al-mursalah is to legislate in
matters of religion, and God has not permitted this. To
do so is similar to istihsan and tahsin Haqli
(legislation through reasoning).63 He admits that Sharicah
is opposed to maslahah, but when human reason finds masla¬
hah in a certain case where there is no supporting
citation in the text to be found, only two things are
meant. Either there definitely is a text which the
observer does not know or one is not dealing with
maslahah at all.64 The obvious assumption in Ibn
Taymiyyah's arguments is that all the possible masalih
are already given in the text. The other assumption is,
of course, that all of God's commands are based on
maslahah. The latter assumption is of particular
significance to Ibn Taymiyyah, as it has to do with the
moral responsibility of man, a matter which he stressed
very much. He condemned both the Muctazilah and the
Jabriyyah in reference to the question of maslahah. The
Muctazilah argued that God is obliged to command only
fi 9
Ibn Taymiyyah, op. cit., vol. 5, p. 22
63 Ibid., p. 23
64 Ibid.
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what is good for man. They conceived God's actions as
analogous to man's actions. They assumed that whatever is
morally obligatory for man must be obligatory for God.
Ibn Taymiyyah refuted this. But he also refuted the
Jabriyyah position that God's commands are not based on
maslahah. He questioned their assumption that the
intention of maslahah is a limitation upon God's acts.
The Jabriyyah argued that a command does not necessitate
iradah (will). Ibn Taymiyyah saw in this argument a
theological advantage, but morally such a doctrine was
harmful. He clarified that in reference to God there are
two kinds of iradah; al-iradah al-sharciyyah al-diniyyah
(the legal and religious will) and al-iradah al-qadriyyah
al-kawniyyah (the potential creative will). When God
commands He wills the first kind of will.65
The consideration of maslahah, or as Ibn Qayyim,
following Ibn Taymiyyah, often calls it, siyasah
(polity), plays an important part in explaining legal
obligations, legal reasoning and legal change in Ibn
Qayyim's Iclam al-muwaqqicin. He expounds the principles
of Hanbalis fiqh, and enumerates the following five as
sources and principles: (1) Nass; (2) The fatawa of the
Companions of the Prophet; (3) Selection from the opinion
of the Companions; (4) Hadith mursal (a report of a
65 See Ibn Taymiyyah, op. cit., p. 30
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saying of the Prophet which lacks a link in the chain
going back to the Prophet); and (5) Qiyas li
al-darurah.66 Thus it is in reference to the three
sourcres that the consideration of maslahah is expounded.
Ibn Qayyim explains that it is valid to attribute cillah
to the commands of God, because the Qur'an and the Sunnah
of the Prophet themselves are replete with examples where
reasons are given to explain the command.67 The larger
part of the Iclam is devoted to illustrating how various
commands are based on certain reasons which he calls
hikmah or maslahah.
The following passage contains a clear statement of
his views on maslahah. In a chapter where he explains how
"fatawa may change according to the change in time and
place, etc..." he says:
"This chapter is of great significance. Due to
the ignorance of the matters [to be discussed in
this chapter] grave errors have been committed in
reference to Sharicah. As a result hardship and
severity has been brought forth [upon people].
Such obligations have been imposed as are not
required, if one judges by the magnificent
Sharicah which keeps the highest level of
masalih♦ The foundations of Sharlcah are laid on
the hikam and masalih al--ibad, in this world of
living (macash) and in the world of return
(macad). The Sharxcah is all justice, kindness,
masalih and hikmah. Hence any case which departs
from justice to injustice ... from maslahah to
mafsadah ... is not part of Sharicah even though
it has entered there by ta'wil
66 See Ibn Qayyim, Iclam al-muwaqqicin, [Cairo: Sacadah, 1955], vol.
1, pp. 29-32











5.1 THE MAQASID DOCTRINE
The Islamic jurisprudence regards "maqasid
al-Sharicah" or the ends and goals of the Sharicah as its
basic doctrine. The laws of the Sharicah are promulgated
because they conform with the objectives of God and the
objectives of God are also the masalih of mankind.
Maqasid al-SharIcah or the goals and ends of Law are thus
one, and that is maslahah or the good and welfare of
human beings.
The "maqasid doctrine" is based on a generally
agreed premise which is theological in its origin. The
premise is that God instituted the sharaic (laws) for the
masalih (benefits, good) of the people, both immediate
and future.1 There exists, however, a difference of
opinion among scholars concerning the details of this
premise.
The mutakallimun accept the general and apparent
meaning of the premise, yet they differ from one another
about whether the masalih are to be understood in terms
of cilal (causes). As we have seen in the case of
1
See al-Shatibi Al-muwafaqat, [Cairo: Mustafa Muhammad, n.d.], vol.
2, p. 6
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al-Ghazall and al-Razi, the Ashcari theologians reject
explicit as well as implicit causality in reference to
God. For them, the premise implies that God is obliged by
the consideration of masalih to act in a certain way.
Since such an obligation proposes limitation on God's
omnipotence, the Ashcaris reject the idea that the
masalifr are the cilal of sharaic. They, however, accept
the premise by interpreting the masalih to be the "grace"
of God, rather than the "cause" of His acts. On the other
hand, the Muctazilah, even though they too maintained
God's omnipotence, yet believe that God is obliged to do
good. Consequently they accepted masalih as the cillah of
Sharlcah.2
The theological disagreement initially concerned
God's acts, but it was extended to God's commands in the
Qur'an as they constitute His acts of speech. Thus the
theological disagreement manifested itself in usul
al-fiqh as well. Theological arguments penetrated into
usul al-fiqh also because a number of writers on usul
were theologians.
Usui al-fiqh, however, required a manner of thinking
and a method of reasoning different from that of kalam.3
2 See M. Khalid Mascud, Islamic legal philosophy, [Islamabad: Islamic
Research Institute, 1977], p. 222
O
—
J Kalam is that part of theology which deals with dialectical
expos it ion
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Legal thinking necessitated that the volition for
voluntary human acts must be attributed to man himself if
man is to be held legally responsible for his acts. Since
obedience to Divine Commands thus depends on human
volition, the Command must be shown to be motivated by
the consideration of human interests. Consequently, the
premise of masalih must be accepted in usul in terms of
"cause".
The premise of masalih came to be generally accepted
in usul. Some usuliyyin (lawyers), such as al-Ghazali and
others, in order to be consistent with their theological
views, redefined the term "cillah" so as to rid it of the
connotation of "causality" and "motivation" in which
sense it was used and disputed in kalam. Passing from
kalam to usul, the term cillah thus underwent a semantic
change. For the explanation of the meaning it acquired in
usul, we now turn to al-Shatibi.
m * •
5.2 THE MEANING OF CILLAH IN USUL
Al-Shatibi explains that al-Razi4 held that like His
acts, God's commands also cannot be analyzed in terms of
cilal (causes) whereas the Muctazilah believed that His
Commands were caused (mucallalah) by the consideration of
the masalih of the people. Since it was inevitable that
cilal be established for al-ahkam al-sharciyyah (the
4
For al-Razi's views on this point see chapter four above
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rules of Sharlcah), the cillah as used in connection with
the usul came to be interpreted as "the sign that makes a
rule known specifically".5
Al-Shatibi argues that the premise of masalih can be
established in Sharicah by method of induction, both as a
general theme in Sharicah and in the description of the
cilal of various commands in detail. For instance, the
Qur'an explains the reasons for ablution, fasting and
jihad as being cleanliness, piety and eradication of
oppression, respectively.6
After explaining this premise, let's now proceed to
explain the details of maqasid al-Sharicah in relation to
the theory of al-masalih al-mursalah. There are five
aspects; four in relation to the Lawgiver, and one in
relation to the mukallaf (subject of command).
The doctrine of maqasid al-Sharicah is an attempt to
establish maslahah in particular and al-masalih
al-mursalah generally as essential elements of the ends
of law. The primary objectives (maqasid) of the Lawgiver
is the maslahah of the people. The obligations in the
Sharlcah concern the attainment of the maqasid of the
Lawgiver which in their turn aim at the people attaining
their masalih. Thus maqasid and maslahah (or al-masalih
5
See al-Shatibi, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 6
6 Ibid., p. 7
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al-mursalah) become interchangeable terms with reference
to the obligations of the Sharicah.
Al-Shatibi defines the concept of maslahah as
follows:
"I mean by maslahah that which concerns the
subsistence of human life, the completion of
man's livelihood, and the acquisition of what is
emotional and intellectual qualities require of
him, in an absolute sense".
This is the definition of maslahah in its absolute
sense. Al-Shatibi, however, takes into account various
other senses in which maslahah can be studied. The
ma?alih belong either to this world or to the world
hereafter. Further, the masalih can be seen as a system;
belonging to different grades and with a definable
relationship with each other.
The second element in the meaning of maslahah is the
idea of "protection of interest". Al-Shatibi explains
that the Sharicah deals with the protection of masalih
either in a positive manner as when, in order to preserve
the existence of masalih the Sharicah adopts measures to
support their bases. Or in preventative manner; to
prevent the extinction of masalih it adopts measures to
remove any elements which are actually or potentially
7 Al-Shatibi, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 25
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disruptive of masalih.8
Al-Shatibi, as do most of the usuliyyin, divides the
maqasid like the masalih into daruri (necessary),
hajl (needed) and tahsinl (commendable). The maqasid
daruriyyah are called necessary because they are
indispensible in sustaining the masalih of din (religion
and the hereafter) and dunya (this world) in the sense
that if they are disrupted the stability of the masalih
of the world is disrupted too. Their disruption results
in the termination of life in the world, and in the
hereafter it results in losing salvation and blessings.9
As we have seen before with regard to masalih that
the darurI category consists of the following: din
(religion), nafs (self), nasi (family), mal (property)
and caql (intellect).10 Scholars, says al-Shatibi, have
observed that these five principles are universally
accepted. Analysing the aims of the sharci obligations,
we find that Sharicah also considers them as necessary.
The sharcI obligations can be divided into two groups
which can be termed positive and preventitive. The
positive group includes cibadat (acts of worship), cadat
(practices) and mucamalat (transactions); and falling
o
■» w
Al-Shatibi, op. cit., p. 8
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid., p. 10
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into the preventive group are jinayat (penalties).
cIbadat aim at the attainment of the masalih of din.
Examples of cibadat are belief and the declaration of
faith (the oneness of God and the prophethood of Mu^anomaeQ
salat (prayer), zakat (alms), siyam (fasting)
and ha j j (pil^yimage) . cAdat aim at the protection of
nafs (self) and caql (intellect). Seeking food, drink,
clothing and shelter are examples of cadat. Mucamalat
also protect the nafs and caql. Al-Shatibi defines
jinayat as those which concern the above five masalih in
a preventive manner; they prescribe the removal of
impediments which prevent the realization of these
interests. To illustrate jinayat, he gives example of
qisas (legal retaliation) and diyah (blood money) for
nafs, and hadd (punishment for drinking intoxicants) for
the protection of -aql.11
The hajiyyat are so called because they are needed
in order to expand (tawassuf) the purpose of the maqasid
and to remove the strictness of literal sense the
application of which leads to impediments and hardships
and eventually to the disruption of the maqasid
(objectives). Thus if the hajiyyat are not taken into
consideration along with the daruriyyat the people on the
whole will face hardship. The disruption of hajiyyat is,
11
See al-Shatibi, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 8-10
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however, not disruptive of the whole of masalih, as is
the case with the daruriyyat. Examples of hajiyyat are as
follows: in cibadat, concessions in salat and sawm on
_a -a
account of sickness or journey which otherwise may cause
hardship in prayers, fasting etc.; in cadat, the
lawfulness of hunting; in mucamalat, permission for qirad
(money lending), musaqat (irrigation) and in jinayat,
allowances for weak and insufficient evidence in
decisions affecting public interest.12
Tahslniyyat means to adopt what conforms to the best
of practices (cadat) and to avoid those manners which are
disliked by wiser people. This type of maslahah covers
noble habits (ethics, morality). Examples of this type
are as follows: in cibadat cleanliness (taharah) or
decency in covering the private parts of the body (sitr
al-cawrah) in prayer; in cadat, etiquette, table manners,
etc.; in mucamalat, prohibition of the sale of unclean
(najs) articles or the sale of surplus food and water,
and depriving a slave of the position of witness and
leadership, etc.; for jinayat, the prohibition of killing
a freeman in place of a slave, etc.13
Al-ShatibI regards the above division of maqasid as
a structure consisting of three grades, connected to one
12
See al-Shatibi, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 10-11
12 Ibid., pp. 11-12
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another. His detailed analysis reveals two aspects of
their relationships with one another. First, every grade
separately requires annexion of certain elements which
supplement and complement this grade. Second, every
grade is related to the others.14
Every one of the three grades requires additional
elements to achieve the fuller realization of its
objectives. For instance, qisas (legal retaliation)
cannot be realized without a condition of tamathul
(parallel evaluation). This position, however, calls for
two clarifications: first, a lack of these additional
elements does not amount to a negation of the essential
objectives; second, the consideration of the additional
elements must not bring about a negation of the original
objectives - that is to say, if the consideration of an
element results in the annulment of the original
objective, its consideration will not be valid. The
reasons for this stipulation are, first, because the
additional element is like a quality (sifah). If the
consideration of a quality results in the negation of the
qualified object (mawsuf), the qualification is negated
as well. Second, even if it is supposed that the
consideration of the additional element results in the
realization of its interests at the cost of the original
14
Al-Shatibi, op. cit., p. 12
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objective, it is stressed that the realization of the
original objective be prefered.15
The above situation is illustrated by the following
example. The eating of carrion is allowed in the Sharicah
to save life. The reason is that the preservation of life
is of utmost importance, and preservation of muruah
(manliness, honour) is only additional (takmili) to the
protection of life. Impure things are prohibited in order
to preserve honour and to encourage morality. But if the
preservation of the additional element, i.e to preserve
honour by avoiding eating impure things, leads to the
negation of the original interest, i.e the preservation
of life, the consideration of the additional element is
forsaken.
Another example may be seen in the act of sale which
is a necessary maslahah while the prohibition of risk and
ignorance in sale transactions is additional. If the
complete negation of risk is stipulated, the result will
be complete negation of the act of sale.
The relationship of the above three grades of
maqasid with one another is the same as that of the
additional masalih to the original objective of the law.
The tahsiniyyat are thus additional to the hajiyyat which
is — —
Al-Shatibi, op. cit., p. 14
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are additional to the daruriyyat. The daruriyyat are the
fundamentals of maqasid. In view of the above
explanation, al-Shatibi deduces the following five rules
in this relationship: (i) the daruri is the basis of all
maqasid; (ii) the ikhtilal (disruption) of glarur I
necessitates the ikhtilal of other maqasid absolutely;
(iii) the ikhtilal of other masalih, however, does not
necessitate an ikhtilal of, the daruri itself; (iv) in a
certain sense, however, the ikhtilal of tahsini or of
hajl absolutely necessitates the ikhtilal of daruri; and
(v) the preservation (muhafazah) of hajI and tahsini is
necessary for the sake of daruri.16
These rules may be illustrated by the rule of qisas
(lex talionis). Qisas is daruri, and tamathul
(consideration of equality) in qisas is tahsini and
takmlll.
To illustrate the first rule, tamathul (tahsini)
exists only because of qisas (daruri). Thus a maslahah
daruriyyah (qisas) is the basis of a maslahah tahslniyyah
(tamathul) .
To illustrate the second rule, if there is no qisas,
there is no consideration of tamathul. In other words,
the ikhtilal of the daruri means the same for the other
^ See al-Shatibi, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 16-17
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grades of maqasid necessarily.
To illustrate the third rule, the ikhtilal of
tamathul does not require ikhtilal of qisas.
The fourth and fifth rules can be appreciated if one
grasps the sense in which darur1 is affected by the
ikhtilal of other maqasid. Al-Shatibi explains the
effect of other maqasid on necessary maqasid with the
following four arguments: (1) The relationship of other
maqasid to necessary maqasid is like that of protective
zones hima). The interruption of one protective zone
amounts to the interruption of the next zone and
eventually to the disruption of the necessary maqasid
which are at the centre of these zones; (2) This
relationship may also be understood as that of the part
and the whole; other masalih together with the daruri
masalift make one whole. The disruption of the parts
obviously means the same as the disruption of the whole.
(3) The hajiyyat and tahsiniyyat can be understood as
individuals in relation to the universal, i.e.
daruriyyat. (4) The hajiyyat and tahsiniyyat serve the
magalifr daruriyyah as a prerequisite (muqaddimah), or as
interrelated (muqarin).17
As mentioned above, the tnasalify are also divided
17 - —
See al-Shatibi, op. cit., pp. 16-24
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into those belonging to this world and those concerning
the hereafter.
5.3 THE TWO APPROACHES OF OBSERVING THE MASALIH OF THIS
WORLD
There are two angles from which the masalih of this
world can be observed. The first angle is to observe them
as they actually exist, and the second is to observe them
on the basis of a clear statement of the Sharlcah.
Examining masalih as they exist in this world, they
are not found as pure masalih. Rather, they are mixed
with discomfort and hardship, however big or small, which
may precede, accompany or follow the masalih. Similar are
the mafasid (opposite of masalih) which also are not
pure but are found to be mixed with a certain amount of
comfort and enjoyment. The entire phenomenon in this
world points to the fact that this world is created from
a combination of opposites and that it is impossible to
abstract (istikhlas) only one aspect. It is for this
reason that the masalih and mafasid in this world are
known only on this basis of the pre-dominant aspect; if
the aspect of maslahah dominates, the matter at issue is
considered, customarily, a maslahah; otherwise it is
considered a mafsadah. In these matters thus, the
determining factor is the prevalent aspect.18
TO _
See al-Shatibi, op. cit., vol.2, p. 26
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It must be noticed here that this principle is
applicable only to acts relating to cadah, and only to
the determination of maslahah or mafsadah in this world
through knowing them as they exist. Acts which are not
cadat are not affected by this principle.19
The second approach to considering the masalih of
this world is to observe them in reference to their
connection with clear statement of the Sharicah (khitab).
The basic rule in this approach is that the masalih or
mafasid as taken into consideration by the Lawgiver are
pure. If they are supposed to be mixed (mashubah), they
are not so in the reality of the Sharicah.20 As explained
above, maslahah or mafsadah in this world is determined'
m ■ _____________
by the predominant aspect (al-jihah al-ghalibah) of the
matter. It is the predominant aspect which is the object
of the clear statement of the Sharicah. The dominated
(al-maghlubah) aspect, whether maslahah or mafsadah is
not the objective of the Lawgiver. Why is it then that
the dominated elements, even though they may be maslahah,
are not the objectives of Sharicah? On other hand, how
can they, when they are not the objectives of Sharicah,
still be masalih? Al-Shatibi solves this apparent
contradiction with the following explanation.
19 —
Al-Shatibi, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 26
Ibid., p. 27
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He argues that al-maslahah al-maghlubah is that
which is considered as such according to the acquired
habitude (al-ictiyad al-kasbi) alone, i.e. without adding
the Lawgiver's requirements of maslahah. Customarily,
such a maslahah is not taken into consideration. This is
* *
the part of maslahah which is also not the objective of
the Lawgiver insofar as the sharciyyah (legality) of
rules (ahkam) as a whole is considered. Further, if the
dominated aspect were also taken into account by the
Lawgiver, no act could have been the subject of command
alone or of prohibition alone. Obviously such is not the
case. If it is supposed that the dominated aspect in a
mixed maslahah is the object of prohibition and the
dominating aspect that of command, then one and the same
act becomes the object of command and prohibition at one
and the same time, which would have been a taklif ma la
yutaq (impossible obligation) as well as absurd
situation.21
The above explanation, however, does not clarify the
existence or occurrence of mafsadah despite the SharicI's
(Lawgiver's) intention to the contrary. Al-Shatibi
elaborates the matter further by saying that the above
position may appear to be that of the philosophers and of
the Muctazilah on the existence and occurrence of evil.
2^" See al-Shatibi, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 28
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According to the philosophers, God created a world in
which the good is mixed with evil. It is the good,
however, which is the purpose of creation. He did not
create the world for evil, even though evil may occur
along with the good.
The Muctazilah believed that evils are not intended
to occur; their occurrence is against God's will
(iradah).
Al-ShatibI first discusses the apparent similarity
between his and the above positions. He argues on the
basis of a distinction between two intentions (qasd) of
God. First, there is the intention of creation (al-qasd
al-khalqi al-takwini); and second, the intention of
legislation (al-qasd al-tashrlcl). The position of the
philosophers and the Muctazilah concern the former, and
al-Shatibi's the latter. As he argues, the occurrence of
mafsadah, despite God's will and intention for maslahah,
is justifiable in the case of al-qasd al-tashrICI,
because a man is held free (mukhtar) so as to be legally
responsible for his acts. This position is not justified
in the case of al-iradah al-takwiniyyah, as this would
imply imperfection in God's powers.22
The above discussion of maslahah has been concerned
22
See al-Shatibi, op, cit., p. 30
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with the cases where the actual practice may be used as
the basis of determining a maslahah. There are cases
where the judgment of general actions is not so
definitive for specific reason. For instance, eating
carrion in case of dire need and killing a murderer for
the prevention of crimes, are considered maslahah despite
the fact that the acts themselves are not so. In other
words, unlike the cases in the above discussion where the
acts, despite their consisting of certain aspects of
mafsadah, are regarded as maslahah in themselves on the
whole, the acts in the above examples, though mafsadah in
themselves, become maslahah because of certain external
considerations. The supposition in this case is that the
external consideration can dominate the internal
consideration. How this domination is decided needs
elaboration.
In view of the above situation, logically, there are
two positions; either both considerations are equal in
such a manner that one cannot be prefered to the other,
or one of them can be prefered. The former position
probably does not exist in Sharicah because it
necessitates that Sharlcah should intend prohibition and
permission simultaneously.
Furthermore, if one consideration is preferable, it
is still possible that the Lawgiver might have intended
the other side. Both sides will always remain to be
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weighed by a mu jtahid. We are obliged only to do what,
after weighing both considerations, we consider to be the
intention of the Lawgiver, not what is intended by Him in
reality (in His mind).23 In this way, after the decision
of a mujtahid, the possibility of the other consideration
being intended has to be disregarded insofar as
fulfilling an obligation is concerned. The possibility
is, however, not disregarded insofar as nazar
(examination, investigation) is concerned.
A group of scholars who believed the above
possibility to be applicable in the case of obligations
as well, maintained the principle of muracat al-khilaf
(the consideration of opposition). As mentioned
elsewhere, this principle, to al-Shatibi, meant an
impossible and hence void obligation.
Al-Shatibi sums up the above discussion by saying
that al-jihah al-maghlubah (the dominated aspect), is not
the objective of a legal obligation. This principle
governs all problems which are subject to ijtihad
irrespective of whether one believes a mujtahid to be
always correct or not.24
23 — ~
See al-Shatibi, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 31
24 Ibid., p. 32
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5.4 HOW THE MASALIH OF THE HEREAFTER ARE DETERMINED
So far the discussion has been concerned with the
masah of this world. The masalih of the hereafter are
■ *
also pure (such as the attainment of the blessings of
paradise) as well as mixed (such as the punishment of
hell) sometimes meted out even to those who believe in
the oneness of God.
The basic rule in such masalih and mafasid is that
they are all determined according to Sharicah, because
the reason cannot grasp matters relating to the hereafter
due to being beyond its scope and horizon.
Sometimes a confusion may arise because of
considering the pure masalih or mafasid as mixed. For
instance, the blessings bestowed upon the prophets in
paradise differ from those given to others. Those in
lower ranks may be regarded as being punished by the
absence of the blessings given to those in higher ranks.
According to al-Shatibi, this confusion arises because a
distinction is not maintained between a species and its
individual members. The individual members may differ in
special characteristics, etc., but they do not differ in
relation to their species; they are members of the same
species. This membership is the fact that determines
their wasf (quality).25
25
See al-Shatibi, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 36
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From the above discussions, al-Shatibi deduces the*
•
following rules as characteristics of maslahah; (i) The
purpose of legislation is to establish masalih in this
world and in the hereafter, but in a way that they do not
disrupt the system of sharc; (ii) the Sharic intends the
masalih to be absolute; and (iii) the reason for the
above two considerations is that Sharicah has been
instituted to be abadi (eternal, continuous), kulli
(universal) and camm (general) in relation to all kinds
of takalif (obligations), mukallafin (subject of command)
and ahwal (conditions, states).26
The above three characteristics thus require
maslahah to be both mutlaq (absolute) and kulli
(universal). The absoluteness means that masalih should
not be relative and subjective. Relativity is usually
based on equating a maslahah with one of the following:
ahwa' al-nufus (selfish inclinations), manafic (selfish
advantages), nayl al-shahawat (fulfilment of desires) and
aghrad (personal interests). According to al-Shatibi all
of the above considerations render the concept of masiahah.
relative and subjective, which is not the
consideration of the Lawgiver with regard to maslahah,
though it may be so in customary law.
He argues on the following grounds: First, the
26 Al-Shatibi, op. cit., p. 37
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objective of Sharicah is to bring the mukallafin out of
the dictates of their desires so as to make them servants
of God. This objective negates the consideration of
personal liking as an element in the consideration of
maslahah.
Second, the masalih cannot be considered as mere
manafic because in cadah as well as in sharc they are
mixed with disadvantages. The point of emphasis here is
that selfish benefit is not essential in the
consideration of masalih in cadah nor is it in sharc..
In cadah some higher goal like the subsistence of
life constitutes the basic consideration in determining
maslahah. In sharc the consideration must still be
higher, and that is the attainment of the blessings of
paradise.
Third, the consideration of the fulfilment of
personal desires also renders the concept of maslahah
highly relative. The consideration of personal desire
varies from state to state, person to person, and time to
time. It is so relative that it cannot be a criterion for
determining maslahah.
Fourth, consideration of individual interests leads
not only to a divergence but, more significantly, also to
a conflict with others and to the deprivation of others'
interests.
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Consequently, relativity and subjectivity are
excluded from the sharcI consideration of maslahah; it
must, therefore, be absolute. In sharc this absoluteness
is provided by the stipulation that maslahah must aim at
the subsistence of life in this world in such a way as
not to harm life in the next world.
5.5 MASLAHAH SHOULD BE UNIVERSAL
• •
The second characteristic of maslahah is its
universality. This universality is not affected by the
takhalluf (falling short) of its particulars. For
instance, the penalties are imposed on the basis of the
universal rule that they generally restrain people from
committing crimes. Yet, there are people who, despite
being punished, do not abstain from committing a crime.
Nevertheless, such exceptions do not affect the validity
of the general rule about the penalty.27 In the Sharicah
it is al-ghalib al-akthar1 (the major dominant) which is
the general-definitive element (al-camm al-qatcI) in the
consideration of maslahah. This is the characteristic
(sha'n) of inductive universals (al-kulliyyat
al-istiqraiyyah). An illustration of this universal may
be found in the universal rules of a language. The
universals of a language are closer to those of the
Sharicah, because both are wadcI (instituted,
2 7 — —
See al-Shatibi, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 52
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conventional) not caqli (speculative). The inductive
universals (in Arabic grammar, for instance) remain valid
even if some of their particulars do not conform to the
majority of particulars.28
In reference to the characteristics of maslahah,
al-Shatibl takes into account consideration of the
criticism of this concept by other jurists. Among them he
specifically refers to Fakhr al-Dln al-Razi, Shihab
al-Dln al-Qurafi and Ibn cAbd al-Salam. He has answered
their criticisms. As these criticisms and answers are
quite relevant to the discussion of maslahah, a brief
summary of this debate is given below.
Analysing the position of those who favour maslahah,
al-Razi refers to their argument that the basic rule in
manafic is idhn (permission, lawfulness) and in madarr is
manc (abstention).29
Al-Shatibl rejects this analysis as an unfaithful
representation of the maslahah-view. It is not possible
to speak about manafic and madarr only in absolute terms
as they do not exist as absolutes in reality; actually
they are largely relative. Secondly, since the masalih
refer to the clear statements of the Sharlcah which take
into consideration the differences among persons, times
28 See al-Shatibi, op. cit., pp. 52-53
29 Ibid., p. 40
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and states, it is inadequate to talk in absolute terms.
Third, since no manafic are to be found that are not
mixed with madarr, if we accept al-Razi's principle, we
will have also to accept that idhn and nahy (prohibition)
can apply to one and the same thing - which is absurd.
Shihab al-Din al-Qarafl, the commentator on
al-Razi's Al-mahsul, had some doubts about the principle
that maslahah constituted the basis of legal obligations.
He argued that maslahah cannot be the basis of ibahah
(permission). This is so first, because maslahah cannot
be realized and hence defined in simple and absolute
terms, because no maslahah can be gained without alam
(pain) and mafasid (evils). Thus to maintain that every
mubah (permissible thing) must be based on maslahah
amounts to a complete negation of mubah. Second, in order
to argue that maslahah is the basis of obligation,
maslahah must be defined in absolute terms and not in
reference to certain specific factors, because this
process of preference of one specific consideration to
another is never ending and because it does not provide a
universally accepted basis of definition. Furthermore,
this position cannot be supported on the grounds that
maglafoah is that whose violator is punished by God. This
*
definition is not acceptable because it is based either
on the assumption that God punishes only evil and this
manner of argument is dawr (arguing in a circle), or on
the assumption that every obligation from God is a
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maslahah simply because it is an obligation.
Al-Qurafi adds that the maslahah view is difficult
to maintain for ashabuna (our colleagues - the Ashcaris)
as well. They cannot say that God takes maslahah into
consideration over against mafsadah, because there are
many mubahat in which this consideration is lacking. The
only proof they have is an argument on the basis of the
induction of the obligations, and this also is based on a
claim to know the asrar (secrets, rational explanation)
of fiqh♦ They are thus necessarily led to the position
that God's actions, commands and considerations are
entirely dependent on His will and nothing else. The
Muctazilah were also led to the same conclusion.30
To answer al-Qarafi, al-Shatibl refers to his own
discussion of the relativity of maslahah. Second, he
answers that a survey of the rules of Sharicah by the
method of induction proves that Sharlcah has taken into
consideration what is regarded as maslahah in customary
practice as well. He argues that such a survey on the
basis of the method of induction provides the dawabit
(determining factors) of maslahah. The examination of the
events by way of induction where al-takallf al-sharciyyah
(legal obligations) have been realized in practice shows
that these takalif and mubahat did not harm human
Tfl _
See al-Shatibi, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 42
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interests (or masalih) but have conformed to them and
established them.
Ibn cAbd al-Salam had distinguished between masalih
al-dar al-akhirah (the hereafter) and al-masalih
al-dunyawiyyah (benefits belonging to this world) on the
basis that the former can be known only by sharc while
the latter are known by needs, experience, practice and
by consideration of probability. He even says that when
one wants to know a maslahah, he may simply find it
rationally, supposing that the Sharic has given no
indication. Judgment is reached rationally in this manner
except in the case of tacabbudat (acts of worship) where
masalih or mafasid are not given.
Al-Shatibi, quoting Ibn cAbd al-Salam here, refers
to him not by name but by terms such as bacd al-nas (some
person) and hadha al-qail (this speaker). To al-Shatibi
masalih in the hereafter are not independent of the
masalih of this world. Hence not only al-masalih
al-ukhrawiyyah but also al-dunyawiyyah, as long as they
are obligations, are known by Sharlcah alone. If the
distinction between the two masalih were absolute, the
sharc would have been concerned only with al-masalih
al-ukhrawiyyah. In fact, to realize the ukhrawiyyah, the
establishment of the dunyawiyyah is inevitable.
Al-Shatibi refutes the implication in Ibn cAbd al-Salam's
statement that the dunyawiyyah are rational and hence the
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consideration of sharc is additional.31
Al-masalih al-mursalah illustrate the type of new
things where the intention and the act both conform to
the purpose of Sharicah. 32. An example of this type is
the levying of new taxes in addition to those prescribed
in the texts. The conformity of the act with the purpose
of Sharlcah and the intention in this case show the right
understanding of Sharlcah, and further, the intention
does not conflict with the objectives of Sharicah.
5.6 AL-MASALIH AL-MURSALAH ARE NOT IDENTICAL WITH BIDCAH
In fact it is this conformity of al-masalih
al-mursalah with the maqasid al-SharIcah that
disassociates them from bidcah (innovation in religion).
Al-ShatibI disagreed with the jurists who identified
al-maslahah al-mursalah as bidcah33 To him the two were
31 — — _ _
See al-Shatibi, Al-muwafagat, vol. 2, p. 48
32 Ibid., pp. 341-42
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Al-Shatibi, here, refers to Imam Malik whose reliance on
al-masalih al-mursalah is strongly criticised by other jurists.
Al-Shatibi defends Imam Malik in the following manner: "Malik,
adhering to the principle of not applying rational explanations in
matters of cibadat revolves entirely around his [approach to] stop at
the limit prescribed by Sharicah, [and thus] disregarding what
munasib requires... [This is] in contradiction to cadat which are
governed according to suitable reason (al-macna al-munasib) which is
evident to human reason. He employed laxity (istirsal) with
self-confidence and with deep insight in reasoning by maslahah... [He
employed this laxity so frequently] that the scholars often condemn
him because of this laxity. They imagined that Malik threw off the
yoke of Sharicah and opened the gate of law-making. How far it is
[from truth], see Al-ictisam, p. 113
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completely opposed to each other.34 To refute such views
he argued that first of all the jurists are not agreed
upon an exact definition of al-masalih al-mursalah. Even
al-Ghazali expressed two different views on this point.35
Secondly, al-Shatibi explains, al-munasib al-mursal
(synonymous with al-maslahah al-mursalah in al-Ghazali's
terminology) which is neither specifically supported by
the legal text nor is it rejected, is not a bidcah. On
the contrary it is supported by the existence of the
genus which is common between al-Sharicah and al-maslahah
al-mursalah, and, futhermore, this genus is considered
valid by Sharlcah. Its validity is not based on specific
evidence but on its consideration as a whole.36
Al-Shatibi illustrates al-masalih al-mursalah with
ten examples. Among them are the following events fron
Islamic legal history: the collection of the Qur'an;
determining the penalty for using intoxicants; allegiance
to a less qualified person for an office in the presence
of a better qualified one.37 He finds three elements
common in all the ten examples. First is the element of
suitability with the objectives (maqasid) of the
34 Al-Shatibi, Al-ictisam, p.115
»
35 See al-Shatibi, Al-muwafaqat, vol. 2, p. 96
3^ Ibid., p. 98
37 Al-Shatibi, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 99-110
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Sharicah.38 Al-masalih al-mursalah do not conflict with
the fundamentals or with the evidences of Sharlcah.
Second, they are rationally intelligible. Al-masalih
al-mursalah do not belong to tacabbudat (acts of worship)
because the latter are not rationally intelligible in
detail. Al-ShatibI gives more than ten examples to prove
this point.39 Thirdly, al-masalih al-mursalah refer to
the following principles: protection of (human)
necessities; removal of impediments which are harmful to
religion; and protection of an indispensable means to the
end of law.40
Al-Shatibi, thus, shows that the acceptable masalih
cannot be equated with bidcah and that they are not
limited to the category of daruri, as some jurists have
maintained; they cover other categories as well. In fact,
the above explanation of al-maslahah al-mursalah conforms
to al-Shatibi's concept of maslahah which is of
fundamental significance to the doctrine of maqasid
al-Sharicah.
38 Al-Shatibi, op. cit., p. Ill
39 Ibid., For instance, al-Shatibi explains, Lawgiver's prescriptions
about cleanliness from human excretions are not rationally uniform.
In case of urine and stool one is obliged only to wash certain parts
of one's body, [ i.e to make ablution], but in case of nocturnal
discharge, washing of the whole body is obligatory
40 Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 113-115
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Chapter 6
NAJM AL-DIN AL-TUFI AND
MASLAHAH '
• •
6.1 AL-TUFI1S TREATISE ON MASLAHAH
• • •
Najm al-Din al-Tufi is a Hanbali scholar who died
in 716 A.H. His treatise on maslahah is connected with
his commentary on the thirty second of a group of forty
sayings of the Prophet compiled by Imam al-Nawawi which
states: "Do not inflict injury nor repay one injury by
another". Since the whole analysis was embedded within
his commentary on the group of forty sayings of the
Prophet mentioned above, there was a need to separate
al-Tufi's opinion on the concept of maslahah from the
rest of the commentary. A Damascus scholar called Jamal
al-Din al-Qasimi did that work and published it in a
special treatise with a short commentary on the margin.
The treatise was also published in the al-Manar journal
in its ninth volume of the tenth part which was issued in
October, 1906.1
6.2 THE MEANING OF THE HADITH "LA DARAR WALA DIRAR"
Al-Tufi began his views on maslahah by justifying
the above mentioned hadith which he made the core of his
treatise. He said that the hadith in question is a sound
1 The text of the treatise of al-Tufi can also be found in "Masadir
al-tashric f_i ma la nass fih" by cAbd al-Wahhab Khallaf, pp. 106 -
144; and in "Al-maslahah fi al-tashric al-Islami wa Nairn al-Din
al-Tufi" by Mustafa Zayd, at the appendix, pp. 14 - 48
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one. Then he went on to say that this hadith has many
chains of authority (asanid) which, although individually
weak, when taken together give strong support to the
hadith. So he concluded by saying that the hadith is
sound and accordingly necessitates practice. As for the
meaning of the hadith, al-Tufi held it to mean the
prohibition of someone causing injury to another person
in any circumstances whatsoever. This means that
preventing evil on one side and stoping the making of
mischief to others on the other side. In explaining the
meaning of that hadith, al-Tufi asserts that the Sharicah
forbids any harm to be caused to any body except as a
result of legal measures which require special proofs. He
argues that the negation of injury in the case of the
Lawgiver (God) in His divine decree is not inevitable
simply because God judges things with the utmost justice
and impartiality in His Omnipotence. He further says that
there are some types of injury which are lawful and
permissible, such as hudud (revealed punishments) and
punishments for various offences. On the question of the
prohibition of injury according to the Sharicah, al-Tufi
puts forward some ordinances from the Qur'an and Sunnah
such as:





"God wants easiness for you"3
The Prophet is reported to have said:
"Religion (Islam) is simplicity";4
and
"I have been sent with a simple way of life"5
Al-Tufi has mentioned these nusus (texts) as an
introduction to prove that the religion of Islam has been
ordained to mankind in order to attain easement and
benefit in life; for had the causing of injury and the
making of mischief not been prohibited by the Sharicah,
there would have been a lack of balance in some of the
ordinances of Islamic legislation, which is impossible
for the divine revelation. Thus the prohibition of
injuries by the law is the sole meaning of the hadith "la
darar wala dirar", which implies a general prohibition of
all kinds of injury except for that which has been
legalised by a special proof.6
6.3 THE OPINION OF AL-TUFI CONCERNING THE CONSIDERATION
OF BENEFIT
Al-TufI maintains that the consideration of benefit
3
Qur'an, 4:38
4 Reported by al-Bukhari, Muslim, Abu Dawud, Ahmad ibn Hanbal,
al-Nasai and al-Tirmidhi
5 Reported by Ahmad ibn Hanbal
^ See Mustafa Zayd, Al-maslahah fi al-tashric al-Islami wa Nairn
al-Din al-Tufi, p.116; and cAbd al-Wahhab Khallaf, Masadir al-tashric
al-IslamT fl ma la nass fih, p. 110
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and the prohibition of injury is a paramount and unique
aspect of the Sharlcah which goes beyond and above of
even the ordinances of the Qur'an, Sunnah and ijmac. He
supports his opinion by saying, "Suppose we thought that
some of the texts of the Sharlcah contain some injury
(i.e the harm is caused by some of its dictates as we
shall see later), if we expel that injury by the use of
this hadith it would mean exercising both this hadith and
the text; but if we did not expel the injury by using
this hadith, it would then mean a neglect of one of the
evidences, in this case it is the hadith in question that
will be made useless. No doubt, the combination of
evidences in solving problems is better than neglecting
some of them.7 In this connection, he enumerates the
evidences of Sharicah and restricts them by means of
induction to nineteen viz., (1) the Qur'an, (2) the
Sunnah, (3) ijmac of the Islamic Ummah, (4) ijmac of the
people of Medinah, (5) qiyas, (6) a saying of the
Companion of the Prophet, (7) al-masalih al-Mursalah, (8)
istishab (continuation of a practice from the time of
ignorance to Islam), (9) al-bara' al-asliyyah (original
exemption), (10) al-cAwaid (customs), (11) al-istiqra'
(induction), (12) sadd al-dharaic (preventive measures),
(13) istidlal (deduction), (14) istihsan (equity), (15)
7 See Mustafa Zayd, op. cit., p.117; cAbd al-Wahhab Khallaf, op.
cit., p. 109
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ikhtiyar al-aysar (taking the simple), (16) al-cismah
(immunity from error), (17) ijmaG of the people of Kufah,
(18) ijmac of the citrah - the house of the Prophet (for
the Shicas); (19) ijmac of the four caliphs.
After refering the knowledge of the demarcations of
these evidences, their methodology and their rules in
detail to the books of usul al-fiqh, al-Tufl goes on to
explain that the hadith before us implies the assurance
of obtaining benefit and the denial of injury. This is
simply because the denial of injury necessitates the
confirmation of benefit due to the fact that they are
contrary to one another. After this he asserts that the
textual ordinances (whether from the Qur'an or Sunnah)
are the strongest evidences out of those nineteen;
however, they might agree with maslahah or disagree with
it. Nonetheless, it is not necessary for al-Tufi that
maslahah has to be in agreement with nass (textual
evidence) or ijmac but it might go against them. After
making this assertion, al-Tufi does not hesitate to
require the pre-eminence of al-masalih al-mursalah over a
nass and an ijmac if it does not agree with them. He
describes this pre-eminence as the specification
(takhgis) of a nass and an ijmac and not as a domination
over them, corresponding to the pre-eminence of Sunnah
over the Qur'an as a means of explanation and
clarification.
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Then al-Tufi goes to explain that there is no
problem if a nass and an ijmac are in agreement with a
maglahah so that no injury at all is found in them,
except in the hudud, which must have been exempted from
the hadith "la darar wala dirar". However, if some injury
seems to be implicit in the nass and ijmac due to
particular evidence, then it is obligatory to follow that
evidence, or else it is necessary to restrict nass and
ijmac by the hadith in question.
6.4 THE CONSIDERATION OF MASLAHAH AND IJMAC
• •
Here al-Tufi raises an objection which might be made
that ijmac, according to most Muslim scholars, is a
clear-cut evidence whereas the consideration of maslahah
is not so, simply because its foundation is uncertain and
therefore it cannot have pre-eminence over ijmac. But
al-Tufi argues that maslahah is stronger than ijmac
because it is based on a sound hadith while ijmac is
based only on the opinion of the mujtahids. Thus,
maglafrah is the strongest proof of Sharicah simply
because one of the strongest arguments supported by
another becomes a strong argument. Then he goes on
talking about maslahah and ijmac in detail to support his
claim taking into account two aspects: (i) the literal
meaning of maslahah which signifies that law should be
applied as it ought to be and not according to what it
is. and (ii) its descriptive meaning which implies that
law should be beneficial. He does this by putting forward
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some evidences to raise the status of maslahah to show
how important it is in the eyes of the Lawgiver, and at
the same time he mentions the evidences of ijmac and
weakens them.
6.5 MASLAHAH IS THE INTENTION OF THE LAWGIVER
Al-TufI argues that if the literal meaning of
maslahah is a thing which is fully utilized according to
the intended objective, such as a pen being fully
utilized if it is used in writing; and this is accepted
in ordinary usage as resulting in benefit - like trade
resulting in profit - it follows also that maslahah in
relation to the Sharicah is a cause leading to the
fulfilment of the intention of the Lawgiver whether in
terms of acts of worship or customary law. While the acts
of worship are the right of the Lawgiver, the practices
are for the benefit of mankind and for the organization
of their affairs ... Al-Tufi makes it clear that the
Lawgiver has cared very much for maslahah in the Sharicah
as a whole; and he quotes the following verses:
"0 mankind! There hath come to you an admonition
from your Lord and a healing for the (diseases)
in your hearts, - and for those who believe, a
Guidance and a Mercy. Say (0 Muhammad): "In the
bounty of God, and in His Mercy, - in that let
them rejoice": that is better than (the wealth)
they hoard".8




beings from their Creator as an exhortation, a healing of
their hearts and a guidance and mercy for those who
believe in it (i.e the Qur'an) should be something which
considers the benefits of people at their fullest. Thus,
the ordained injunctions and rules in the Sharicah are
for the accomplishment of those benefits.
Then al-Tufi poses a hypothetical question: "Why is
it not possible to presume that nass and ijmac contain
the general consideration of the benefits of mankind so
as to be a proof of their knowledge of the Sharlcah? He
responds by saying that this is true with the acts of
worship, but with transactions and customary law nass and
ijmac must be in agreement with maslahah. He then
recapitulates the differences between the acts of worship
and transactions in this connection and says that the
former belong to the will of God whose techniques can
only be known from God Himself through either nass or
ijmac; whereas the latter, the consideration of benefit
in them is the prime intention of the Lawgiver.
As al-Tufi clarifies the concern of the Lawgiver on
maslahah in detail, he, at the same time, investigates
four things. First of all he surveys the actions of God
and asks, "Are the God's actions accounted for or not? He
answers this question by bringing forward the arguments
of those whose response is affirmative as well as of
those whose answer is negative. Then he says, "The
154
actions of God are directed towards the beneficence and
perfection of His creatures and not to His benefit and
perfection due to the fact that He is Self-sufficient".
Secondly, he discusses the issue concerning the decision
of God on the consideration of benefits for His creatures
and asks, "Is it a matter of favour from Him as it is
held by the Sunnis or a question of obligation on Him as
it is held by the Muctazilahs? After establishing that
the opinion of the Muctazilahs is based on tahsin
(approval) and taqbih (detestation) which both have to do
with a mere exercise of the mind - a speculative method -
al-Tufi argues, "The truth is that the consideration of
benefits by God is a matter of His favour to His
creatures and it is not a matter of compulsion over Him".
Thirdly, he talks about the benefits which the Lawgiver
has laid down and examines, "Are they absolute benefits
in all aspects and cases or are they the best ones in all
aspects and cases or are they the suited and the perfect
ones in each and every situation?" Al-Tufl establishes
that the last type of benefits (i.e the suited and the
perfect ones) is the best and is likely to be the correct
one. Fourthly, he puts forward the proofs which indicate
the consideration of maslahah by the Lawgiver as
manifested in the Qur'an, Sunnah, ijmac and qiyas. . .
Al-Tufl gives as a proof of the consideration of
maslahah from the Qur'an verses concerning the law of
qigas (legal retaliation) and punishments for theft and
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adultery for examples, and then he says, "Generally
speaking there is no verse in the Qur'an which does not
consist of benefit or benefits as we have explained in
another place"9 When commenting on these verses of the
Qur'an he has mentioned that the principles of the
philosophy of Islamic jurisprudence have verified that
the textual ordinances (nusus) have been ordained to
accomplish these principles. He went on to maintain that
the fundamentals of Islamic religion are sufficient and
stand well above all that which has been said by the
dialecticians, sophists and the philosophers.
6.6 MASLAHAH IN THE SUNNAH
• •
In his observation of the consideration of maslahah
in the Sunnah, al-Tufi presents the hadlth on the
prohibition of mudabarah (i.e to sell or buy goods which
have already been purchased by someone else) which he
considers to be maslahah. He also considers maslahah to
be involved in the traditions: that a townman should not
sell to a countryman and a woman should not be married
together with her aunt or her mother's sister, so that
one's kinship is not disrupted.10. Then he goes further
establishing the fact that there are many of such types
of cases in the Sunnah where individual as well as
g _ _ _
It may be he means his book, Al-irshadat al-ilahiyyah ila
al-mabahith al-usuliyyah
10 Reported by al-Bukhari and Muslim
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community interests have been considered; simply because
the Sunnah is an explanation of the Qur'an, so the
explainer must collaborate with the explained. This
means that the Sunnah takes maslahah into account as much
as the Qur'an does no more no less.
6.7 THE CONSIDERATION OF MASLAHAH BY QIYAS
In his discussion as to the proof of the
consideration of maslahah by qiyas, al-Tufi has put
forward the argument that God is concerned with the
benefits of His creatures prior to this life, as well as
in this life and in the life to come. As to the
beginning, God has created human beings from nothing in a
form by which they could secure benefits in their lives,
while living in this world. God has made easy for them
the means of their sustenance by creating the heavens and
the earth and all that is found therein and between them;
and eventually God has led those who follow His guidance
and do good deeds to the success of being subservient to
Him so as to win His pleasures and acquire His reward in
the bliss of paradise in the hereafter. As long as God
has considered these benefits for His creatures, it goes
without saying that it is not possible for Him to neglect
their benefits in His commandments and legislation (the
basis of Sharlcah) which is an overall action of guidance
to control their social system and to maintain order in
their community so as to secure safety for their material
wealth, blood and prestige without which their lives will
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fall a prey of chaos and animosity. It follows therefore,
that God has considered the benefits of His creatures in
all aspects and it is improbable to think that God has
neglected them in any case whatsoever...
Al-Tufi supposes for the third time as he did twice
before that nass and ijmac might disagree with maslahah;
and if it so happens then it is maslahah which should be
given priority. He says that it is important in this
case to restrict nass and ijmac by this maslahah or to
clarify them by it ... It is quite a natural procedure to
al-Tufx that all evidences of the Sharicah have to be
restricted by maslahah due to the fact that the strongest
of these evidences (nass and ijmac) could not face such a
challenge. Al-Tufi has defined maslahah by explaining how
the Lawgiver has cared for it, and therefore it should be
the axis of all the evidences of Sharlcah.
As al-Tufl observes the consideration of maslahah by
ijmac, he argues that "salam" (forward selling) and
"ijarah" (the renting transaction) are permitted by the
Sharlcah though opposed to analogy (which requires
transactions to take place hand in hand at the same
time); nevertheless, the two mentioned transactions are
allowed on the basis of the consideration of the benefits
of people. The case is also the same with the right of
pre-emption (shufcah) and many other Islamic laws. He
then says that most of the chapters concerning
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transactions in Islamic jurisprudence are proved by means
of masalih which are accepted by the majority of the
Muslim scholars, except those who do not rely upon such
method such as the scholars of the al-Zahiriyyah school
system, as well as those who suspend judgement on the
question of ijmac being one of the evidences of Sharlcah
have agreed on this fact.
6.8 THE ROOT OF IJMAC AND ITS BASIS
Then al-Tufl goes on to discuss ijmac in detail and
says that its wording is of "ifcal" class form from an
Arabic verb "jamac" - which means resolution or
agreement. When defined terminologically, ijmac means
consensus of the mujtahids of the Muslim Ummah on a
particular legal rule. The evidence for it stems out of
the Qur'an, Sunnah and qiyas; and al-Tufl remarks that
the proof of ijmac from the Qur'an has been based on
three verses. He criticises this interpretation in the
following manner.
The first verse is:
"If anyone contends with the Apostle even after
guidance has been plainly conveyed to him, and
follows a path other than that becoming to men of
faith, We shall leave him in the path he has
chosen, and land him in Hell, - what an evil
refuge" .1;L




threatens the one who wrangles with the Prophet and makes
his choice another path rather than the believers' path.
Actually, a threat is given against an evil deed or
leaving an obligation. The path of the men of faith here
- which is the basis of this threat - is that one which
is agreed upon. It follows therefore that to follow ijmac
is an obligation. Al-Tufi opposes this argument from six
aspects: (i) that if a threat is given for two things
collectively (as is the case with this verse - viz. to
dispute with the Prophet and to depart from the path of
the believers) it is not necessarily applicable to each
of them individually; since one of them could be a
condition or a pillar of the other, and therefore the
verse does not mean that to follow ijmac is
obligatory...; (ii) that the definite article (al) used
in the word "al-mu'minin" might mean special kind of
people, which could then imply the Sahabah or some of
them only; since the address was made to them and in
their time. As it is established in usul al-fiqh that
"al-ihtimal yusqit al-ihtijaj" (probability demolishes
argument) so this means that the argument is nullified;
(iii) that the annexation in the expression (a path other
than that of the believers - (ghair sabil al-mu'minin) is
not absolute, due to the ambiguity of the word "other
than - ghair". The verse could be interpreted as "he
follows a different path from the path of the believers"
i.e opposed to their belief (which means non-belief); and
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this meaning is witnessed by the logical sequence of the
verse itself before and after the expression. Thus, there
is no proof in the verse of the obligation to follow
ijmac; (iv) that there is a mid-path between the path of
the believers and the non-believers and that is the path
of lawfulness which is free from both threat as well as
promise. So, the verse is not a proof for the obligation
of following the path of the believers, (v) that the
verse in question corresponds to the verse before it and
is joined to its conditional nature... We find in the
verse prior to it three things: (1) exhortation to a deed
of charity; (2) exhortation to do justice; and (3)
exhortation to make conciliation between people. So the
act of not following the path of the believers means
doing things contrary to these ones mentioned in the
verse. As long as there is this possibility of
interpretation the proof for ijmac is rejected..; (vi)
that even if we accept that the verse is a proof for the
obligation of following ijmac, yet there is no impediment
in it which prevents the pre-eminence of maslahah over
ijmac due to the fact that maslahah is a stronger proof
of the Sharlcah than it.
The second verse which has been presented by al-Tufl
as a proof of ijmac is:
"Thus have we made of you an Ummah justly
balanced that ye might be witnesses over the
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nations...".12
Where "justly balanced " means the people of justice
whose dealings are righteous. As long as i jmac is a
consensus of the mujtahids of this Ummah who have got
this noble quality, it follows therefore that ijmac is a
just means of legislation and must be followed...
Al-TufI also argued that this verse is an unfounded
evidence for ijmac. The reason he gives is that justice
is a necessity for righteousness in matters of
truthfulness and falsehood which applies to the act of
narration and giving evidence. Whereas in matters
concerning right and wrong through the exercise of
deduction of laws and diligence which incorporates in its
totality ijmac, this qualification does not hold water.
He furthermore raises an objection that the reality of
the justice of the Ummah necessitates its consensus on a
firm basis which obligates its application. However, most
of those who assert the validity of ijmac have accepted
its formation on the basis of mere indications (imarat
mujarradah) like qiyas and the narration of a single man
(riwayat ahad). Still many amongst them have accepted its
formation on the basis of a mere research i.e without a
firm basis; but just on the pretext of the immunity of




whether on a firm basis or not must be followed. Thus, it
is not an agreed upon opinion that the Ummah does not
come together except on a firm basis i.e it can make a
consensus even on a weak basis...
Al-TufI goes on to argue that even if it is admitted
that the Ummah does not come together except on a
decisive measure, the question still remains concerning
what does that decisiveness purport! If by decisiveness
is meant rationality (which does not contain
contradiction), this is hardly non-existent in the proofs
of the Sharicah; and if ever it happened to exist it
would not be expected to go against maslahah. On the
other hand if by decisiveness is meant legal
absoluteness, it won't be anything other than one of the
three evidences of the Sharicah, viz. (i) al-nass, or
(ii) ijmac or (iii) the consideration of maslahah. With
regard to ijmac, it is not possible to accept it on the
basis of another ijmac lest it becomes a proof proved by
its own existence - which is void. As regards al-nass, it
is divided into four categories: (i) clear cut and
well-established (mutawatir sarlh) which is decisive in
its wording and verification, yet it might be dubious in
terms of its generalization and unrestricted nature.
However, if the "mutawatir sarlh" does not have a
specific possibility in that case he prevents it from
opposing the consideration of maslahah; (ii)
well-established but dubious (mutawatir muhtamil); (iii)
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clear cut but isolated (ahad sarlh); and (iv) isolated
and dubious (ahad muhtamil). As it could be seen clearly
that the last three categories of nass are not
decisive.. .
If the basis of the decisiveness of one ijmac upon
another ijmac and nass is rejected and excluded - which
we have agreed upon previously - then there only remains
the consideration of maslahah and the dependence of the
decisiveness of i jmac on it.
The third verse which al-Tufi gives as a proof for
ijmac is:
"Ye are the best of people evolved for mankind,
enjoining what is right, forbidding what is wrong
and believing in God
The manner in which this verse is considered to be a
proof for ijmac is that God's eulogy of the believers
signifies His justification for them; and therefore their
consensus should be a proof (of the Sharicah).
Nevertheless, al-Tufi opposes this verse as the proof for
ijmac in the same manner as he has done to the previous
one.
He tries to verify the proof of ijmac by Sunnah
quoting a saying of the Prophet which states:





Al-Tufi establishes that the various wordings and
versions in which this saying has been reported have made
it to attain the status of "al-tawatur al-macnawi" (the
established in its meaning) and therefore it becomes a
decisive proof which necessitates the following of ijmac.
He says that it is as strong as a decisive nass in its
wording and its basis and therefore deserves practice. In
spite of this fact, al-Tufi opposes this proof and says
that the attainment of this hadith to the status of
"al-tawatur al-macnawl" is not conceded simply because it
has not reached in strength the position of an Arabic
simile " the generosity of Hatim and the bravery of CA1I
and its like in celebrity. So anything less than the
status of "al-tawatur al-macnawl" is not so a strong
proof even if it acquires the quality of majority
transmition (al-ifadah) among people.
Suppose somebody might argue, says al-Tufi, that the
proof of the firmness of this hadlth is that the Muslim
Ummah has accepted its validity. Nevertheless, al-Tufi
argues that this assertion could be refuted in three
ways: (i) that those who rejected ijmac have not accepted
this hadith because of their opposition to ijmac; thus
the claim that the Muslim Ummah has unanimously accepted
14
Reported by Ibn Majah
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it is not valid; (ii) that the implication of unanimity
of the Ummah in accepting this hadith is mere proving
ijmac by another ijmac which is invalid; and (iii) that
the acceptance of the hadith by the Ummah on the
probability of our agreement is, in actual fact, a
supposition and not decisiveness. A supposition cannot
formulate the basis of ijmac which is alleged to be one
of the strongest proofs of the Sharlcah simply because by
being so it is deprived of its strength...
Al-Tufi goes on to say: "Even if we accepted that
the hadith in question has reached the status of being
firmly established (tawatur), nonetheless, this does not
mean that we hold it to require the obligation of
following ijmac, because of the possibilty that what was
meant by the word "perversion" might refer especially to
non-belief. The lack of the consensus of the Muslim Ummah
on perversion in this special meaning does not exclude
its agreement on another perversion. Thus, this hadith is
not a suitable proof for the obligation of following
ijmac other than interpreting faith as opposed to
non-belief. In the same way, it is not suitable a proof
for ijmac to base on another hadith which states:
"Follow the majority (of my Ummah), verily he who
keeps aloof (from it) will be thrown in hell
fire, and the hand of God is over the entire
body",15
15
Reported by Ahmad ibn Hanbal and Ibn Majah
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simply because this hadith means to obey the rulers and
the Imams and not to go against them.
6.9 OBJECTIONS TO THE PROOFS OF IJMAC
After completing his argument concerning ijmac based
on the Qur'an and Sunnah, al-Tufi puts forward two
general objections to the proofs which he has mentioned:
(i) that the proofs of ijmac are apparently hearsay upon
which some problems in interpretation occur and need be
proved by the consensus of the Muslim scholars due to
lack of conclusiveness. Thus, to prove ijmac by these
proofs is a circular argument (i.e proving ijmac by
another ijmac); (ii) the word "believers" in the above
mentioned verse include all the believers; and the word
"my followers" in the hadith encompases the whole Ummah.
Nevertheless, the Ummah, according to another hadith16 is
divided into seventy three sects and does not come
together except on the belief of God and His Messenger
and other few basic fundamentals. These basic
fundamentals are therefore the ones which ijmac is
concerned and not all the rules of the Sharicah. It is
then obvious that this is not a place where ijmac is
claimed, and the verse and the hadith are not applicable
for its proof...




reason and establishes that it is generally impossible
for the pious and intellectual people to agree on an
error in magnitude after striving diligently and
researching the law. Nevertheless, this acceptance is not
to be taken as a proof for ijmac simply because it is
found that people of different faiths do agree on an
error in great numbers and after hard work in research
carried out with diligence and high intellectual
capacities, because they become a prey of error in
connection with faith in God as visualized by Muslims.
After this al-Tufl discusses four aspects in which
he manifests the contradiction of the proofs with regard
to the verification of ijmac in the following manner: (i)
that if ijmac is considered one of the proofs of the
Sharlcah it is necessary for the assembly (of the
mujtahids) to attain immunity from making mistakes and
sins; or at least the Sharicah should attest their
immunity - which is not the case. The protection of the
consensus of the Muslim Ummah or mujtahids from making
errors in themselves is invalid simply because the
possibility of making mistakes is not ruled out. As
regards the witness of the Sharlcah to their exemption
from making errors, it has only been reported to us by
some individuals, which are insufficient to establish it;
(ii) that the term "my Ummah" in the hadlth which states:
"My Ummah will not agree on a perversion ..." does not
mean to include all the sects of the believers due to the
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fact that some of these sects have been deemed to be out
of the pale of Islam because of their innovations in the
belief. They are not therefore to be included in the
circle of the assembly; and still some sects do not hold
ijmac as one of the proofs of the Sharicah and therefore
their assembly is not to be taken into consideration even
if they do so. The term "my Ummah" in the hadlth is not
suitable to mean the sect which is saved (al-firqah
al-najiyah) only amongst the seventy three sects simply
because this will lead to make an estimation in
proportion so as to be read: "Eighth of the nine parts of
my Ummah will not agree on an error"; which is too weak a
style of speech to be accredited to the Messenger of God.
It follows therefore, that the meaning of "perversion" in
the hadlth should be especially "non-belief"; and thus
the proof does not confirm ijmac. (iii) that Ibn cAbbas
prefered the clearly stated nass (zahir al-nass) over
ijmac in the question of debarring a mother from taking
one third (1/3) of inheritance so that she took one sixth
(1/6) with the existence of two brothers. He cited the
verse:
"If the deceased left brothers (or
sisters ) . . . " ;17
and he debated with cUthman ibn cAffan (the third
caliph) saying that God has judged in the Qur'an that if
17 Qur'an, 4:11
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the deceased left brothers (or sisters) the mother has to
take one sixth of the inheritance, therefore, since the
two brothers are in the plural form in Arabic language,
the mother should deserve one sixth only and not one
third.18 cUthman ibn cAffan agreed with the opinion of Ibn
cAbbas contrary to his own opinion and ijmac. This means
that the clear meanings of nusus are stronger than ijmac;
(iv) that Ibn Mascud went against the ijmac of the
Safrabah on the question of the permision to use sand for
purification "tayammum" while in sickness and said: "Were
we to allow the sick people to use tayammum instead of
making ablution, then a person would resort to it because
of coldness when there was water". Although this opinion
of Ibn Mascud was widespread at the time of the Sahabah,
no criticism of it has been received from them. If Ibn
Mascud was right in going against the nass19 and the ijmac
of the Sahabah because of the general maslahah, this
implies that the pre-eminence of maslahah upon nass and
ijmac is possible and permissible. On the contrary, if
Ibn Mascud was wrong in his opinion, then the assembly of
the Sahabah is erroneous for not criticising him; and in
both the situations the proof of ijmac is repudiated.
18 See M. Zayd, Al-maslahah fi al-tashric al-Islami wa Nairn al-Din
al-Tufi , p. 126
19 The nass in question is the hadith which states: "The earth is
made a mosque for me and its sand is a purification, wherever time
for prayer comes I purify myself with the sand and pray on it".
Reported by Muslim.
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Al-Tufi goes on to maintain that first of all, the
difference of opinion of Ibn Mascud is contrary to the
ijmac of the Sahabah; and secondly, although Ibn Mascud
was criticized by Abu Musa al-AshcarI, it was an
individual criticism and only indicated the Sahabah's
mistake in not repudiating Ibn Mascud. Since the
consensus of the Sahabah as a community did not reject
the opinion of Ibn Mascud, it follows that the
disapproval of Abu Musa al-AshcarI was merely a
contention. Therefore, the opinion of Ibn Mascud which is
against the nass that formulated the basis of the ijmac
of the Sahabah remains paramount and intact.
Before finishing his analysis of ijmac, al-Tufl
establishes the fact that his opposition to the ijmac and
its proofs should not be taken as a complete rejection of
it due to the fact that he himself talks of it in
connection with cibadat (acts of worship) and the like.
All that he means in this regard is to clarify that the
consideration of maslahah which is deduced from the
« » •
hadith "la darar wala dirar" is a stronger proof in the
Sharxcah than ijmac simply because its basis is stronger
than the basis of ijmac. He further tries to prove in
favour of the opinion which he has put forward, that the
consideration of maslahah takes precedence over nass and
ijmac in three respects: (i) that those who rejected
ijmac have accepted the consideration of maslahah. This
means that maslahah is a matter agreed upon by all
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whereas ijmac is a subject of disagreement; and to
maintain something which is agreed upon is better than
that about which there is disagreement; (ii) that the
nusus do contradict and disagree with each other thus
causing difference in judgments and decisions which would
appear to be blameworthy in the Sharicah; whereas the
consideration of maslahah is an item of agreement in
itself where none is different, and this quality of
agreement is desired in the Sharicah. Thus to follow it
is better and safer.
6.10 THE SOURCE OF DISPUTE AMONG THE FOLLOWERS OF THE
MADHAHIB
After putting forward some nusus which demand
accordance and agreement in judgments and decision
making, al-Tufi digresses and points out what happened to
the followers of the celebrated Imams of the four schools
of jurisprudence who, later, began to dispute and argue
with each other due to competition between them,
preferring the apparent meanings of the nusus rather than
taking maslahah into consideration. Had they agreed with
each other in their methodology of dealing with the
nugus, then there would have been neither dispute nor
difference of opinion... Al-Tufi goes further
maintaining that one of the main causes of the Muslim
scholars' disagreement is the contradiction of the
narrations of hadith and the divergent interpretations of
the nusus of Qur'an. He mentions the assertion of some
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people who said that the sole cause of the contradictions
in hadith is cUmar ibn al-Khattab who prevented the other
Sahabah from compiling the Sunnah when they asked
permision from him and he replied:
"I don't write the Qur'an along with something
else".20
Nevertheless, cUmar's opinion is contrary to some sayings
of the Prophet such as:
"Write for Abu Shah the farewell sermon";21
and
"Preserve knowledge by writing down".22
Al-Tufi quotes from those people who say: "Had cUmar
allowed the Sahabah to write down what they heard from
the Prophet, then the Sunnah would be fully preserved and
every hadith which reached the Imams would have the
authority of the Companion who transmited it, and those
books would be known to us as we know the books of
al-Bukhari, Muslim and others, (iii) that there are some
instances in the Sunnah in which contradiction occurs
between nusus and masalih. Al-Tufi gives eight examples
in which he finds clear opposition. Then he concludes by
saying that the consideration of maslahah must precede
all the rest proofs of the Sharicah in order to improve
211 See Mustafa Zayd, op. cit., p.128
2-1 Reported by al-Bukharl and Ahmad ibn Hanbal
9 9 — T" Reported by al-Darmi in Muqaddimah, p. 43
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the people's welfare, organise their affairs and procure
all the goodness which God has bestowed upon them by
binding all the rules together in a systematic order and
getting rid of all contradictions. Then he states that
the pre-eminence of al-masalih al-mursalah over all the
other evidences of Sharicah is a question of the use of
reason or rather a special preference. The inference that
al-Tufi reaches after discussing these three aspects is
that al-masalih al-mursalah is a stronger legislative
device in the Sharicah than ijmac and should be made to
take precedence over all the evidences of the Sharicah if
there is any contradiction between them.
6.11 AL-TUFI'S CONCLUSIONS ON MASLAHAH
• • •
After this assertion, al-Tufi gives four answers to
suggested objections to his exposition of the
pre-eminence of the consideration of maslahah over all
the proofs of Sharicah. He maintains that: (i) his
conclusion in favour of the precedence of al-masalih
al-mursalah is not to diminish the proofs of Sharicah by
a mere mischievous analogy resembling satanic thinking,
rather it is an assertion of the precedence of a stronger
proof (i.e the consideration of maslahah) over a strong
one (i.e ijmac) which is an accepted principle (in usul
al-fiqh). (ii) the Lawgiver (God) is well versed in all
the benefits of His creatures as His bounties to them
depict this reality. Nonetheless, the pre-eminence of the
consideration of maslahah over the proofs of the Sharlcah
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is never a denial of this truth simply because maslahah
is one amongst these proofs and the most preferable.
Moreover, as long as God has given us the talent of
recognizing our benefits normally, it is therefore not
reasonable to discard it and depend on an ambiguous thing
which might be a doubtiful method towards the attainment
of maslahah; (iii) he refutes the claim of those who
allege that the difference of opinion of the Imams on the
question of legal rules and judgments is a mercy
" ikhtilaf al-Aimmah rahmah". He says that there is no
sound nass to support this claim; and even if there were
a sound nass to support this opinion, the agreed maslahah
must take preference over the disagreed one because the
former is more probable than the latter. Moreover, the
disagreed maslahah makes possible two harmful effects:
(a) some people would be given to use the dispensations
of a certain madhhab (school of law) which could lead
them to deem some unlawful things as lawful ones and
therefore involve themselves in great wickedness; (b)
that some of the non-believers who are in need of
embracing Islam might be prevented by the differences
within the Ummah, because those differences are thought
to involve error and naturally a man would be repulsed
from them. It is without doubt that in following the
principle of the consideration of maslahah the ways
towards making beneficial judgments are unified and the
causes of differences are demolished; (iv) he further
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establishes that his analysis is not erroneous but is not
necessarily the only method due to the fact that the
foundation of this analysis is the use of reason which
assumes probability only and not decisiveness.
Notwithstanding, there is an urgent necessity to follow
it simply because probability in question of customary
law (and transactions) is equal to decisiveness in other
matters. The argument that by doing so implies that the
Ummah before this generation must have been wrong is just
a misunderstanding which could be arrived at by anybody
who comes to a new methodology which has never existed
before. With regard to the vast majority (al-sawad
al-aczam) which the hadlth commands us to follow, there
is a clear poof and a great argument in favour of the
consideration of maslahah in the sense that had it not
the case been so, then it would be necessary for the
scholars (who are few) to follow the masses whenever they
went against them as the masses are the majority.
Al-Tufi maintains that his theory of the
pre-eminence of maglahah over all the proofs of the
Sharicah is different and unique from the theory of Imam
Malik on al-masalih al-mursalah in the sense that his
theory is more comprehensive... He goes on to say: "The
consideration of maslahah is in actual fact a support of
the nusus (of the Qur'an and Sunnah) and ijmac in the
acts of worship whereas its consideration in
transactions, customary law and general social
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obligations, it is a basic condition". In connection with
acts of worship says al-Tufi, the rules and judgments are
verified either by single clear cut proofs or by a
variety of proofs which are congruent in meaning, or by
contradicting proofs which could be grouped together
without affecting the nusus. But if the contradicting
proofs could not be grouped together, then ijmac takes
precedence over the rest of the proofs, or else nass
takes precedence in the absence of ijmac.
When the proof is singled out from the Qur'an for a
particular judgment, whether it be a clear cut ordinance
or an apparent meaning of a verse, it has to be exercised
by giving the precedence to the most probable of its
suitable meanings. If the possibilities of the apparent
meaning of the verse are of equal strength, then any of
those possibilities may be exercised in the acts of
worship... If the proofs from the Qur'an for the same
particular thing are two or numerous, then they will be
taken as if they were one verse only if all their
implications are congruent. But if their implications are
multifarious, the verses are grouped together by the
method of particularisation or by means of restriction
and the like, if at all there is a possibility of
grouping the verses together; but in cases where their
grouping together becomes difficult, then one or some of
the verses are deemed abrogated and the case is verified
by the agreement of the Sunnah.
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When the Sunnah becomes the only evidence in a
judgment and the proof is verified by one sound hadith,
then it is necessary to carry out that hadith without any
further research. But if the proof from the Sunnah is
based on more than one hadith and all the ahadith are
• •
equal in correctness and their implications are unified,
then all the ahadith will be applied as if they were one
hadith only. If their implications are divergent
nonetheless they could be grouped together, then they
will be merged with one another; and if grouping is
impossible some of them will be deemed abrogated. If the
meaning is specific just in the Sunnah itself, then there
is no need to go beyond it for another proof; but if the
meaning is not specific, then proof should be sought and
verified with the conjunction of the Qur'an and ijmac or
more than that amongst the proofs of the Sharicah. If
some of the ahadith are not sound it is a natural
practice that only the correct ones are to be applied;
but if the ahadith compete with each other in soundness,
it is necessary to give precedence to the most correct
ones as far as possible... When the Qur'an and Sunnah
both provide evidence in a particular case, one of the
two things should take place, either they agree with each
other or they disagree. If they agree with each other,
then one (i.e Sunnah) is a clarification and an emphasis
of the other. But if they disagree with each other, a way
should be found to bind them together as much as
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possible; and if grouping them together is impossible,
then one should be deemed abrogated by the other if that
is suitable; but in case abrogation it is not applicable,
then the Qur'an should take precedence over the Sunnah
simply because it is the origin and logic demands that
the origin should not be discarded for its derivative.23
This is how al-Tufl defines rules in connection with
the acts of worship. Whereas in connection with
transactions and practices the established norm is the
consideration of maslahah of people in the first place
before all else, then if any other proof agrees with it,
no word is to be added as is the case with the five
fundamentals (al-ahkam al-khamsah) where nass, ijmac and
maslahah have all agreed together - eg, to kill the
killer, or to amputate the hand of a thief, or to flog or
stone an adulterer... In the case of divergence between
the Qur'an and the Sunnah when there is the possibility
of merging some of the proofs into others in some
judgments or conditions while excluding the others or of
taking into account the consideration of maslahah, then
they could be grouped together. If grouping together is
not possible, maslahah takes precedence over the rest of
the proofs due to the fact that the hadith "la darar wala
dirar" states categorically the negation of injury which
23 See Mustafa Zayd, op. cit., appendix, pp. 43-46; cAbd al-Wahhab
Khallaf, op. cit., pp. 138-141
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prompts the consideration of maslahah, and thus it must
take precedence due to the fact that maslahah is the main
objective as far as people are concerned in the
legislation of laws, whereas the rest of the proofs are
in reality a means to this objective. Logically, the ends
should take pre-eminence over the means...
Al-TufI here perceives the possibility of opposition
between benefits (masalih) and injuries (mafasid); and he
therefore lays down a canon to avoid that
contradiction... He begins by saying that every proposed
rule or law constitutes maslahah only, or mafsadah alone,
or contains both maslahah and mafsadah together. If it
constitutes a single maslahah or several, then it has to
be acquired as much as possible. But if it is not
possible to acquire more than one and the masalih were
contending against each other in degrees of importance,
then the most important ones are to be acquired; and if
there is no competition one only will be obtained by
means of preference, but if there happens to be doubt
about which, then drawing lots will take place... If ever
a mafsadah is the only quality within a thing in one or
more forms, then it must be expelled and checked as much
as possible. But when it is not possible, then only that
which is possible has to be expelled. If it becomes
difficult to stop more than one mafsadah then an effort
has to be made to expel the most injurious mafasid if
they are at different levels of harm; but if they are
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equal, then only one amongst them will be debarred by
means of selection or by drawing lots if doubt occurs. If
the maslahah and the mafsadah altogether do exist in a
thing, it is incumbent and necessary to deter the
mafsadah as much as possible, but if it is difficult to
do so then precedence should be given to the one which is
important to obtain or expel if they are at different
levels of importance. But if they are apparently equal in
importance, then anyone could take precedence in
selection but if doubt occurs, then drawing lots will
take place... If two masalih oppose each other or two
mafasid contradict each other, or a maslahah counteracts
a mafsadah and one outweighs the other respectively, then
the weightier one (al-arjah) will be preferred either to
be obtained or expelled. If both are equal in
importance, only one of them will be considered in the
selection by means of preference or drawing lots...".24
As a conclusion to his analysis of the theory of the
pre-eminence of the consideration of maslahah in Islamic
law, al-Tufi emphasizes the point that this theory is
applicable only to transactional operations (mucamalat)
and customary law and not to the acts of worship due to
the fact that the rules and laws concerning mucamalat are
in the realm of political affairs whose enactment depends
24
See Mustafa Zayd, op. cit., appendix, pp. 46-47; and cAbd
al-Wahhab Khallaf, op. cit., pp. 141-142
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on the benefits of the people. Thus, it is important that
in mucamalat the consideration of maslahah should take
precedence and formulate its basis. Whereas the acts of
worship are the rights of the Lawgiver (God) alone and no
one can know His rights in terms of quality, quantity,
time and place except through His decree and will. It is
obligatory therefore to perform acts of worship in the
way they have been laid down for us by the Lawgiver
Himself or by His Prophet and not as it has been
stipulated by the philosophers who worshipped through
their reason denying the code of laws from God and so
made Him angry, and consequently they lead astray and
perverted other people... Then al-Tufi winds up his
analysis by emphasizing once again that maslahah is one
of the devices of the Sharlcah, its strongest proof and
special one. He ends up by saying that maslahah is a
distinct feature to the people who have been given
responsibility (mukallafIn) in the light of customs and
common sense. If we find that any proof of the Sharlcah
has neglected it or has not considered it, then we should
know that we are prompted to obtain that maslahah through
our own consideration as it is clear that the nusus of
the Sharicah have not encompassed all the rules and
judgments of the everchanging events as much as we know
that we are required to complete those rules and
judgments by means of qiyas.
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THE CRITIQUE OF AL-TUFI'S THEORY
Al-Tufi's theory of the pre-eminence of the
consideration of maslahah is based on three propositions:
(i) that maslahah is the pivot of the intention of the
Lawgiver, thus it is the special and the strongest of all
the proofs of the Sharicah; (ii) that it is not necessary
for maslahah to coincide with a decisive nass or the
ijmac of the Muslim Ummah, but it can go against the nass
and ijmac, in which case it should take precedence over
them on the basis of the first assumption; (iii) that the
sphere of action within which his theory could operate is
in transactions (mucamalat) and customary law which are
concerned with the people's polity and social
obligations. As regards the acts of worship, their rules
should be directly received from God due to the fact that
they belong to His will.
Al-Tufi presented proofs for each of these
propositions at the beginning of his explanation of the
hadlth "la darar wala dirar", due to the fact that the
hadith itself is the first proof for the first
proposition and the basis of his analysis. Then he
produces detailed proofs showing that the Lawgiver has
considered maslahah in every thing, basing his proof for
this on the Qur'an, Sunnah, ijmac and qiyas♦ He does
this again and again to emphasize his position. In trying
to establish the precedence of maslahah al-Tufi weakened
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ijmac and made it a point of divergence amongst the four
celebrated Imams of the schools of Islamic jurisprudence.
He referred the cause of the divergence of opinion of
these Imams to the nusus of the Qur'an and the Sunnah. He
also presented the proofs of ijmac and after discussing
them he eventually rejected them so that he could come
out with the idea that maslahah is stronger than ijmac
simply because the former is an issue on which there is
agreement whereas the latter is the subject of
disagreement. In order to be just in our discussion on
the al-Tufl's theory, it is imperative to observe the
sequence of the logical progression of his analysis.
Al-TufI begins with the explanation of the hadith
"la darar wala dirar" in which he establishes its
meaning to be: "No injury should be caused (whether
legally or illegally) except by a specialised measure".
Then he clarifies this meaning by discussing the
limitations and exclusions therein and says:"As regards
the Sharicah's limitation of causing injury it is due to
the fact that infliction of injury by God's decree is
inevitable. The same is the case with the exclusion of
causing harm by a special legal measure. The hudud
(revealed punishments) and other remedies for various
crimes do cause injuries to those inflicted, as they are
acts of justice legalized by a special proof. Then he
mentions some precise nusus which he maintains confirm
the masalih. It is clear here that it means that the
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proofs of the Sharlcah do not conflict with maslahah in
any case whatsoever simply because all types of injuries
are initially excluded by the Sharlcah. As regards the
hudud and other punishments for the different crimes,
although they seem to appear as injuries in themselves,
they are in actual fact applied to attain important
benefits such as security and peace without which the
lives of people will be under great threat. In this case
the hadith "la darar wala dirar" is not a proof of the
pre-eminence of maslahah over nass.
In spite of this, al-Tufi bases his opinion upon the
implication that this hadith makes maslahah override all
the evidences of the Sharicah. He tries to support this
by saying that if some evidence of the Sharicah contained
injury, we should get rid of that injury by applying this
hadith. Thus that evidence of the Sharicah would be
particularised by the application of this hadith and
reconciled with it. Otherwise, it would result in a
suspension of one of these evidences - in this case it
would be this hadith. There is no doubt that to apply all
the evidences collectively is better than suspending some
of them.
Most Muslim scholars would argue that even if some
evidence of the Sharicah contained injury and therefore
in such a case we would require this hadith especially to
get rid of that injury, it does1nt necessarily oblige the
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precedence of maslahah over nass but it would rather be
an application of one nass coming before another nass by
means of takhsis (particularization). Moreover, they
would argue that in the method of general
particularization (takhsis camm) in which a general
evidence like this hadlth stands together with a
particular evidence, it is the particular one which
restricts the general one yuhmal al-khas& cala al-camm anc}
not vice versa.
Al-TufI sees that the pre-eminence of the
consideration of maslahah over the nass as a type of
particularizing nass by maslahah or a clerification of
nass by maslahah and claims that this method, as a
principle, has its origin in usul al-fiqh whereby
sometimes the Sunnah takes precedence over the Qur'an by
means of bayan (clerification) while in actual fact the
Qur'an has to precede the Sunnah in legislation and not
to come after it. Most Muslim scholars do agree that some
evidences of the Sharicah do restrict others - this is an
agreed factor in usul al-fiqh - but they would argue that
it is not an agreed matter that the implication of nass
and ijmac could contain injury. As regards the hudud and
other punishments, they have already said above that they
are exercised in order to obtain important benefits
whereby the injuries which are caused by these
punishments are far less significant as compared to the
expected benefits in them. The case is not also
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understood with the dictum in which al-Tufi asserts that
the consideration of maslahah which is implied from the
hadith "la darar wala dirar" has to take precedence above
nass by means of particularization or clarification! It
seems that al-Tufi himself has felt this ambiguity when
he cast some doubts on the strength of the consideration
of a maslahah, which is based on a weak basis, as
compared to the ijmac which is based on a strong basis.1
Inspite of this fact, al-Tufi tries to refute this truth
by giving a detailed account of maslahah and ijmac to
forward his case.
Al-Tufi defines maslahah according to the common
usage as well as in accordance with the technical usage
in the Sharicah and remarks that there is no objective
difference between the two definitions... As regards the
common usage, he notes, maslahah is "a cause which brings
about goodness and advantage, such as trade which brings
profit; whereas in accordance with the technical usage in
the Sharicah, maslahah is "a cause which leads to the
t »
intention of the Lawgiver whether being acts of worship
or customs...";2 and the literal meaning of its wording
could give light to both the definitions. Maslahah, to
1
See Mustafa Zayd, Al-maslahah fi al-tashric al-Islami wa Nairn
al-Din al-Tufi, appendix, p. 15; and cAbd al-Wahhab Khallaf, Masadir
al-tashric fi ma la nass fih, p. Ill
2 See Mustafa Zayd, op. cit., appendix, p. 19; and cAbd al-Wahhab
Khallaf, op. cit., p. 112
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al-Tufl, is: "the quality of a thing in its perfection as
it is expected to be, such as a pen becomes a utility
when its quality is expressed through being writing
with". It is quite obvious that a pen could not be of any
benefit unless it is used for writing; the same is the
case with trade, profit is the corner-stone of its
existence. But the question arises: "Is the benefit so
obtained the main cause leading to the intention of the
Lawgiver or is it the purpose which is embedded in its
own existence?" Al-Tufl has argued here that the benefit
so obtained is the sole basis to which the intention of
the Lawgiver owes its rationality; and has formulated his
opinion by making maslahah pre-eminent above all the
evidences of the Sharlcah so that it stands alone as the
pivot of its rationale. However, if his theory is based
on the consideration of the maslahah as a cause of
legislation in the Sharicah as he has argued, then it is
not proper for him to hold it unique amidst the rest
evidences of the Sharicah due to the fact that all the
evidences do share this common factor. But his theory is
based on the consideration of maslahah as the sole and
pivot of the intention of the Lawgiver as he has argued
in so many places in his treatise.3 It is clear that
al-Tufi aimed at emphasizing the general outlook of
3 See Mustafa Zayd, op. cit., appendix, pp. 21 & 46; and cAbd
al-Wahhab Khallaf, op. cit., pp. 110, 129 & 141
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maglahah as he perceived it, and the maglahah which he
considered to be the strongest of all the evidences of
Sharlcah is by no means the same as "maslahah mursalah"
as it has been defined by the jurists. This could be
easly discovered from his technical definition of
maglahah when he said: "Maglahah is a cause leading to
the intention of the Lawgiver whether being in the acts
of worship or customary law."4 By this, al-Tufi has made
maslahah a general feature encompassing both the fields -
i.e acts of worship and customary law; while he himself
said that the realm in which the consideration of
maslahah operates concerns transactions and customary law
and not acts of worship...".5 In this he seems to be
arguing with himself.
Secondly, it is also obvious in al-Tufi's assertion
that he reckoned "al-magalih al-mursalah" with the
nineteen evidences of the Sharlpah when he made his
comment on the hadith ".la darar wala dirar"6 and at the
introduction of his book "Al-isharat al-ilahiyyah"7 after
which he established that the strongest evidences of the
Sharicah are nagg (Qur'an and Sunnah) and ijmac which if
4
See reference above
5 See Mustafa Zayd, op. cit., appendix, p. 19; and cAbd al-Wahhab
Khallaf, op. cit., p. 112
^ See Mustafa Zayd, op. cit., appendix, pp. 16, 17; and cAbd
al-Wahhab Khallaf, op. cit., pp. 109, 110
7 Najm al-Din al-Tufi, Al-isharat al-ilahiyyah, p. 3
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they disagree with maslahah it is obligatory to make it
take precedence over them. Here again al-Tufi seems to
have contradicted himself by making maslahah weaker than
nass and ijmac, and at the same time making it the
strongest evidence above all.
Thirdly, he has expressed his method in connection
with the consideration of maslahah and said that his
theory is not the same as what Imam Malik held of
al-masalih al-mursalah8 in the sense that the Malikis
have maitained that a maslahah which conflicts with nass
is void.9 Thus the type of maslahah, even in its form of
unrestrictness (mursalah) i.e the benefit which has
neither been considered by the Sharicah nor cancelled it
- which al-Tufi is keen to analyse is a general maslahah
free from any reservations and conditions. He visualises
that every kind of maslahah enters the realm of the
intention of the Lawgiver without distinction or
categorization into the different kinds of maslahah.
Never does he demarcate between the necessary benefits
(daruriyyat) from the reasonable ones (hajiyyat) and from
the luxurious ones (tahsiniyyat) though he points out the
agreement between nasg, ijmac and maslahah in the five
basic fundamentals (i.e the preservation of religion,
8 Mustafa Zayd, op. cit., appendix, p. 43? and cAbd al-Wahhab
Khallaf, op. cit., p. 138
9 Mustafa Zayd, op. cit., pp. 51-53
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soul, mind, offspring and material wealth).10 Al-Tufi
went even further than that, in his commentary on
Mukhtasar al-Rawdah written by Ibn Qudamah by saying that
the division of maslahah into categories is unnecessary
and a uselessly painstaking, and states that the best
method to judge masalih (benefits) should be more
comprehensive than that and more precise. Let us quote
here what he says there in order to cast some light on
the issue regarding his opinion. Al-TufI says: "Be
informmed that those who divide maslahah into
considerable, cancelled and unrestricted; necessary and
unnecessary - have just flattered the issue and taken
pains for nothing while the way to judge maslahah is
quite general and concise. Thus we have established that
the Lawgiver has considered maslahah in absoluteness and
has excluded injury in its entirety. So upon this we say
that if an action consists of pure maslahah we have to do
it, and if it consists of total injury we must discard
it. But if an action envelopes maslahah on the one hand
and bears injury on the other - and it appears in our
mind that the attainment of maslahah is as equal as the
repelling of injury in that action - we either prefer the
side which carries more weight or we make our choice by
mere selection. An example of this issue is like the one
10
See cAbd al-Wahhab Khallaf, op. cit., p. 141; and Mustafa Zayd,
op. cit., appendix, p. 46
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who does not possess enough clothes to cover his body in
prayer except a piece which suffices one of his private
parts only (the front or the back of his body); in this
case, is he to cover his rump due to the fact that it is
an unveiled shameful evil, or has he to cover his front
part because of facing the qiblah (the direction of the
holy shrine in Makkah), or is he to choose between the
two because of the conflict between the two maslahahs and
the two injuries? But if the maslahah is not as equal as
the injury and either the attainment of maslahah is
weightier than the repelling of injury or vice versa,
then we adhere to the weightier one simply because such
an exercise is attested by the Sharlcah. By this rule
every division of maslahah which has been mentioned by
its advocates becomes redundant. With regard to legal
consideration, whether pure or preferable, maslahah is
apparent. As to the cancelled maslahah such as the
prohibition of growing grapes (to avoid the making of
wine), or to share residence (by a man and a woman) -
this is so because of the conflict between maslahah and
mafsadah inherent in them. Nonetheless, the maslahah
found therein is weaaker than the enormous mafsadah, and
thus its prohibition is weightier than its permission,
which necessitates the blocking of the benefit which
could be obtained by growing grapes and the companionship
of the unmarried couple in the same appartment due to the
expected mafsadah of distilling wine and committing
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adultery. Were it to be admitted that this mafsadah is
just a suspected one not real and decisive whereas the
conflicting maslahah is decisive, then the attainment of
maslahah would be more appropriated than vice versa".11
Al-Tufi neglects the divisions and categories of
maslahah. He casts away all that which has been mentioned
by those who divide maslahah into a number of types and
he sets a new criterion for the decision of whether a
thing or an action bears maslahah which ought to be
obtained or bears mafsadah which must be expelled - i.e
according to the quantity of maslahah or mafsadah
therein. Thus, any action which is totally beneficial and
bears no injury or its maslahah is weightier than its
mafsadah, its enforcement is obligatory. The same is the
case also with anything which is completely harmful and
bears no maslahah therein, or the mafsadah side is
heavier than the maslahah side; its eradication is
compulsory. But as regards an action or a thing which
contains maslahah and mafsadah in equal proportions its
judgment, according to al-Tufi, is to remain in
suspension awaiting the discovery of which among the two
is probable, or making preference between doing it and
not doing it... In other words, al-Tufi observes actions
and things from this angle and this consideration - i.e
11
See Ibn Badran al-Dimashqi, Nuzhat al-khatir al-catir, vol. 1, p.
416
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actions which contain pure maslahah or the maslahah in
them is weightier than their mafsadah, must be put into
practice no matter how awkward they may appear and even
if no nass is ordained in their favour or no ijmac is
enunciated. In fact it is obligatory to put into practice
even if they go against nass and i jmac. Whereas if the
actions bear total mafsadah or the mafsadah found therein
is heavier than their maslahah, it is compulsory to
foresake them even if they are ordained by nass and
ijmac. As regards the actions in which their maslahah and
mafsadah are in equilibrium in every aspect - as presumed
by al-Tufl - their judgment will be suspended for a while
till probabilities are found and preferences are made;
and in this case it is not recommended to go against nass
or ijmac simply because those actions are not stronger
over nass and ijmac due to the weakness caused by the
conflict between maslahah and mafsadah therein.
Inspite of this criterion by which al-Tufl casts
away all the divisions of maslahah in his commentary to
the book "Mukhtasar al-Rawdah" of Ibn Qudamah,
nonetheless, al-Tufl himself mentions this very criterion
in his commentary to the hadlth "la darar wala dirar" but
in different terms - in which he establishes that the
nusus and ijmac are applicable to the acts of worship;
but as regards the judgments of transactions and customs
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maslahah is paramount.12 Then he puts a rule to avoid the
opposition of the masalih by the mafasid13 and supposes
there also that there could be a state of equilibrium of
maslahah and mafsadah in every aspect of an action, but
here he doesn't stop from making a decision as he stopped
there (see above), instead, he enunciates and fixes that
the judgment should be made by preference and in case of
suspicion it should be made by drawing lots.14
Most Muslim scholars are of the opinion that an
action which bears maslahah and mafsadah in equal
proportions in every aspect does not exist. With regard
to the example which al-Tufi has given i.e that of the
one who misses clothing for prayer except a piece which
could cover one of his private parts, their opinion is
that, the covering of his front part is paramount due to
the fact that it is a particular one in which male and
female differ.
Moreover, a comtempoV"3fy°f w^° one °f the
celebrated Hanball scholars called Ibn Qayyim whose
opinion on the issue in which its maslahah is as equal as
its mafsadah could give more light in support of the view
1 O
See Mustafa Zayd, op.cit., appendix, p. 43; and cAbd al-Wahhab
Khallaf, op. cit., p. 138




of the majority of the Muslim scholars. He says:
"As regards the second issue - the one in which
its maslahah is equal to its mafsadah - there is
difference and dispute as to its existence and ts
judgment; some people affirmed it while the
others denied it. The answer to this question is
that this situation seems unlikely to happen even
though people are divided upon it. To clerify
this assertion further, either this issue's
existence demands to be practised because of
being its maslahah weightier (than its mafsadah)
or it is a non-existent one which ought not be
practised due to the fact that its mafsadah is
heavier than the maslahah inherent therein. A
thing is done because of its maslahah and not
done due to its mafsadah. However, to get a thing
in which its maslahah weighs equal to its
mafsadah is a dictum whose existence is hardly to
be proved; but proof rather stands against it.
Actually, maslahah and mafsadah, benefit and
injury and pleasure and pain, if they are in
opposition to each other, one should prevail over
the other and the judgment will be in favour of
that which prevails. To get a situation in which
the two opposing qualities are equal in such a
way that one does not prevail over the other is
unlikely. The case should be stated either: the
two contending qualities are together in
existence, which is impossible to occur in a
single place; or it should be said that the two
qualities are together non-existent - which is
also impossible, simply because it is a
preference between the two without a qualifier.
This impossibilty is a result of a supposition of
the contention between the two qualities
thrusting back each of them which is an invalid
case; thus, one of them should subdue its
opponent and take with it the right of
judgment".15
Al-Tufi maintains that God has considered maslahah
• *
in every ordinance as implied in the following verses:
"0 mankind! There hath come to you a direction
from your Lord and a healing for the (diseases)
15
See Ibn Qayyim, Miftah dar al-sacadah, vol. 2, p. 17
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in your hearts, and for those who believe, a
Guidance and a Mercy. Say: "In the bounty of God
and in His Mercy, - in that let them rejoice;
that is better than the (wealth) they hoard".16
He deduces from these two verses seven aspects which
verify the consideration of maslahah by the Lawgiver.17
He then establishes that if we were to study the nusus of
the Qur'an thoroughly, we would be able to find many
evidences which indicate this. Al-Tufi elaborates the
point that the Lawgiver has cared for maslahah so much
that His deeds are connected to the ultimate objectives
for mankind's beneficence. Thus, God's consideration for
the masalih of His creatures is a necessity and a favour
and not an obligation upon Him. God's care for maslahah
is comprehensive, extended to all places and situations
in the most suitable way... Al-Tufi infers from this and
says that it is impossible for God to consider maslahah
for His creatures at the time of their creation, in the
mundane life as well as in the hereafter, and after that
become oblivious of their masalih in the rules and
judgments of the Sharicah, which are imperative to be
cared for and which are part of the maslahah of their
lives. Not only this, but those rules and judgments are
the means for the security of their material wealth,
their blood and their honour; and without which their
16 Qur'an, 10: 57, 58
17 See the details of these aspects in the appendix of Al-maslahah fi
al-tashric al-Islami wa Nairn al-Din al-Tufi, by Mustafa Zayd, pp.
19-20; and cAbd al-Wahhab Khallaf, op. cit., pp. 112 - 113
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whole existence on earth will be in chaos. Thus, it goes
without saying that God has considered maslahah in all
its aspects in the ordinances of the Sharlcah. If the
case is so, it therefore becomes commendable and
obligatory to follow the nusus where they exist.18
However, although it is inappropriate to subject the
nusus to maslahah, God has left some scope for ijtihad in
the elaboration of the law.
Although this explanation in its general and
detailed nature is clear, the surprising thing is that
al-Tufi goes on to say immediately after this: "If it
(i.e maslahah) agrees with nass and i jmac or any other
evidence of the Sharlcah it's well and good, but if it
conflicts with any evidence of the Sharlcah then a
reconciliation is made between them as we have mentioned
by means of particularising maslahah over the other
evidence and making it take precedence through the method
of clarification.19 The reason for this ambiguity is that
al-Tufi contradicts himself in the sense that he presumes
and confirms the impossibility of the Lawgiver neglecting
maslahah in one hand, and assumes the conflict of the
evidences of the Sharlcah in the other hand; and then
bases his judgement on this assumption. Since the
18 See Mustafa Zayd, op. cit., appendix, p. 25; and cAbd al-Wahhab
Khallaf, op. cit., p. 118
19 Ibid.
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Lawgiver has considered maslahah in every aspect of His
creatures' lives, it therefore goes against logic for
al-Tufl to think that the nusus of the Sharicah (which
are His own dictates) could conflict with maslahah,
especially when he has not given one example of such a
situation.
The contradictions in al-Tufi's theory become
clearer when we see that he himself has said: "As regards
the Qur'an, there is no verse in it except it contains
maslahah or masalih".20 As to the Sunnah he says: "Since
it is a clarification of the Qur'an, it has therefore to
agree with it (in containing masalih)".21 In connection
with ijmac, says he: "All the authentic Muslim scholars
do verify the rules (ahkam) either to bring about masalih
or expel evils. This principle is accepted even by those
who do not profess to the fact that ijmac is one of the
evidennces of Sharicah"; and in connection with common
sense, al-Tufl says that every being who possesses a
sound mind knows for sure that the objective behind the
rules of transactions (mucamalat) and customary law in
any just law is for the attainment of the benefits of
people; and there is no law which is more just than the
Islamic law, it is therefore, the best of all the laws in
n r*
See Mustafa Zayd, op. cit., appendix, pp. 22 - 23; and cAbd
al-Wahhab Khallaf, op. cit., pp. 115 - 116
Ibid.
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the consideration of the masalih...22 This is the
assertion of al-Tufi in the issue where he declares
categorically that there is no nass either in the Qur'an
or Sunnah which does neither contain maslahah nor expel
evil; and that ijmac of the Muslim mujtahids is
supplementary to the nusus.
It would seem that he should regard the Sharicah as
capable of accommodating all types of masalih which no
nass has mentioned or which no ijmac has approved of.
Nonetheless, those masalih should not go against what has
been ordained in the Sharlcah either directly or
indirectly. Above all, those masalih, whatever they might
be, could not be termed as primary ones due to the fact
that the fundamental benefits have been considered by the
Sharicah and indicated by more than one evidence.
Actually, those masalih are regarded as secondary ones
emerging after the epoch of legislation (cahd al-tashric)
and therefore it was necessary to lay down some rules for
their consideration. Those masalih are regarded as
annextures and supplements to the primary ones and not
opponents of them.
As regards the question of an enemy shielding
himself with a band of Muslim prisoners of war which has
22
See Mustafa Zayd, op. cit., appendix, p. 23; and cAbd al-Wahhab
Khallaf, op. cit., p. 116
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been mentioned by al-Ghazali (see chapter three above)23
which could seem a real contradiction of what we have
mentioned here; most Muslim scholars would argue that in
this issue the conflict lies between two benefits and not
between maslahah and nass. Its explanation is that when
that band of Muslims is kept alive and the enemy is left
to pass through, the maslahah is just to preserve the
lives of those few people; but when that band is killed
and the enemy resisted, the maslahah in this case is
greater which has to do with the preservation of the
lives of the entire Muslim Ummah. No doubt, the
preservation of the lives of all the Muslims precedes
that of a small group. That is why we see al-Ghazali
putting condtions on the issue in question showing the
necessity, decisiveness and its primary status which
makes it deserve pre-eminence over the other maslahah.24
Suppose al-Tufi claimed that his theory of the
pre-eminence of maslahah over all the evidences of the
Sharlcah is in reality particularising a nass by another
nass and not by maslahah due to the fact that the hadith
"la darar wala dirar" is a decisive nass in the necessity
of the consideration of maslahah to the extent of
restricting every nass which bears injury. This would
mean that it is not maslahah which is preceding nass but
23
See al-Ghazali, Al-mustasfa, vol. 1, pp. 294-296
24 See al-Khidr, Usui al-fiqh, p. 391
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it is another nass that takes precedence... Nonetheless,
most Muslim scholars would argue that this claim (which
could be adopted to elaborate the theory of al-Tufl)
reverses the situation in the method of particularization
as it was pointed out earlier that it is a special nass
which restricts a general one and not vice versa. The
nagg "la darar wala dirar", which is quite general and
comprehensive, is before al-Tufl a particularizing nass
which could be used to restrict any other nass on a
derived issue (mas'alat farciyyah) whose application
results in causing injury. Whereby it was necessary for
him to restrict the derived issue, if it ever existed, by
a special nass excluded from this general nass so that
some injuries are made legal to serve some purpose.
In order to complete this point in the survey of
relationship between maslahah and nusus let us discuss
the three claims which have been put forward by al-Tufl
in his assertion of the precedence of maglafrah over nass,
which are as follows: (i) that the nusus are diversely
opposed to each other and are the cause of difference in
judgments which is detested by the Sharicah...; (ii) that
the consideration of maslahah is a matter which is agreed
upon in itself and there is no diagreement therein, thus
it is a cause of accordance which is required by the
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Sharicah;25 (iii) that it is established in the Sunnah
that there is a conflict between masalih and nusus in a
* * ■ *
number of issues.26
Al-Tufi has presented the first two arguments
together and deduced from them that the consideration of
maslahah is worth following rather than the application
of nusus due to the fact that the matter which is agreed
upon deserves the right to be followed and commanded to
be adopted rather than the one on which there is
disagreement. Then he put forward as a proof of his
argument some verses of the Qur'an and ahadith. He also
pointed out the difference of opinions which happened
between the Imams of the four celebrated madhahib and the
disagreement between the followers of these madhahib as a
proof of his argument about the contradiction of the
nugu? and their diversity... Possibly, what al-Tufi meant
about nusus here are the nusus of Sunnah particularly,
because he has mentioned after that, that some people
claimed that the cause of difference in hadlth is cUmar
ibn al-Khattab who rejected the idea of compiling the
Sunnah from his colleagues as reported by some
narrators... As regards the third argument, he has
pointed out an alleged conflict with miscellaneous
n c
See Mustafa Zayd, op. cit., p. 35; and cAbd al-Wahhab Khallaf, op.
cit., p. 129
26 See Mustafa Zayd, op. cit., appendix, pp. 39 - 40; and cAbd
al-Wahhab Khallaf, op. cit., pp. 133 - 134
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examples which he considers to be connected with his
argument.
Al-Tufi seems reasonable when he demands agreement
of opinion in legal judgments. Nevertheles, it seems
incorrect in his assertion that the nusus do contradict
each other in diversity so as to be the cause of
difference of opinion detested by the Lawgiver; whereas
most Muslim scholars see that the nusus are in harmony
with each other and comprehensive enough to accomplish
the benefits required for mankind. If the nusus were in
contradiction with each other as al-Tufi claimed, it
• *
would not be enough to depend on the consideration of
maslahah to get rid of this contradiction, and if it were
assumed that this claim was true, then our own benefits
would become the principal source of the Sharlcah, and
not the Qur'an.
There is no instance in which some nusus rendered a
thing legal and some of them declared the very same thing
illegal. In other words all the nusus do complement each
other. Secondly, most Muslim scholars would argue that
the consideration of maslahah is not an agreed upon maxim
in itself in which no difference of opinion is viewed as
compared to the nusus, which, as al-Tufi claims, are full
of tensions. They assert that it is the consideration of
maslahah which is a disagreed issue due to the fact that
maslahah keeps on evolving with changes in environments,
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places, times, peoples and societies. As regards the
nusus, no change is found therein to different
environments, places, times, peoples, societies etc...
The nusus are constant and standard.
a a_
As regards the narrations of the traditions of the
Prophet, it is true that not all of them have reached the
status of tawatur (narrated by a vast number).
Nonetheless, most Muslim scholars would argue that this
does not mean that most of the traditions are not
decisive. Still they would not admit to speculate that
the nusus of Qur'an and Sunnah in their totality do not
formulate a decisive verified homogenous corpus - after
restricting a general nass by a special one (takhsis
al-camm) and clarifying the aggregate whole (bayan
al-mujmal). Even al-Tufi himself, when talking about the
evidences for the rules of acts of worship within the
context of the nusus which seem to conflict with each
other as a result of their multiplicity, lays down a
criterion to bing accord between the different nusus from
the Qur'an and Sunnah.27 The seemingly conflicting nusus
could therefore be brought into accord without reference
to the consideration of maslahah. As al-Tufi talks about
•« ■- •
the evidences of the rules of customary law and
transactions, he again puts a measure to which the
27 See Mustafa Zayd, op. cit. appendix, pp. 43 - 46; and cAbd
al-Wahhab Khallaf, op. cit., pp. 138 - 141
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masalih and the mafasid are brought into adjudgment if
ever they seem to conflict with each other so that their
tensions are avoided.28
Furthermore, al-Tufl is not satisfied with the
general reconciliation of the nusus and maslahah but he
shows the weakness of maslahah as he is forced to resort
* »
to drawing lots.29 Is it therefore proper to say after
this that maslahah, as a device of legislation in Islamic
law, is stronger than nass? Al-Tufl has insisted in his
theory on the decisiveness of the consideration of
maslaftah in his verification of various evidences which
he put forward in clarifying the care of the Lawgiver for
maslahah. At the same time he categorised nass into: (i)
mutawatir sarih (a clear cut narration from a vast
O Q
The scholars of usul al-fiqh use a number of canons in this issue
some of which have been mentioned by al-Ghazali in his book
Al-mustasfa which could be summarised a s follows:"..if it is
possible to accord together the two contending nusus it's well and
good, but if it becomes difficult and the date of enactment of each
nass is known, then the last to be enacted abrogates the first one,
but in case the date is not known then verification by those nusus
will fall and judgment is sought from other nass [or evidence]. If
another nass [or evidence] is not found then the mujtahid is at
liberty to choose one out of the two. [Al-Ghazali, Al-mustasfa, vol.
2, pp. 392 - 394]. He has also mentioned how one nass could be
preferred from the other in seventeen ways which are connected with
sanad [chain of narrators], matn [text] and five ways which are
connected with other issues. See the details in vol. 2, pp. 395 - 398
of Al-mustasfa. We should not forget also that the conflict of nusus
is just a mere surface perception only as far as our comprehension
and knowledge are concerned and not in reality as we have mentioned
above. See al-Shatibi, Al-muwafaqat, vol. 4, p. 63; Qur'an, 4:32 and
Usui al-tashric al-Islaml, p. 273
29 You will find this in four places of p. 47 of the appendix of
"Al-maslahah fi al-tashric al-Islami wa Nairn al-Din al-Tufi" by
Mu§£afa Zayd; and cAbd al-Wahhab Khallaf, op. cit., p. 142
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number), (ii) mutawatir muhtamal (a dubious narration fom
a vast number), (iii) ahad sarIh (a clear cut isolated
narration) and (iv) ahad muhtamal (a dubious isolated
narration). Then he judges all these categories of nass
to be undecisive even the mutawatir sarlh simply because,
as he puts it in his own expression, "it might be dubious
in its generality or unrestrictness...30
It is obvious that the differentiation which al-Tufl
has presented between nass and the consideration of
maslafrah is not equitable and just due to the fact that
if the evidennces which he has applied to confirm and
establish the consideration of maslahah in general are
decisive enough to make it one of the devices of
legislation in Islamic law, the same is true with the
nusus in general that they are decisive and one of the
origins of the Sharlcah and the strongest source without
any need of proof or verification. If al-Tufi intends to
give the quality of decisiveness to every secondary
ma?lahah just because it is in the realm of masalih which
have received the care of the Lawgiver, it would
therefore be more appropriate to attribute the quality of
decisiveness to every nass in every secondary issue
simply because it is in the realm of the nusus of the
Sharlcah. Al-Tufi's consideration of maslahah as a whole
3^ See Mustafa Zayd, op. cit., appendix, p. 30; and cAbd al-Wahhab
Khallaf, op. cit., p. 123
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to be the only decisive device of the Sharlcah and then
to judging all the nusus to be undecisive is a vacuous
differentiation. It follows therefore that his theory of
the pre-eminence of the consideration of maslahah over
nusug which is based on this differentiation is not
correct. The right attitude towards this issue should be
that both the proofs - i.e the nusus and the
consideration of maslahah - are decisive devices of the
Sharlcah. They both consist of juz'iyyat (partial cases)
which are either qatciyyah (decisive) or zanniyyah
(speculative); and so do the rest of the evidences of the
Sharlcah.
Al-TufI has judged the nusus to contradict each
other so as to result in the laws which are abhored by
the Lawgiver. The question of the difference of opinion
between the Imams of the Islamic schools of jurisprudence
due to the apparent meanings of the nusus is not an
astonishing feature, but the truth is that he does'nt
sight even a single instance in which such a difference
shows that these Imams do not agree to the fact that the
Lawgiver has cared for the masalih of mankind in His
commandments concerning either acts of worship or social
obligations. But as we have seen in chapter three when we
were discussing the position of the Imams of the schools
of jurisprudence in relation to the theory of al-masalih
al-mursalah, that they all agree to the point that
maslahah should duly be considered in every judgment and
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is one of the devices of the Sharicah in matters where:
(i) neither nass nor i jmac nor qiyas is found, and (ii)
there is need and necessity (darurah) to consider
maglahah to the exclusion of na?s and ijmac.
It goes without saying therefore that the difference
of opinion between the Imams has not been caused by the
preference of the apparent meanings of the nusus over the
consideration of maslahah, but by the difference of the
levels of knowledge and understanding of the nusus as
well as the degree of ijtihad and observation. For this
reason it is not proper to blame the nusus for the
misinterpretation of a mujtahid.
Al-Tufi has differentiated in the application of
nusus between the acts of worship and mucamalat
(transactions) by establishing that the acts of worship
are the right of the Lawgiver (God) as such in which
neither the time nor place and methodology are known
except from Him only; thus it is obligatory to take
evidences of the acts of worship from the nusus.31 He
then asserted that the nugus are in a state of opposition
and conflict in such a way that they cause difference in
rules and judgments. Most Muslim scholars would argue
that al-Tufl seems to contradict himself in that he
31 See cAbd al-Wahhab Khailaf, op. cit., pp. 114, 140; and Mustafa
Zayd, op. cit., appendix, pp. 21, 46
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proclaims the nusus to be the main source for the
evidences of the acts of worship while at the same time
he judges these very nusus to be in conflict with each
other in the rules and judgments for social obligations.
Their argument is based on the fact that it is illogical
to accept something to be right in one place and at the
same time to be wrong in another place. It was necessary
for him to take the nusus as contradicting to each other
in the acts of worship too and so not to make them the
source for the evidences of their rules and judgments; or
rather to accept these nusus as not conflicting with each
other at all and base upon them the laws concerning
social obligations as is the case with the rules
concerning acts of worship.
This is the stand-point of al-Tufl in connection
with the nugus as well as with the ijmac when he
discussed its evidences in relation to the rules of the
acts of worship and the laws of social obligations. He
went further to refute every evidence of ijmac and
invalidated it in such a way that at the end of his
analysis the whole banch of its evidences became
demolished, saying: "Be informed that our intention from
all this is not to slander ijmac and to totally demolish
it, because we do speak of it in the acts of worship,
nonetheless, our intention is to clarify that the
consideration of maslahah which is based on the hadith
» « •
"la darar wala (jirar" is stronger than ijmac due to the
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fact that the former's base is stronger than the latter's
base as is apparent in its proof and from what could be
concluded in our refutation of the evidences of ijmac".32
He weakens ijmac by raising various objections to its
evidences so that the strength of maslahah and its
evidences which he has put forward becomes very strong.
Then upon this unfounded hypothesis, al-Tufi bases some
rules and judgments in which he considers it to be the
strongest evidence in the acts of worship simply because
maslahah is not rejected there.
This leads to the question: "Why should it be
supposed that there is a conflict between ijmac and
maslahah? Most Muslim scholars would argue that such a
supposition is merely theoretical simply because nothing
has been presented as actual instances in which such a
situation occured. They would also argue that even if a
conflict between ijmac and maslahah occured in some
questions another ijmac would have been made which would
take into consideration that maslahah which seems to
conflict with the previous ijmac. In reality it is only
in the opinion of al-Tufi in which ijmac is restricted to
water-tight compartments, whereas most Muslim scholars
32 _ —
Thus, goes the expression of al-Tufi as he raises an objection on
his claim that the consideration of maslahah is stronger than ijmac,
while he maintained that his objection is only to point out the
strength of maslahah and not to revile ijmac and totally demolish
it... See cAbd al-Wahhab Khallaf, op. cit., p. Ill; and Mustafa Zayd,
op. cit., appendix, p. 18
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are of the opinion that ijmac has a capacity to
accommodate within its scope any maslahah in any
environment and at any period due to the fact that there
can be a consensus of the mujtahids of the Islamic Ummah
on a legal judgment at any particular time after the
death of the Prophet.33 It follows therefore that it is
incorrect to think that there is a conflict between ijmac
and maslahah and base on this thought an opinion of the
precedence of the consideration of maslahah over all the
evidences of the Sharicah.
More astonishing is the case in which al-Tufl claims
that the consideration of maslahah is an agreed source of
legislation in Islamic law saying that even those who
oppose ijmac accept its validity. Most Muslim scholars
would argue that the al-Tufi's dependence on the
agreement of those who reject ijmac is not a proof to
show that the consideration of maslahah is an agreed
source of legislation. It is as if those who reject ijmac
are the only ones from whom opposition is feared most and
that the attainment of their consent will cast away every
type of opposition therein... In reality the two issues
are different from each other. In other words, it would
be accepted from al-Tufl that the Shicites, the
Kharijites and the Nazzam (among the Muctazilites) who
33 See cAli Hasab-Allah, Usui al-tashric al-Islami, p. 51
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reject the ijmac, do accept and agree upon the
consideration of maslahah. It would be accepted from him
also that maslahah is an item of agreement before most of
the Muslim scholars.
It seems more appropriate to consider maslahah as
one of the recognised devices of Sharlcah. It also seems
apropriate that this device can act as an independent
basis upon which laws could be based in the absence of
na?s and ijmac. Wherever a secondary maslahah is found in
which there is neither nass nor ijmac nor qiyas could be
applied, a rule should be exercised for its attainment
and its maintenance. If the Lawgiver has provided an
ordinance for a certain thing or issue, or the Muslim
mujtahids have made a consensus in its favour, it is
primarily presumed that this hukm (law) is liable to
attain maslahah♦ Nonetheless, it could sometimes happen,
through need and necessity, that there existed another
maslafrah stronger than the one enunciated by the Lawgiver
or envisaged by the consensus of the Muslim mujtahids and
these two seemed to contradict each other. In this case a
hukm could be enacted to attain the stronger maslahah
even if it goes against the nass and ijmac, and that is
so due to the submission and accommodation of that need
and necessity only. A typical example is the decision of
cUmar ibn al-Khattab (the second caliph of Islam) not to
amputate the hand of a thief in the year of famine cam
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al-majacah,34
In this connection, it is useful to reproduce the
verdict of Yahya ibn Yahya al-Laythi, a student of Imam
Malik, to one of the kings of al-Andalus, cAbd al-Rahman
ibn al-Hakam, which we have previously mentioned in
chapter two. The king intentionally broke his fast in the
month of Ramadan by having a sexual contact with his
wife. Afterwards he felt sorry and wanted to expiate for
his sin by emancipating a slave. But Yahya went against
the text of the hadith which necessitates the remedy in a
descending order, starting with the emancipation of a
slave, or the fasting of two consecutive months and
ending up with the feeding of sixty indigent people;
instead of following this order Yahya obliged the king to
fast the two consecutive months only. Al-Tufi said in
this issue: "To particularise fasting to an affluent
person for the remedy of Ramadan is not far (from the
right path) as a result of diligence of a mujtahid. It is
not a type of enacting laws by a sheer opinion, but it is
either a kind of diligence to look for maslahah or a type
of restricting a general feature deduced from the
discarding of the details envisaged in the hadith of
al-Acrabi35 which is a general one and weak. Thus, the
34 See Muhammad b. cAbd al-cAziz al-Hillawi, "Fatawa wa Ugdiyat Amir
al-mu'minln cUmar b. al-Khattab", p. 164
IS _ —
Reported by al-Bukhari and Muslim
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whole exercise is being particularised by the suitable
beneficial use of reason (al-ijtihad al-maslahi
al-munasib). The particularisation of the generality is a
praiseworthy method. In actual fact, the Sharicah has
differentiated between the rich and the poor in so many a
place, let this therefore, be one of those places".36
Most Muslim scholars would argue that first of all
the hadith of al-AcrabI which al-Tufi has mentioned is
not a weak one but a strong one being reported by
al-Bukhari and Muslim - which is the highest category of
the divisions of Hadith. Secondly, if the objective of
the beneficial use of reason is to confirm the attainment
of maslahah, then maslahah in this issue is found in the
■ ■ ■ JL
emancipation of a slave due to the fact that a member of
society is granted his liberty whose skills and knowledge
in the building of a better Ummah will be of great
benefit to the entire community. Whereas the remedy of
fasting the two consecutive months remains as a
terrifying agent for an individual person only. Even if
such an effect is attained after fasting the two months,
still the maslahah seems immaterial here due to the fact
that an affluent person who performs sexual relations out
of no fear in Ramadan may not be able to fast the two
consecutive months to expiate for his sin since he has
1 ~ ___ _
See Ibn Badran al-Dimashqi, Nuzhat al-khatir al-°atir, vol. 1, p.
417, as quoted from Sharh Mukhtasar al-rawdah
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not been able to be patient in one month only. But in the
emancipation of a slave, a trace of fear will be found in
his heart for by liberating a slave for each day he




MODERN STUDIES AND DEFINITIONS ON THE CONCEPT OF
MASLAHAH
• •
In modern times the concept of maslahah has
undergone still further formulations. With the great
social changes affecting all departments of life
utilitarian philosophies became popular. The movement of
modernism in Islam searched in Islamic tradition for a
principle that would help them grapple with the changing
conditions. They found in maslahah such a concept.
Naturally therefore more attention has been given to the
study of this concept in modern times than ever before.
In 1857 the cAhd al-Aman, a document of reforms in
Tunisian law, was issued. This document later became the
fundamental legal instrument in the 1860 constitution -
"the first constitution to be issued in any Muslim
country in modern times.1 In its preamble, maslahah was
referred to as the principle of interpretation of law:
"God has given justice as a guarantee of the
preservation of order in this world, and has
given the revelation of law in accordance with
human interests (masalih).2
The document then expounded the following three
principles as the components of the concept of maslahah:
1 Albert Hourani, Arabic thought in the liberal age, 1798-1939,
[London: Oxford, 1962], p. 65
2 See Muhammad Bayram, Safwat al-ictibar, vol. 2. p. 11, vide
Hourani, op. cit., p. 64
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liberty, security and equality.3
In 1867 Khayr al-Din Pashah, in his Aqwam
al-masalik, reaffirmed that the principle of maslahah
must be the supreme guide of the government.4 He found
this principle extremely significant as it could be used
to justify a change of institutions in the interest of
the public as well as to condemn a change when it opposed
public interest.5
In 1899, in his speech of the reforms in the court
systems in Egypt and the Sudan, Muhammad cAbduh also
stressed the use of maslahah as a guiding principle in
law making.6 J. Schacht has argued that the principle of
maslahah, according to cAbduh, was preferable to the
literal application of Islamic law.7
It is to be noted that Khayr al-Din and Muhammad
cAbduh both refered to maslahah as a principle of
interpretation of law - and as such a principle of
change, dynamism and adaptability.
The same theme, in varying versions, has been
3
Muhammad Bayram, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 11
4 Ibid., p. 92
6 Ibid., p. 93
6 Mufti Muhammad cAbduh, Taqrir Mufti al-diyar al-Misriyyah fi islah
al-mahakim al-sharciyyah, [Al-manar] vol. 2 {1899}, p. 761
7 See Schacht, Muhammad cAbduh, in The Shorter Encyclopaedia of
Islam, [Leiden: Brill, 1961], p. 406
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repeated by a large number of modern Muslim scholars of
Islamic law. Among them the following are notable
illusrations: Rashid Rida, Subhi Mahmasani, cAbd
• ' • • • '
al-Razzaq al-Sanhuri, Macruf al-Dawalibi, Mustafa
al-Shalabi, cAbd al-Wahhab Khallaf, Muhammad al-Khidr and
Mustafa Zayd.8
In 1906, al-Manar journal of Islamic knowledge
published Najm al-Din al-Tufi's treatise on maslahah.
However, the application of the radical views of al-Tufi
raised a strong reaction among the conservative group of
scholars in Egypt. Only to illustrate this opposition, we
quote Zahid al-Kawthari's criticism of al-Tufi as
follows:
"One of their spurious methods in attempting to
change the sharc in accordance with their desires
is to state that 'the basic principle of
legislation in such matters as relating to
transactions among men is the principle of
maslahah; if the text opposes this maslahah, then
the text should be abandoned, and maslahah should
g
The following works by the authors enumerated below stress the
dynamism of maslahah as a principle of interpretation of islamic law^
Rashid Rida, Yusr al-Islam, [Cairo: Nahdah, 1956], pp. 72 - 75; Subhi
Mahmasani, Falsafat al-tashric fi al-Islam, transl. by F. J. Ziyadah
[Leiden: Brill, 1961], {Arabic Ed. Bayrut, 1952}, pp. 130 - 133,
205f; cAbd al-Razzaq al-Sanhuri, Wujub tangih al-qanun al-madani
al-Misri, in "Majallat al-qanun wa al-iqtisad", vol. 6 [196] 3 - 144
{vide Kerr, op. cit.}; Macruf Dawalibi, Al-madkhal ila —ilm usul
al-fiqh [Bayrut: Dar al-cilm li al-malayin, 1965] pp. 442 - 450; Mus¬
tafa al-Shalabi, Taclil al-ahkam, —ard wa tahlil li tarigat al-taclil
wa tatawwuratiha fI cusur al-ijtihad wa al-taqlid, [Cairo: al-Azhar,
1949], pp. 278 - 384; cAbd al-Wahhab Khallaf, Masadir al-tashric
al-Islami fi ra la nass fTh, [Cairo: Dar al-kutub al-cArabi, 1955],
pp. 70 - 122; Mustafa Zayd, Al-maslahah fi al-tashric al-Islami wa
Najm al-Din al-TufI, [Cairo: Dar al-fikr al-cArabi, 1954]; Muhammad
al-Khidr, Usui al-fiqh, {Cairo: Mustafa Muhammad, 1933}
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be followed'. What an evil to utter such
statements, and to make it a basis for the
construction of a new sharc? This is nothing but
an attempt to violate divine law (al-sharc
al-Ilahl) in order to permit in the name of
maslahah what the sharc has forbidden. Ask this
libertine (al-fajir) what is this maslahah on
which you want to construct your law?... The
first person to open this gate of evil... was
Najm al-Dln al-Tufi al-Hanbali... No Muslim has
ever uttered such a statement... This is a naked
heresy. Whoever listens to such talk, he partakes
of nothing of knowledge or religion".9
Al-Kawthari did not deny the fact that the sharc
took into consideration the interests and good of the
people, but he insisted on that what is good and what is
bad can only be known through revelation. Maslahah as an
independent principle for the interpretation of law has,
therefore, no validity whatsoever.
Al-Kawthari1s criticism of maslahah is typical of
the traditional view of the concept. To him maslahah is
arbitrary and merely personal. Infact, this fear of
arbitrariness concerning the reasoning on the basis of
regard for human interests, and hence considered to be
the violation of Divine law is a familiar feature in the
history of the Islamic legal theory. Maslahah and
similar legal principles which were employed in favour of
the adaptability of Islamic law, were opposed on the same
grounds.
9 -T —
Zahid al-Kawthari, Maqalat ai-Kawthari, [Posthumous Publication in
1372 A.H] as quoted by Mustafa Zayd, op. cit., pp. 164-66
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Recent studies on maslahah can be generally divided
into two groups. First, there are studies dealing with
al-maslahah al-mursalah and istislah and, second, those
dealing with maslahah as such. The focus in the first
group of studies is not on maslahah proper but on
al-maslahah al-mursalah, yet it is significant to note
that for them istislah is in no way different from
al-maslahah al-mursalah.
Ignaz Goldziher compared istislah with istihsan
saying that the latter is a Hanafi principle according to
which a decision reached by analogy can be dismissed when
the legislator finds that this decision opposes a certain
matter which he believes is beneficial. That is to say
that istihsan revoves the rigidity of law depending upon
the discretion of an individual jurist. Istislah, on the
other hand, depends on a rather objective method; it
removes the rigidity of law in consideration of general
human "interests" (masalih) which are sufficiently
defined. He also suggets that istislah partially
resembles the Roman legal principle of utilitum publicum
as well as Rabbinic law".10
10
I. Goldziher, Das prinzip des istishab in der Muhammedanischen
gesetzwissenschaft, Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde des
Morqenlandes, vol. 1 [1887], pp. 128 - 236; vide summary in French by
G. H. Bousquet, in Arabica, VII [1960], pp. 12 - 15. The points of
resemblance with Roman and Rabbinic law are not elaborated but most
probably Goldziher refers to certain areas of flexibility in contrast
to the strict application of law
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N. P. Aghnides and G. H. Bousquet also refer to
istislah in the same sense. Aghnides defines it as a
principle that consists in recommending a thing because
it serves a useful purpose, although there is no express
evidence in the revealed sources to support such
action.11 Bousquet's definition is as follows:
"Istislah consists of discarding by exceptional
disposition the rules deduced by qiyas in cases
where the application of general rules would lead
to illogical, unjust and undesirable resulsts".12
Joseph Schacht's treatment of maslahah is not much
different from that of the above writers. He described
istislah as a special form of analogy, or rather a type
of istihsan used by early Malik! scholars and which later
came to be called istislah.13 Schacht re-emphasises that
istislah is identical with the Roman legal principles of
utilitum publicum which characterises jus honorarium.14
R. Paret also finds istislah to be connected with
istihsan, but the former is more limited and definite as
it replaces a general principle such as "finding good",
11
N. P. Aghnides, Mohammedan Theories of Finance, [London: Longman,
1916], p. 102
1^ G.H.Bousquet, Precis ds DroitMusulman, [Alger: Maison du Livre,
1947], p. 37
12 J. Schacht, The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence, [Oxford:
Clarendon, 1959], p. Ill
14 J. Schacht, "Classicisme, traditionalisme, et ankylose dans la loi
religieuse de 1' Islam"in Classicisme et declin culturel dan
1'histoire de 1'Islam, [ed] Brunschvig et als, [Paris: 1957], p. 158
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by a rather specific principle, such as "according to the
demand of human welfare (maslahah)". Maslahah thus is
the material principle underlying istislah which is a
method of reasoning. In actual details where Paret traces
the history of istislah, he specifically refers to
al-maslahah al-mursalah, rather than maslahah as such.
This is why he finds nothing of much importance after
al-Ghazall had theorized about istislah. His references
to usul are confined to the discussions of al-maslahah
al-mursalah.15
Analysing the treatment of maslahah by modern Muslim
scholars such as Muhammad cAbduh and others, A. HouranI• *
criticised their use of maslahah in a utilitarian sense.
He argued that such an interpretation of maslahah was not
justified; "for the traditional thought, maslahah had
been a subordinate principle, a guide in the process of
reasoning by analogy rather than a substitute for it". 16
Von Grunebaum, in his study of the concept of reason
in Muslim ethics, concluded that istislah (public
interest) is unmistakably one point at which human
"reason" is permitted to impinge on traditional or
systematic considerations that would normally be viewed
15 Rudi Paret, 1stihsan and Istislah, in Shorter Encyclopaedia of
Islam, p. 185
Albert HouranI, op. cit., p. 234
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as the determining factors of sharc development.17
Although all of the above opinions agree in
regarding maslahah as a principle that removes rigidity
and that suggests adaptability to changes based on human
needs, yet according to the same writers, its function is
restricted to exceptional cases or to the use of a
special form of analogy. The reason for such a limited
view of maslahah in these studies is that they have
studied only al-maslahah al-mursalah to the exclusion of
other aspects of maslahah.
There are, however, a few studies which evince an
integral approach to the problem of maslahah as such.
Among such studies, the following four are relevant to
our point. G. F. HouranI has examined maslahah as an
ethical concept. M. H. Kerr and Muhammad Sacid Ramadan
al-Buti have analyzed it in particular reference to legal
theory. E. Tyan has studied it as a principle of
methodology.
Tyan describes maslahah as "general interest",
"social utility" and "good", and has defined istislah as
"to recognize a rule as useful".18 He distinguishes two
conceptions of istislah. In the original conception of
17
G. E. Von Grunebaum, Concept and Function of Reason in Islamic
Ethics, Oriens, vol. 15, [1962], p. 15
1 ft° E. Tyan, Methodoloqie et Sources du Droit en Islam, "Studia
Islamica", vol. 10, [1959], p. 97
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istislah, the interests (masalih) were divided into three
categories according to its recognition by the law, the
last category being al-masalih al-mursalah. The directing
principles in this kind of research consisted essentially
in considering the elements of social utility (maslahah)
and of suitability (munasabah). The speculation according
to this conception of istislah remains within the limits
of law.
The other conception of istislah is more
extensive.19 According to this conception of istislah it
can be employed not only in relation to matters which are
not regulated by the precise texts of law, but also in
those matters which have been subjected to such
regulations, so that it be legitimate to make it prevail
over precise rules or over conflicting or contradicting
regulations, provided that, in the final analysis, they
(the rules derived from this method of reasoning) remain
in conformity with the objections of law, i.e they accord
with the above-mentioned five major interests viz.
religion, physical integrity, descendance, patrimony and
mental faculty.20
Tyan, thus, concluded that istislah is a method of
interpreting the already existing rules by disengaging
19
E. Tyan, op. cit., vol. 10, p. 97
20 Ibid.
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the spirits of these rules from the letter; exceptions
and extensions are reached which command practial utility
and correspond to the fundamental goals of the law.21
G. F. Hourani has studied maslahah as an ethical
concept in medieval Islam, but his study bears
significant connection with the present conception of
maslahah.22 He observes that there were two theories of
value in medieval Islam: one, that of objectivism, i.e
that the value has real existence; the second theory of
value was that of theistic subjectivism, that the values
are determined by the will of God. The theory of
objectivism was expounded by Muctazilah; the idea of
rational good was called by them hasan or maslahah. The
theory of theistic subjectivism was maintained by the
Ashcaris. The position of these two theories manifested
itself in the field of fiqh also. Jurists in the early
period used certain methods which did not correspond with
"theistic subjectivism". Principles such as istihsan and
istislah tended rather towards "objectivism". The
ethical basis of these principles, however, remained
unarticulated. The Muctazill theory of rational good
[that there is an objective good including a real public
interest (maslahah) and a real justice (cadl), and that
21
See E. Tyan, op. cit., p. 98
9 9 — -r
See G. F. Hourani, "Two Theories of Value in Medieval Islam",
Muslim World, vol. L, [1960], pp. 269-278
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they could be recognized by human reason] could have
provided a basis to support the above principles. But the
theory of objectivism was superseded by theistic
subjectivism. Why? Hourani suggests that, apart from
religious and political factors that prevented
objectivism from being adopted by the lawyers, the
Muctazili theory of objectivism had its own deficiencies.
First it could not show how moral judgment operates.
Second, it could not fill up the theoretical gap between
means (moral and legal acts) and the end (the eternal
happiness, which is the happiness in the world and
hereafter for Muslims).
On the other hand, the theory of theistic
subjectivism corresponded with ShaficI and Zahiri views
on legal reasoning, which opposed the use of ra'y and any
judgment independent of the revelation. Shaficis denied
the objetive value of idle fancy, zann and hawa.
Theologically also the theory of objectivism appeared to
curtail the omnipotence and omniscience of God, which the
theory of theistic subjectivism promoted.
Hourani's study of maslahah, choronologically, is
confined to the early period of Islamic tradition.
Because of this limitation he could not take into
consideration the development in the treatment of
maglahah by later usuliyyln such as al-Shatibi. In fact,
Hourani's criticism of objectivism is mainly ethical. The
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three deficiencies that he ascribed to maslahah as an
objective value are not found in al-Shatibi's conception
of maslahah as a legal value. Muhammad Sacid Ramadan
al-Buti presented his doctoral dissertation, Dawabit
al-maslahah f1 al-Sharicah al-Islamiyyah at al-Azhar
University in 1965. In his introduction to the published
edition of this dissertation al-Buti explains that the
critics of Islam have adopted a new measure to destroy
it. They are urging the Muslims to open the gate of
ijtihad, and in order to accomplish this end they refer
to the concept of maslahah as the fundamental principle
of Sharicah. He is, however, convinced that real motive
behind this proposal for ijtihad is the destruction of
Islam. He admits that the gate of ijtihad has never been
closed and that the Lawgiver has given full consideration
to the principle of maslahah, but this principle has
always been restricted with a number of qualifications.23
After a detailed analysis of the etymology and concept of
maslahah, he deduces the qualifications which the
traditional jurists had suggested in the application of
this principle. He also compares this concept with the
concept of "utility" and "pleasure" in the philosophies
of Stuart Mill and J. Bentham. He concludes that maslahah
in its unqualified sense is identical with the above
23
M. S. R. al-Buti, Dawabit al-maslahah fT al-Sharicah
al-Islamiyyah, [Dimashq: Umawiyyah, 1966/67], pp. 12 - 14
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concepts which he considers as purely hedonistic. The
qualified concept of maslahah, however,
contradistinguishes itself from utility and pleasure as
it takes into consideration the following three
characteristcs. First, it is not limited in this world
only but equally includes the hereafter. Second, the
Islamic value of good is not material. Third, the
consideration of religion dominates other
considerations.24 He has thus concluded that if these and
other qualifications are disregarded and the term
maslahah alone is held up as a light post and a
criterion, then an ijtihad such as that will descend upon
Muslims from all sides. [To prove such terrifying results
after opening the gate of ijtihad it suffices to observe
the evil that brings the laws of Sharlcah out of the
fortress of texts into the open, exposed to desires and
arbitrary opinions that deceive (us) behind the name of
maslahah and manfacah.25
If al-Buti's expositions of maslahah and its
qualifications are accepted, maslahah, as a matter of
fact, becomes superfluous as a legal concept. The
consideration of maslahah by the Sharic (Lawgiver), then
only means that maslahah is what the Sharic commands.
24 Al-Butl, op. cit., pp. 23 - 60
25 Ibid., p. 414
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In other words, maslahah has no objective value.
This is the logical conclusion from al-Butl's view of
Islamic law according to which he rejects a distinction
between this world and the hereafter. He does not
separate mucamalat (transactions) from cibadat (acts of
worship) but rather considers the former part of the
latter. He does not distinguish between huquq Allah and
ftuquq al-cibad. In fact, his conception of Islamic law is
that of tacabbud (mere obedience). On all these points he
is in disagreement even with the jurists who employ the
concept of maslahah in reference to human needs. His
disagreement becomes particularly evident if his
conclusions are compared with al-Shatibi's conception of
maslahah.
■ ■
Al-Buti has frequently referred to al-Shatibi in his
dissertation, but these references are selective and
often out of the context. Al-Buti's study fails to bring
out the real significance of the concept of maslahah
mainly because he has not given full consideration to the
proponents of this concept such as al-Shatibi.
The same deficiency is found in M. Kerr's study of
maslahah, which also offers a detailed analysis of the
concept. Examining Rashid Rida's legal doctrines, Kerr
observed that the logical conclusion of Rida's arguments
for the use of maslahah would be that it is something
equal to natural law and that istislah does not depend on
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texts and qiyas. Such conclusions, however, are not
spelled out by Rida himself.26 Why? According to Kerr,
the failure to spell out the full implications of the
argument has to do with theological nature of Islamic law
which influences even maslahah, theoretically the most
liberal principle of legal interpretation in Islamic
jurisprudence. The theological foundations of Islamic law
insist on minimizing the part of human reason in the
formulation of law.27
Before he goes into a detailed analysis of the
concept of maslahah in traditional jurisprudence, Kerr
clarifies two general aspects of Islamic law which, in
turn, affect the function of maslahah. Firstly, Islamic
law has its basis in revelation and thus is an expression
of the will of God. Kerr refers to the theological
differences between Ashcaris and Muctazilahs about the
will of God. In contrast to the Muctazilah, Ashcarl
denied freedom in man's acts. Consequently, the
intellectual spirit and method of Islamic jurisprudence
"could not entirely escape the influence of the law's
theological underpinnings, which proclaimed that reason is
essentially irrelevant to the substance, determination
26
See M. Kerr, "Rashid Rida and legal reform", Muslim World, [1960],
p. 108
27 M. Kerr, Islamic Reform, p. 56
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and obligatory character of moral principles".28
The second aspect that affected maslahah was the
emphasis on qiyas. According to Kerr, the method of qiyas
itself is a means of protecting the authority of
revelation.29 In fact, the term cillah in jurisprudence is
not applied in usual sense of cause and effect. cIllah
is not a value judgment, but only the attribute or the
characteristic of the matter under consideration that
gives rise to the judgment.30 Further, the limitations of
the means to identify cillah are also confined to the use
of indication within the text. Munasabah (suitability) is
the only means that goes beyond the indications of the
texts. Kerr finds even munasabah to be a conservative,
circumscribed and timid acknowledgement of the place of
social utility (maslahah) in God's commands. In fact, he
concludes in the final analysis that wunasabah is
subordinate to the indications of the text.31
Kerr thus treats maslahah as one of the aspects of
munasabah. He also divided maslahah on the basis of the
conformity to the sources, and thus it is only
al-maslahah al-mursalah which really needs to be
discussed. According to him al-maslahah al-mursalah is a
2 8
Kerr, op. cit., p. 60
29 Ibid., p. 77
30 Ibid., p. 67
31 Ibid., p. 73
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form of qiyas, because whereas qiyas looks for the
cillah, al-maslahah al-mursalah seeks hikmah, a more
general cillah. Kerr concludes that because it is not
based on a specific cillah, istislah has been a
subsidiary and occasional technique of disputed
validity.32
In the-final analysis Kerr comes to equate maslahah with
al-maslahah al-mursalah. He says
"The maslahah is therefore a more specific term
for hikmah and since it is known in each case not
by direct indication in the textual source but by
the jurist's own judgment, it is a maslahah
mursalah.33
Kerr also confines maslahah to its correspondence
with the textual sources. It is noteworthy that Kerr, in
his discussion, refers to such jurists as al-Ghazall and
al-Qurafl who viewed maslahah in the above terms. He also
discusses the views of Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Qayyim whom
he chose as opponents of the validity of maslahah as a
principle of legal interpretation. But these jurists,
too, regarded maslahah as subordinate to textual sources
and qiyas. The consideration of maslahah according to
them, would prevail over the text and qiyas only when the
latter are harmful to obey.
32
See Kerr, op. cit., p. 76
33 Ibid., p. 81
233
Kerr has not taken into account jurists such as
al-Shatibi, who favour maslahah as an independent legal
principle. The significance of studying al-Shatibi's
views is evident from Tyan's analysis of istislah which
gives a more integral picture of maslahah.
The absence of al-Shatibi from Kerr's analysis of
maslahah is regretable. According to Kerr, Rashid Rida,
whose view led Kerr to study the concept of maslahah in
detail, characterises al-Shatibi "as exceptionally
outspoken in his defence of istislah.34
It comes a further surprise that al-Shatibi was not
only disregarded but also suffered a sort of indifference
when Kerr, probably following Paret,35 confused him with
Abu al-Qasim al-Shatibi.36
To sum up, the present studies on maslahah generally
present an unbalanced analysis of this concept. They have
failed to see the real significance of this principle as
3^
See Kerr, op. cit., p. 107
35 R. Paret, op. cit., mentions 1194 as the year of al-Shatibi's [d.
1390] death, which is in fact the year in which Abu al-Qasim Muhammad
b. Firah al-Shatibi died. See Brockelmann G.A.L [Brill, 1943], p.
520, and F. Knenkow, "Shafibi", in E.I.I, vol. IV, pp. 337 - 338.
Unfortunately, the same error is repeated in the heavily edited and
revised version of Paret' s article in the Urdu Encyclopaedia of
Islam. Urdu dairah macarif Islamiyyah [Lahore: Danishgah Punjab],
vol. II, [pp. 586 - 591], p. 589
36 See Kerr, op. cit., p. 194, referring to Riga's mention of
al-Shatibi rightly quotes his year of death, but in his index on p.
247 identifies him as Abu al-Qasim b. Firah al-Shatibi
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it was conceived and employed by those jurists who viewed
it as an independent principle, but not to the extent to
which al-Tufi has gone making it override all the
evidences of the Sharlcah. The independence of the
concept of maslahah depends on the absence of the
validity of the textual evidence, as is the case with the
theory of al-masalih al-mursalah due to the fact that
this theory is part and parcel of the concept of
maglahah. Hence, in Islamic law it would seem more
appropriate that there should be no consideration of
maslahah or application of the theory of al-masalih
al-mursalah with the presence of textual evidence either
from the Qur'an and Sunnah or from ijmac.
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Chapter 8
THE DIFE_RENCE BETWEEN THE THEORY OF
AL-MASALIH AL-MURSALAH AND THE
THEORIES OF PUBLIC INTEREST
Here it should be pointed out that there is a great
diference between the nature of the theory of al-masalih
al-mursalah in Islamic law and the theories of "public
interest" as propounded by the Western writers. In
Islamic law "public interest" is determined by the
highest degree in seeking the pleasures of God through
fulfilling His commandments and performing virtuous
deeds. Any action which meets the approval and
satisfaction of the will of God, or any rule or judgment
that is just and unbiased which could be applied or
executed to all people without any reservations could be
named as public interest in Islamic law. In Islam the
sublime good lies with God and not with human beings and
so is the case with the specification of evil. For
instance, if the majority of people, or all the people,
are in favour of wine and demand a policy or rule be
enacted for its manufacture so that money could be
obtained to meet the running costs of health and social
services. This is not considered as a public interest in
Islamic law simply because it is opposed to the
commandment of God and thus against His will and
pleasure.
Whereas the nature of "public interest" as viewed by
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the Western writers refers to or stands for a body of
substantive truths or principles. These truths or
principles are not formal tests that any public policy
must meet; however general they may be and however much
skill may be required to apply them in particular cases,
they provide substantive guidance to the proper content
of public policy. They are akin to what some philosophers
now call "rules" as opposed to "principles". The problem
of determining what is in the public interest is first
and foremost a problem of attaining knowledge of this
body of supreme truth. One who does not have such
knowledge could only stumble onto the right policy as a
blind man might stumble onto the right road at a
junction.1 Plato asserts:
"...the Sun not only makes the things we see
visible, but also brings them into existence and
gives them growth and nourishment; ... so with
the objects of knowledge; these derive from the
Good not only their power of being known, but
their very being and reality...".
Plato's position minimizes the "contextual"
dimension of the descriptive meaning of "public
1
Plato, Memo 97; Republic, 506, translated by Francis M. Cornford
[London: Oxford University Press, 1941]
2 Plato, Republic, 508, p. 220
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interest". 3. The justifiability of a particular public
policy turns not upon the relationship between that
policy and features peculiar to the problem or
circumstances to which or in which the policy is to be
applied. It turns upon its relationship to a truth or a
body of truths which exists and has been discovered
antecedent to the emergence of the problem,
circumstances, or policy. It is the time that a statesman
has been trained to know this timeless "Good" which
equips him to decide questions of common concern. This
view raises questions about the relationship between the
particular policy enacted now, which is held to be in the
public interest, and the timeless truth or truths which
the philosopher-king must know. Whether we ever speak of
the public interest in the sense of a body of substantive
truths such as those Plato denominates the Good, we do
say, in these circumstances, is a justifiable or
commendable public policy - because of its relationship
to the Good or for some other reason. A theory of "public
interest" that is to account for the manner in which the
concept functions must be able to account for the manner
3
If the metaphysical and epistemological substructure of Plato's
theory is set aside, it becomes clear that many theories of "public
interest" in the West are closely akin to Plato's. Whenever it is
argued that "public interest" stands for a body of substantive truths
or proposition about public policy, the theory can be likened,
however enormous the other differences may be, to Plato's theory. For
this reason, conclusions reached about by Plato will prove to be
applicable to a large number of theories as well
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in which we justify this policy, not a set of highly
abstract metaphysical or moral truths.4
Plato's conclusion is that "public interest" and
"common good" are concepts which would be appropriately
employed only by philosopher-kings in discussion with
other philosopher-kings. If it is true that "public
interest" functions to commend and justify public policy,
and if only the philosopher-kings are capable of fully
understanding the justifications and commendations, it
follows that there would be no occasion to use the
concepts outside of the circle of philosopher-kings.
Benn and Peters argue that "public interest" is not
a substantive concept at all, not a goal of public
policy, but simply a procedural principle or requirement
which is one of a number of conditions that a justifiable
public policy must satisfy. In their words: "... the
prescription "seek the common good" is not of the same
type as "maintain full employment". Whereas the latter is
a counsel of substance, the former is one of procedure.
We may have different ideas about the way to maintain
employment, but we are clear what the world would be like
with it or without it. "Seek the common good" is
different, not because it is vague or more general, but
because it does not describe a determinate goal at all.
4 Richard E. Flathman, The Public Interest, p. 54
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It is an instruction to approach policy-making in a
certain spirit, not to adopt a determinate policy. To say
that the state should seek it is to say only that
political decisions should attend to the interests of its
members in a spirit of impartiality".5
Bertrand de Jouvenel argues that the descriptive
meaning of "common good" consists in what he calls
"social tie".6 If this is justified, any conflict between
freedom or justice and the "social tie" must be decided
in favour of the latter - or else we must alter the
commendatory force of "common good". Jouvenel defines the
"social tie" broadly enough to win wide agreement about
its importance. However important it may be, it does
violence to the highly pluralistic value system of
Western societies to suggest that service of the "social
tie" will always take precedence. Determination of the
descriptive meaning of "public interest" will involve
examination of substantive considerations of a highly
general sort - norms, values, precepts - but its nature
and meaning cannot be equated with a single norm, value
or precept.
These conclusions lead to the theory of "public
5
S.I. Benn and Richard Peters, Social Principles and the Democratic
State, p. 273
6 B. de Jouvenel, Sovereignty, chap. 7 [Chicago, University of
Chicago Press, 1957]
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interest" argued by Peter Drucker. Drucker suggests that
"public interest" is purely "an organizing concept", a
concept that provides a framework within which
substantive values and procedural norms are related to
one another and to the contextual considerations peculiar
to specific policy decisions.7 Once again, this view has
much to recommend it. "Public interest" does not supply
the values, formal principles, and contextual facts
relevant to determining its descriptive meaning in
particular cases; it provides a heading or category under
which values, etc., can be brought together and
evaluated. To this extent it is enlightening to think of
"public interest" as an organizing concept.
Julius Cohen suggests that "public interest" is ...
used in a dual sense; first in a logical sense - i.e., to
explicate the meaning of the established basic values of
the community. Thus it would be in the public interest to
pursue a certain goal because it would be consistent with
the meaning of a basic community value. Second, it is
used in an instrumental sense - i.e., that a policy would
be in the public interest if its consequences would
implement one or more of the established basic values of
7 Drucler1 s view is reported in Wayne Leys and C. M. Perry,
Philosophy and the Public Interest, [committee to Advance Original
Work in Philosophy, Chicago, 1959] p. 31
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the community.8
Cohen recognizes that the general norms and
standards are necessary to determine the descriptive
meaning of "public interest"; he also asserts that we
look to "community values" to find those norms and
standards - as opposed, perhaps, to the laws of nature,
the products of an autonomous reason, or the patterns of
history.
Whereas David Truman equates "public interest" with
social unanimity , and, finding no issue on which the
latter prevails, dismisses "public interest" as a mere
"datum" of politics.9
8.1 THE BASIS OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE THEORY OF
AL-MASALIH AL-MURSALAH AND THE THEORIES OF PUBLIC
INTEREST
It could be easly found that the nature of the
theories of "public interest" in the western framework of
thinking differs immensely vis-a-vis the nature of the
theory of "al-masalih al-mursalah" in Islamic law. While
the basis of "public interest" in the western theories is
the "givens of community values" or "the social ties",
the basis of the theory of al-masalih al-mursalah is the
o
J. Cohen, A Lawman's view of the Public Interest, in Carl
Friedrich, editor, The Public Interest, [Nomos V] New York, Atherton
Press, 1962, pp. 155-6
Q
D. Truman, The Government Process, [New York: Alfred A. knopf,
Inc., 1951], pp. 50 - 51, 358 - 9
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"intentions of the Lawgiver" in preserving the five
fundamentals of human existence viz. religion, life,
reason (mind), offspring and material wealth. The
meaning of "public interest" in Islam is therefore quite
different from the meaning of the same terminology in the
West. To judge a case or to legislate a rule in Islam
requires a full knowledge of "Divine Guidance" simply
because God (the Lawgiver) alone deserves the right to
command:
"...the command rests with none but God; He
declares the truth, and He is the best of
judges".10
It follows therefore, that no rule or judgment in
Islamic law in favour of "public interest" could be
legislated without the spirit and appreciation of the
divine revelation due to the fact that the real truth of
everything rests with God alone and so is the case with
the real benefits.
It should be born in the mind that there are various
frameworks within which interpreters and propounders are
working. Some of these frameworks take this cosmos as the
only source of their knowledge while the others take the
inside as well as the outside of this universe as the
sources of knowledge. As far as a mujtahid in Islamic law
is concerned, he bases his interpretation within the
10
Qur'an, 6 : 57
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Islamic framework which obtains its knowledge from the
inside of this universe through observation and reasoning
as well as from outside this universe by means of divine
revelation. Thus it is a grave mistake to venture to
refute a rule or a judgment in Islamc law without the
light and knowledge of the divine guidance and basing the
argument within the Western framework which obtains its
knowledge from within this universe only. The case is
also true with benefits. In Islam benefits are two fold:
(i) worldly and (ii) hereafter. Those who condemn and
accuse Islamic law of rigidity, uncouthness and cruelty
are viewing the issue within the Western framework which
considers worldly benefits only and ignores and rules out
the hereafter all together. As we have seen in our short
survey of the Western theories of "public interest" that
their basis is either "community values" or "social ties"
only which have nothing to do with divine guidance or
revelation.
It goes without saying that the theory of al-masalih
al-mursalah in Islamic law is not a theory in the western
sense of the word like the theories of "public interest",
due to the fact that there are no theories in Islam which
develop into laws or principles as is the case with the
Western theories. Theories in Islam are simply
expositions of interpreters elucidating their findings
and expressing their opinions. What all the theory of
al-masalih al-mursalah is about is to illustrate the
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attitude of a mujtahid in the attestation of the divine
wisdom in the judgment of cases and in the process of




As a problem of legal theory the question of
adaptability to social change has been a controversial
one in the history of usul al-fiqh. The qadis in the
early courts of law, particularly in the Umayyad period,
relied mostly on £a'y (consideration of opinion). The use
of ra'y generally amounted to a general consideration of
human needs. Ra'y was, thus a method that kept the then
institution of law adaptable to social change.
There was, however, opposition to ra'y among the
scholars who specialized in hadith and in local practice.
These scholars considered the use of ra'y as an arbitrary
and therefore unreliable method of making decision. The
diversity of laws that resulted from the exercise of ra'y
by the qadis in various cities increased the number of
opponents to the use of ra'y.
The general attitude of the hadith group was to
adhere strictly to the Qur'an and Sunnah (of the Prophet
as well as that of his companions), and thus to reject
any idea of the adaptability of Islamic law. This
attitude was motivated by the religious apprehension of
distortion of Islamic tradition by the use of raVy. It
was, however, impossible to maintain in the face of the
enormous degree of social changes that had taken place in
Islamic society by the end of the eighth century.
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The literal provisions of the Qur'an and Sunnah were
insufficient to accomodate the growing number of social
changes. Even the method of extending these provisions by
accepting the ijmac of the past generation of scholars on
certain matters failed to meet the demand. The need to
accomodate the changes could not be denied, but how to
extend the limited legal provisions to adapt to these
changes?
The method of qiyas developed as an answer to the
need for the adaptability of Islamic law. Even among the
hadith group, a large number of scholars recognized this
need and accepted the validity of the method of qiyas for
this purpose. The religious and theological implications
of the attitude of the hadith group, however, spelled out
the same fear of arbitrariness for the method of qiyas as
it has done for ra'y. Consequently, the Zahirls who still
adhered to the older trend of rejecting anything beyond
the literal provisions, opposed the use of qiyas and
departed from the mainstream of the headlth) group.
Although initially a method of adaptability, yet in
reaction to the Zahiri and similar criticism, qiyas was
soon ushered into the protection of strict formality. It
was sought as a foolproof corrective of the method of
ra'y. To remove the fear of arbitrariness, qiyas was
connected with the "sources" - the Qur'an and hadith. The
appeal of this method was so strong that it overshadowed
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its opposition as well as any other methodological
development in Islamic legal theory.
Nevertheless, the method of ra'y was not completely
swept away by qiyas. Trends similar to the use of ra'y
survived in the form of principles such as istihsan,
istislah, darurah, munasabah etc. Incidentally, rules
derived from these principles constitute the basis of a
considerable part of Islamic law - probably even more
than those based on qiyas.
The qiyas which was the basis of a number of other
methods in extending or adapting legal doctrines to
social changes, was itself hampered by at least two
limitations: One was the attitude of formalism which
required that in order to be conclusive, the analogy must
be derived explicitly from the original sources (Qur'an,
Sunnah or ijmac of the early generations). In other
words, the basis of analogy must be explicitly expressed
as a "cause" or "reason" for the original ruling. This
attitude discouraged the use of implicit cause in the
original ruling as a basis of analogy. Also this attitude
required reference to specific original rulings, rather
than encouraging the search for, and the application of,
general principles or the intent and "spirit" of the law
in original rulings.
The second limitation, which further strengthened
the attitude of formalism, stemmed from the theological
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view of the problem of causality in reference to the
attributes of God. The Ashcarls opposed the idea of there
being any causality behind God's actions and speech.
Thus, since the command of God, being one of His acts,
cannot have any cause or motive, the entire method of
qiyas came to be suspected as wrongly or arbitrarily
seeking to appoint causes for the commands of God.
One of the major consequences of the above
limitations - i.e formalism and denial of causality - was
that the discussion on the problem of social change and
legal theory became essentially a question of inference
from the "sources of law".
To escape this dilemma, the Zahirisrejected qiyas
altogether. The ShaficIs, who did not entirely reject
qiyas, imposed limitations on its application. They
rejected any method of reasoning or any form of qiyas
which was not linked with certain specific rulings in the
Qur'an or Sunnah. Nevertheless, they could not deny the
occurrence of social changes, nor could they refuse to
accept these changes in practice. They had, therefore, to
adopt methods such as istishab (presumption of continuity
of a legal evidence) to justify these changes. Hanafis
and Malikls employed certain methods which did not
strictly adhere to the requirements of the theory of the
sources of law, principally methods of qiyas. Two such
methods are istihsan (to decide in favour of something
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which is considered hasan, good, by the jurist, over
against the conclusion that may have been reached by
qiyas), attributed to the Hanafls, and istislah (to
decide in favour of something because it is considered
maglahah, more beneficial, than any alternative rule
decided on another basis). These methods were not
accepted by all the schools. Yet the concept of istihsan
and istislah have in common the consideration of human
good. Invariably the underlying principle in the
reasoning of these schools was to favour the adaptability
of Islamic law to social changes.
In order to render the concept of maslahah suited to
their legal philosophy, the Shafici jurists imposed upon
this concept the approach of the "source of law". They
divided maslahah into categories according to its basis
in the sources. If maslahah accorded with the sources, it
was not disputable, since it was somehow justifiable as a
method of qiyas, when it was literarily derived from the
sources. The only category which was questionable was
that which was not based on the sources. This category
was called al-maslahah al-mursalah which is the core of
this treatise. Naturally for the Shafici jurists the only
discussion of maslahah that mattered was a discussion of
al-maslahah al-mursalah. This view came to dominate other
schools, and even the Malikls eventually accepted it.
The significant consequence of the above
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categorization of maslahah was that the original idea of
maslahah as a principal independent source came to be
disregarded, and istislah came to be equated with
al-maglahah al-mursalah. This is contrary to the recent
studies related to maslahah as we have seen before.
Eventually, the concept of maslahah with its simple
beginnings unfolded its various aspects as it came into
contact with theology, tasawwuf, logical analysis and,
most significantly, with social and legal changes.
Theological determinism introduced by Ashcari jurists
appears largely in the discussion of taklif (obligation).
To Ashcaris, taklif is created by divine command. The
Muctazilah refuted this sense of theological determinism.
They differentiated between two senses of obligation:
taklif and wujub (obligatoriness); the latter was
rational and ethical, while the former was theological.
In other words, mere command does not oblige man to act;
it only informs him. What obliges man is the knowledge
of good and bad, or of useful and harmful. It might be
concluded that this interpretation should have been
acceptable to the legal concept of obligation. Yet there
were certain complexities. First, if legal obligation is
based on one's knowledge of utility, it may lead to
arbitrariness, and furthermore this criterion in its
absolute sense is not universally applicable. All the
things which are apparently useful also have certain
elements which are harmful either to the person concerned
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or to others. Second, all the rules of Sharicah do not
conform to the rule of utility; there are obvious
hardships and disadvantages in obeying them. Third, to
preserve an order and a system the decision of utility
cannot be left to the individual. Who should then decide?
Still another aspect of the relationship of maslahah
and taklif was brought forth by Sufis. The consideration
of seeking utility and avoiding harm leads one to view
obligation in a formal sense. Whenever there is a choice
between hard and soft, a maslahah oriented person chooses
the latter. Not only that, to avoid harm to himself, he
seeks devices which are legal; and since he is a utility
seeker, he feels satisfied by escaping the full
implications of legal obligation. To Sufis, this
attitude, even in its lawful aspects, was quite opposite
to the meaning of obligation towards God. They opposed
this attitude as huzuz of nafs (lower soul) who is one of
the enemies of the traveller on the path of God.
However, such an interpretation of the application of the
Sharicah can only be regarded as appropriate to committed
Sufis.
Finally, it would seem that the al-Shatibi's
treatment of the concept of maslahah deserves a paramount
status for the modern understanding of maslahah. The
growing needs of the Islamic society today to cope with
the modern advancement of science, technology, economics,
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politics, etc., demand a thorough and comprehensive
examination of the concept in question. Since the whole
development process of society depends mostly on the
principles which give guidance to do constructive and
creative activities in all aspects of life, it is
therefore necessary that these principles should be
determined through a methodology which is competent and
capable of analysing and differentiating between good and
bad, benefit and injury, constructive and destructive,
civilized and uncivilized etc. Al-Shatibi's
comprehension of maslahah as that which concerns the
subsistence of human life, the completion of man's
livelihood, and the acquisition of what is emotional and
intellectual qualities require of him, in an obsolute
sense; is actually "food for thought" for a modern
mujtahid to exercise his independent thinking to discover
such unrestricted interests (masalih mursalah) in order
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